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Where does a decision come from? The answer is simple: it is a brain process. Decisions 
can be very different and occur on all levels of our every-day life: we can make small 
decisions or we can make life-changing decisions; we can be aware of making decisions or 
we can even react on something without having consciously made the decision to do so. 
Usually, we are happy to attribute unconscious decisions, such as finding ourselves opening 
the door of the fridge without having intended to do so, to automatic brain processes. We do 
not do this so easily, however, with conscious decisions, in spite of the fact that conscious 
decisions do not happen “in consciousness” instead of the brain (Lamme, 2006). It is not 
even the brain process that is conscious of itself; but a brain process that somehow creates 
what we perceive as a conscious decision, even though this explanation might not feel 
intuitively satisfying (Dennett, 1991; Prinz, 2003; 2006a). A conscious decision evolves in 
the brain (Libet, Gleason, Wright & Pearl, 1983; Soon, Brass, Heinze & Haynes, 2008) and 
can be evoked by stimulating the brain (Desmurget et al., 2009). One way to look at humans 
(and other primates) is to say that they are decision-making agents, permanently reacting on 
stimulation from the environment or from their own somatic and cognitive systems. Investi-
gating different decision processes along the reaction chain from stimuli to responses is one 
of the most fascinating tasks with which one could possibly be faced. The decision making 
processes introduced in this work varied in terms of the degrees of freedom in different 
“What we commonly call the mind is a set of operations carried out 
by the brain. The actions of the brain underlie not only relatively 
simple motor behaviors such as walking and eating, but all the 
complex cognitive actions that we believe are quintessentially human, 
such as thinking, speaking and creating works of art.” 
(Eric K. Kandel, in Kandel, Schwartz & Jessell, 2000,  
Principles of Neural Science, pp. 5-6) 
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dimensions that the decision makers had when choosing between responses. Nevertheless, 
all decisions were very simple; they required nothing more than a transformation from a 
visual stimulus to a motor response.  
The first project addressed decisions in a rule-determined task context. It was com-
prised of a major functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study and a smaller fMRI 
control study (also see Bode & Haynes, 2009). The second project investigated a necessary 
precondition, namely the discrimination of stimuli under different levels of visibility, in a 
perceptual decision making study (also see Bode, Bogler, Soon & Haynes, under review). 
Three small behavioural experiments were used to optimise stimuli and experimental 
procedures. A major fMRI experiment was conducted as well as an additional fMRI local-
izer experiment, used for further detailed analyses. Finally, the third project compared 
guessing in perceptual decision making with intended free decisions (Bode et al., under 
review). This project was comprised of a small behavioural study and a major fMRI ex-
periment. Despite being interconnected, all three projects make statements on their own 
right and require context-specific interpretations. They will therefore be presented and 
discussed in detail in their separate experimental sections. It is intended that each section is 
highly readable without frequent cross-references to the other sections, which is why each 
of them also contains an individual detailed methods part. Since all fMRI studies used 
similar data acquisition parameters and approaches for data analyses, this necessarily leads 
to some repetition in the description; this, however, hopefully makes each individual section 
more comprehensible. To further increase the readability of each section, less central parts 
of the projects (such as behavioural pre-tests, supplementary analyses and supporting 
results) are reported in individual appendices (A to C). This indeed requires some cross-
referencing but hopefully avoids that the reader is too lost in details. Preceding the experi-
ments, a general introduction will explain the basic framework for the presented work; the 
theoretical context is given in depth in the respective introductions to each experiment. The 
introduction to methods will then give a short overview about fMRI. It strongly focuses on 
multivariate pattern classification, which was used for all experiments presented here. This 
section might interrupt the flow of arguments and could be skipped by the experienced 
reader. Finally, following the experimental sections, a short general discussion of all studies 
is given to integrate all results into a common framework – and hopefully to shed light on 
different mechanisms of decision making, which are used in our daily ventures to find the 




2.1 General introduction 
2.1.1 From stimuli to responses 
 
The present work is dedicated to the question of how reactions to different elements (or 
stimuli) in the environment are prepared and encoded in the brain. Of course, this might be 
the broadest question one could possibly ask and most studies in psychology and neurosci-
ence tackle this issue in some way. The number of meaningful elements that are behaviour-
ally relevant is virtually unlimited. It can be a simple flash of light or a complex social 
interaction, requiring different reactions and involving fundamentally different processes. In 
its simplest form, however, the process can be depicted like this: a stimulus is presented, 
which has to be encoded by the neural system; a decision has to be made defining how to 
react on it and an appropriate (motor) response has to be selected and carried out. One 
example of such a stimulus is a traffic sign, which has a clearly defined meaning such as 
“stop here”. The person being confronted with it has to follow a simple rule by activating 
the corresponding stimulus-response mapping. A more challenging situation arises when the 
same stimulus would lead to a different reaction depending on the context. For example, the 
letter “C” on water taps refers to “cold water” in English speaking countries while in 
France, it stands for “eau chaude” (meaning hot water). The correct response (turning on the 
tap or not) requires the activation of abstract rule knowledge, also referred to as task-sets 
(Sakai, 2008). Hence, it is possible to vary the degrees of freedom in rule determinism to 
investigate response preparation. The first experiment used a task-switching approach (e.g. 
Brass & von Cramon, 2004a; 2004b; Dove et al., 2000) to disentangle the neural representa-
tions of fixed and flexible rules in the human brain. Rule information is one important 
component used by the cognitive control system located in prefrontal and parietal cortex to 
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flexibly guide behaviour (Miller & Cohen, 2001; Quintana & Fuster, 1999; Stoet & Snyder, 
2004). It is an open question, however, which brain regions process rule information during 
different processing stages to the final response. 
This first study left the aspect of real decision processes untouched. Following the in-
structed rule was the only required decision. Before reacting according to a rule, however, 
one has to make sure that the relevant stimulus was perceived correctly. For example, a road 
sign might easily be misinterpreted in a hail storm. The second study addressed this ques-
tion and required perceptual decisions about weakly visible stimuli, using a perceptual 
decision making task (Gold & Shadlen, 2007; Heekeren, Marrett & Ungerleider, 2008; 
Smith & Ratcliff, 2009). Signal detection models of perceptual decision making typically 
assume that the ability to discriminate two stimuli is governed by the overlap of response 
distributions they evoke in the sensory system (Green & Swets, 1966). It has been shown 
that in the sensory system there exist neurons that reliably reflect perceptual choices under 
all visibility conditions (Britten, Newsome, Shadlen, Celebrini & Movshon, 1996). Under 
this model, the trial-to-trial variability in choice under conditions of low visibility is mainly 
due to noise fluctuations in the same sensory system. The alternative, however, is that 
different neural systems are involved in perceptual decision making depending on whether 
people have confidently perceived a stimulus. In line with this, different networks in 
prefrontal and parietal cortex were shown to be differentially activated for highly or poorly 
visible stimuli (Dehaene et al., 1998; Heekeren, Marrett, Bandettini & Ungerleider, 2004) 
and networks can process stimuli differently depending on their visibility (Fang & He, 
2005). Also, the activation and information encoding in specialised sensory areas has been 
shown to be modulated by participants’ successful categorisation performance (Grill-
Spector, Kushnir, Hendler & Malach, 2000; Williams, Dang & Kanwisher, 2007). The 
experimental approach taken in the present work was to search for information encoding 
about the outcome of a perceptual decision process separately under high and low stimulus 
visibility. The dissociation of information about stimuli and choices was considered to be 
conceptually close to choice probabilities used in single-cell studies in monkeys (Britten et 
al., 1996; Gold & Shadlen, 2000; Kim & Shadlen, 1999; Nienborg & Cumming, 2009; 
Purushothaman & Bradley, 2005; Shadlen & Newsome, 2001).    
Finally, decisions can be made even in the absence of superimposed rules or perceived 
stimuli. Everyday life, so it seems, permanently requires such stimulus-independent, free 
decisions. Even though one might never be in a completely stimulus-free environment 
(Thorndike, 1911), voluntary decisions are defined as internally motivated rather than 
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externally triggered. The last study therefore addressed the question of how free decisions 
(Haggard, 2008) compare to guessing in perceptual decision making. These might be 
fundamentally different since voluntary action selection and stimulus-based action selection 
have been shown to involve partially different brain networks (Waszak et al., 2005). On the 
other hand, as will become evident with the second study, perceptual decisions without 
sufficient sensory input (or guessing) might resemble free decisions at least in some impor-
tant aspects, as both are internal decisions. Brain structures in medial prefrontal cortex 
(PFC) and medial parietal cortex have been shown to be involved in processing intentions 
and voluntary action selection (Bode et al., in prep.; Cavanna & Trimble, 2006; Cunnington, 
Windischberger & Moser, 2005; Deiber, Honda, Ibañez, Sadato & Hallett, 1999; Haynes et 
al., 2007; Jenkins, Jahanshahi, Jueptner, Passingham & Brooks, 2000; Lau, Rogers, Hag-
gard & Passingham, 2004a; Soon et al., 2008) and were candidate regions for a common 
internal decision network. The last study varied decisions from determined to fully internal 
and by doing so completed the spectrum from the first study that used a fixed task setup. In 
order to investigate the underlying decision networks, all studies made use of a methodo-
logical approach that made it possible to directly decode the decision outcomes and abstract 
rules from regional cortical activity measured with fMRI (Haynes & Rees, 2006; Norman, 
Polyn, Detre & Haxby, 2006).  
 
2.1.2 Localizing information about rules and decisions 
 
In the present work, fMRI was used for the investigation of the neural basis of decision 
processes. This method is a powerful tool for linking cognitive processes to brain activity at 
a macroscopic level. It has been criticised, however, that neuroimaging does not contribute 
to the development of models in cognitive psychology (Coltheart, 2006). Functional MRI in 
particular was characterised as being better suited to formulating data-driven hypothesis 
rather than unambiguously selecting between them (Logothetis, 2008). Of course, using 
fMRI is not automatically guaranteed to reveal anything substantial; a stronger activation in 
a brain region for one process compared to a second process by no means rules out the 
general involvement of the same region in both processes. One way to escape this dilemma 
is offered by recently developed multivariate pattern classification approaches (for reviews 
see Formisano, De Martino & Valente, 2008; Haynes & Rees, 2006; Mur, Bandettini & 
Kriegeskorte, 2009; Norman et al., 2006). These methods do not look for simple activation 
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differences between experimental conditions within single locations but search for informa-
tion encoding in local spatial activation patterns that could be used to predict abstract 
mental states. This means the content of decisions and the information flow in the brain 
from stimulus processing to response selection become accessible. In the present work, this 
approach was used to reveal information-encoding brain networks, which would have been 
overlooked by conventional analyses. It is believed that the decoding of information can 
indeed be used to test models about the questions outlined above. Demonstrating specific 
information encoding is superior to revealing unspecific activation, which could be simply 
related to the general preparation of mental operations or the support of processes in other 
brain regions. Hence, the conceptual link to the underlying cognitive process becomes 
closer than in classical fMRI studies. Multivariate methods are more sensitive than conven-
tional analyses because they take into account patterns of brain activity at many locations, 
they can use weak (but stable) information and they can directly predict the participants’ 
cognitive states (Haynes & Rees, 2006). To allow for a better understanding of the experi-
ments, the next paragraphs will first give a brief overview about the principles of fMRI and 
data analyses before multivariate pattern classification approaches will be explained in 
greater depth. For more detailed information see e.g. the textbooks of Buxton (2002), 
Jezzard, Matthews & Smith (2003) or the review articles of Heeger and Ress (2002), 





2.2 Introduction to methods 
2.2.1 Basic physical principles of MRI 
 
MRI is a method that noninvasively acquires images of the brain. This is possible because 
atomic nuclei posses an intrinsic angular moment called ‘spin’. In very simplified terms, the 
proton can be thought as a small magnet, precessing like a spinning top about an axis. More 
than 70% of the human brain consists of water; and the H+ protons of water are spin-½ 
nuclei that dominate the signal measured with MRI (Logothetis, 2008). These normally 
random spin directions of protons can be aligned parallel to or anti-parallel to an externally 
applied strong magnetic field in a MRI scanner, denoted B0 (common field strengths used 
for functional imaging in humans are 1.5 to 7 Tesla). The majority of protons will preferen-
tially align more parallel to the B0 field than anti-parallel, because of the lower (and there-
fore preferred) energy state accompanied with parallel alignment, even though the 
difference is very small. Importantly, this results in a net magnetization (described as a 
magnetization vector), which, however, cannot be measured because it is oriented parallel to 
the magnetic field B0. Therefore, a radio frequency pulse (RF pulse) is applied perpendicu-
lar to B0 with the amplitude B1, matching the precession frequency of the protons. The latter 
is given by the Larmor-frequency (w), defined by the magnetic field strength (B0 [T]) and 
the gyromagnetic ratio ( [MHz / T]), which is different for each kind of nucleus:  
w = B0 *  
Due to the protons’ resonance, the RF pulse causes the protons to absorb energy and 
has two important effects: first, it tilts the magnetization vector from the horizontal plane 
(usually described as dimension z) to the transversal plane (xy). Second, it aligns the preces-
sion of the spins, which means that the protons’ rotations are in phase. This transversely 
rotating magnetization vector can then be recorded as a signal by a receiver coil placed 
around the head. The technique makes further use of the fact that after switching off the RF 
pulse, the transverse magnetization decays quickly, a process described as relaxation. The 
dipoles start to align with the magnetic field B0 again and release their energy to the lattice. 
This process is called longitudinal relaxation or spin-lattice relaxation. It is described by the 
time-constant T1 (the time it takes for 63% recovery of magnetization along the z-axis). The 
time-constant T2 describes the time it takes for 37% of the transversal magnetization (xy-
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plane) to decay, which is called spin-spin relaxation. The T2 relaxation occurs because spins 
start precessing out of phase again, due to random, fluctuating fields caused by other spins 
in the surround. A faster transversal relaxation as predicted by T2, however, can be observed 
because of the additional effects of constant, static field inhomogeneities, described by the 
time-constant T2*. In order to acquire images, MRI makes use of these relaxation processes, 
which are differentially fast depending on the tissue. Different tissues therefore are visible 
as different contrasts in the images.  
In order to acquire an image of the whole brain (also referred to as volume or scan), 
signals from each position in the brain (cuboid voxels) have to be received; the size of each 
voxel can vary between studies depending on research interests and technical requirements. 
Several steps are necessary for the spatial reconstruction of the signal. First, a field gradient 
is applied to B0 (axial z-axis: inferior to superior), which makes it possible to excite only a 
small slice of tissue with a RF pulse of a given frequency and therefore to select the slice 
position. The decoding of the y-position is achieved by another short gradient applied along 
the coronal y-axis (anterior to posterior). When switched off, the positions along the y-
direction have locked-in phase differences, because they precessed with a different speed 
for a very short time and can therefore be identified (phase encoding). Finally, another 
negative gradient is used along the sagittal x-axis (left to right) after the RF pulse is applied, 
followed by a positive gradient such that a gradient echo (GE) occurs after half of the signal 
read-out time (used to re-phase the spins). The frequency or precession therefore also varies 
along the x-axis (frequency encoding). With each measurement, the mean signal contains 
the sum of frequencies; the individual signals, which correspond to the spatial positions 
along the axes, can then be decoded using Fourier Transformation. The time between two 
RF pulses is called repetition time (TR); the time between excitation and measurement is 
called echo time (TE). These parameters can be chosen such that they determine the influ-
ence of T1 and T2 on the image contrast. Finally, different imaging sequences can be used, 
differing in their use of RF pulses, gradients and therefore in their T1-, T2- and T2*-
weighting. All the presented studies used gradient-echo EPI sequences, which are very fast 
and efficient because they allow the acquisition of a full image using only one RF excitation 





2.2.2 Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 
 
In order to investigate rules and decision processes as in the present studies, brain activity 
had to be measured and related to the cognitive tasks. This can be done with functional MRI 
(fMRI). It makes use of the blood-oxygen-level-dependent (in short: BOLD) contrast, which 
was discovered by Ogawa and colleagues. They found that MRI images displayed dropouts 
at the location of big blood vessels (Ogawa, Lee, Nayak & Glynn, 1990a; Ogawa, Lee, Kay 
& Tank, 1990b) and related this effect to regional neural activity; this assumption was 
experimentally confirmed shortly after (Turner, Le Bihan, Moonen, Despres & Frank, 
1991). In short, oxygenated blood, oxyhaemoglobin (Hb), is diamagnetic, which enhances 
the signal. Deoxyhaemoglobin (dHb) is paramagnetic and introduces field distortions 
(susceptibility artefacts), which lead to less signal. Neural activity is accompanied by a 
local increase in blood oxygenation, which is needed for glucose metabolism. The increase 
in oxygen extraction from the blood is achieved by vascular changes, namely an increase in 
regional blood flow, in blood volume and in blood velocity, all of which are related in a 
complex way (see Buxton, 2002 for details). Importantly, even though more oxygen is 
extracted from the blood during neural activity, this is accompanied by a local oversupply in 
blood oxygen and therefore a better BOLD signal (for a discussion of the oversupply see 
e.g. Buxton, 2002; Logothetis & Pfeuffer, 2004). This increased BOLD signal occurs with a 
latency of 3-6 s after the onset of neural activity, depending on the task and the brain region 
involved (for details see Heeger & Ress, 2002). The location of the signal can be revealed 
with fMRI with high spatial resolution, whereas the temporal resolution is rather poor (e.g. 
compared to electroencephalography, EEG) because of the hemodynamic delay. Since 1992 
the BOLD signal has been used in experiments in humans (Bandettini, Wong, Hinks, 
Tikofski & Hyde, 1992; Kwong et al., 1992; Ogawa et al., 1992).  
It is crucial to understand what exactly the measured signal reflects in order to relate it 
to the cognitive mechanisms of interest. Is it valid to conclude that the BOLD signal simply 
reflects a local increase in neural activity in terms of a higher firing rate (action potentials, 
the output signals of neurons)? At least, this is usually the implicit assumption. The BOLD 
signal, however, does not perfectly correlate with the neurons’ firing rate as measured with 
single-cell recordings in monkey cortex. Perisynaptic activity from neurons in the surround 
up to 3 mm from the electrode tip (local field potentials, LFP) was found to be the better 
predictor (Logothetis 2002; 2003; 2008; Logothetis & Pfeuffer, 2004; Logothesis and 
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Wandell, 2004). Moreover, LFPs predicted the BOLD signal even in the absence of spiking 
activity (Logothetis, Pauls, Augath, Trinath & Oeltermann, 2001), confirming the impor-
tance of pre-synaptic activity for the BOLD signal rather than simple output signals to other 
regions (Logothetis, 2008; Logothetis & Wandell, 2004). Unfortunately, the LFPs also 
represent an ambiguous mixture of activity. Logothetis (2008) pointed out that neural 
activity in general cannot be explained by a simple feed-forward integration model in which 
all information is just transmitted to the next “higher” brain area; connections between 
regions are feed-forward and feedback. Moreover, it is not the single neuron that processes 
the information but micro-units composed of many interconnected neurons, resulting in 
local mass activation. The local connectivity of such micro-units reveals strong excitatory 
and inhibitory recurrence, coining the term excitation-inhibition networks (EIN) (Logothe-
tis, 2008). The BOLD signal could therefore not only arise from an increase in firing of 
task- or stimulus sensitive neurons but also from an increase in balanced exhibitory and 
inhibitory conductance, which does not necessarily cause a net increase of stimulus-related 
cortical output. In conclusion, it seems that the BOLD signal always contains a mixture of 
sources and it can hardly be used to draw conclusions about what exactly happens within a 
single fMRI voxel. The magnitude of the fMRI signal therefore cannot be quantified to 
accurately reflect differences between brain regions (Logothetis & Wandell, 2004). Even the 
comparison between tasks within the same region might be problematic, which makes it 
theoretically impossible to deduce the exact role of an area for a task at hand. Nevertheless, 
today BOLD fMRI is one of the best tools for the investigation of the neural basis of 
cognitive functions in humans (Logothetis, 2008), but its restrictions have to be kept in 
mind: it will not be possible to unravel the exact mechanisms of the cognitive processing 
steps using fMRI. The present studies, however, still go beyond conventional fMRI studies 
by directly demonstrating the encoding of information within brain regions. 
 
2.2.3 Pre-processing and univariate analysis of fMRI data 
 
The classical approach of fMRI data analysis is briefly described in this section. It explains 
how to get from the acquired images to conclusions about cognitive tasks; but it is also 
crucial to understand the differences to the multivariate approach that was used in the 
present work. Detailed overviews about various other ways of data analyses can be found in 
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several textbooks (e.g. Faro & Mohamed, 2006; Friston, Ashburner, Kiebel, Nichols & 
Penny, 2006; Jezzard et al., 2003).  
The signal in fMRI time-series contains a mixture of changes in neural activity as 
well as correlated and uncorrelated noise (Friston et al., 1995b). An important limitation for 
task-related signals is the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) that defines how much signal can be 
attributed to the experimental condition. Averaging across multiple functional images from 
the same experimental condition is required to eliminate the (unsystematic) noise compo-
nents. Therefore, a series of t images is recorded (which also can be expressed as v voxels 
with a time-series of t time-points). During data pre-processing, the images of each partici-
pant first have to be realigned to one image of the series. This procedure corrects for small 
movement that might have occurred during the scanning session (Brett, Johnsrude & Owen, 
2002). For this, the brain is treated as a rigid body and six motion parameters are used for 
realignment (translational movement and rotation in three spatial dimensions). It is also 
possible to co-register the functional images to a structural, high-resolution image recorded 
during the same session. Additionally, it has to be considered that the functional images are 
multi-slice images and each slice samples a slightly different point in time. Slice acquisition 
time correction can be applied to compensate for this effect. In order to compare individual 
brain images between participants, the images must then be transformed into a common 
space: spatial normalisation uses computational warping to match the individual images to 
a standard brain (see e.g. Aguire, 2006). Template images are provided e.g. by the Montreal 
Neurological Institute (MNI) or the stereotactic brain atlas by Talairach and Tournoux 
(1988). Commonly, the functional images are also spatially smoothed using Gaussian 
kernels. This step is useful since it is physiologically implausible that sharp drops of activa-
tion occur at the boundaries between voxels and if these are observed in the data, they rather 
display the influence of measurement noise. It therefore helps to increase the normalities of 
the data, to overcome residual differences between participants and to reduce sensitivity for 
false positive results in single voxels’ time-series (Aguire, 2006).  
The statistical analysis aims at identifying voxels’ time-series in which the signal of 
interest is greater than the noise level (Smith, 1994). The experimental conditions are 
contrasted with a baseline condition or with each other, depending on the experimental 
protocol and research question. The most common way to achieve this is to use a General 
Linear Model (GLM) (Friston et al., 1995a,b). The events (or different experimental blocks) 
are used as regressors to explain variance in the data. For each voxel’s time-series (univari-
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ate analysis), the fit to the model is quantified by a parameter estimate (-value). In a 
simple way, for one stimulation condition this can be expressed as: 
y(t) =  * x(t) + c + e(t) 
In this equation, y(t) corresponds to the observed data (with a vector of signal inten-
sity values for each time point), x(t) corresponds to the model (with a vector of ones and 
zeros representing the presence or absence of stimulation conditions), c is a constant (e.g. 
baseline intensity) and e(t) corresponds to the error. Therefore,  is the value with which the 
model has to be multiplied to fit the data. In order to get a better fit of the model, the time-
series can be convolved with the haemodynamic response function (HRF) to mimic the 
BOLD response in a more realistic way. The parameter estimates obtained from the GLM 
are fed into group-level statistical analyses, which then result in statistical maps, displaying 
the uncertainty of their estimation (t-values). This allows the identification of voxels that are 
believed to be significantly activated for each experimental condition. A statistical threshold 
(expressed as p-value) has to be applied to these maps, taking into account a correction for 
multiple comparisons. Often, additional voxel-cluster thresholds are used to further limit the 
possibility of false positives. Differences between the relevance (or activation) of voxels for 
experimental conditions can be inferred by subtracting parameter estimates from each other. 
Finally, the activated areas have to be labelled, which can be done on different levels (Brett 
et al., 2002).  
  
2.2.4 The multivariate pattern classification approach 
 
In recent years, new approaches were taken in analysing fMRI data. As outlined above, 
conventional univariate analysis compares each voxel in the brain separately with respect to 
activation differences between experimental conditions. This approach has proven to be 
very useful for identifying areas involved in cognitive processes; however, at the cost of 
information reduction. Differences between participants are treated as noise and fine-
grained information in activation patterns are blurred or cancelled out. Only the “tip of the 
iceberg” (Formisano et al., 2008) of shared activity becomes visible. In contrast, pattern 
classification methods make use of unique fine-grained spatial activation patterns of indi-
vidual participants’ data. The idea behind this approach is to extract information related to 
different cognitive processes by testing the correlation of activation patterns between 
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experimental conditions or by using them to predict experimental conditions directly 
(Formisano et al., 2008; Haxby et al., 2001; Haynes & Rees, 2006; Kriegeskorte, Goebel & 
Bandettini, 2006; Mur et al., 2009; Norman et al., 2006). This approach has been labelled 
“information based fMRI” (Kriegeskorte et al., 2006; Kriegeskorte & Bandettini, 2007a,b; 
Mur et al., 2009), “mind reading” or “brain reading” (Cox & Savoy, 2003), “multi-voxel 
pattern analysis” (MVPA) (Normal et al., 2006) or “multivariate decoding” (Haynes, 2009; 
Haynes & Rees, 2006). 
The great advantage of this class of methods is that it accounts for the possibility that 
regions carry information about cognitive processes even though this might not be reflected 
in differences in the average signal (Haynes & Rees, 2006). Consider for example the neural 
responses to mental processes such as the processing of very similar visual stimuli, or 
abstract rules as in the present studies. In principle, one would expect that different neurons 
(or micro-units) might be involved in each computation but one would also expect these 
neurons to be located in the same macro-anatomical regions. Different neurons within a 
single voxel might code for one mental process (e.g. detecting the first stimulus), some 
might code for the other process (detecting the second stimulus), while other neurons might 
not code for any task related processes at all. A region of a relatively small size such as 1 
mm
2 covering cortical surface will still contain 90.000 to 100.000 neurons (Logothetis, 
2008). It is therefore very likely that conventional analysis will fail to detect small activa-
tion differences within this voxel (and neighbouring voxels) between conditions. If these 
voxels display small but stable biases, however, multivariate methods can link the resulting 
activation patterns to experimental conditions. This method could therefore be regarded as a 
test for pattern stability. It has been claimed that this approach is sensitive to differences at 
a finer scale than the voxel size (Haynes & Rees, 2005a; Haynes & Rees, 2006; Kamitani & 
Tong, 2005). This view has recently been challenged by simulations, which showed that 
supra-voxel information sources rather than sub-voxel information would account for 
decoding (Op de Beeck, 2010). Others, however, demonstrated that these simulations were 
partly based on inaccurate assumptions and could not dismiss potential sub-voxel informa-
tion sources (Kamitani & Sawahata, 2010). Also at odds with Op de Beeck (2010), strong 
orientation-specific signals at the scale of cortical columns (below and up to 1 mm) in 
primary visual cortex (V1) of cats have been demonstrated using high-field and high-
resolution fMRI; these orientation biases (which were also found in humans) were still 
detectable when the spatial scale was increased to several millimetres (Swisher et al., 2010). 
Likewise, the build-up of free decisions could be decoded from prefrontal cortex using a 
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standard resolution of 3x3x3 mm3 voxels (Soon et al., 2008) as well as using a much 
smaller resolution of 1x1x1 mm3 voxels (Bode et al., in prep.). Hence, these small biases are 
likely to be the basis for pattern classification approaches; however, most likely in combina-
tion with some large-scale global biases and effects of blood vessels (Kamitani & Sawahata, 
2010; Swisher et al., 2010). 
Multivariate pattern classification can potentially demonstrate involvement of brain 
regions beyond unspecific preparatory activation or support for processes taking place 
elsewhere in the brain. For example, several studies found that parietal and prefrontal cortex 
were both involved in task switching (e.g. Brass & von Cramon, 2004a; Crone, Wendelken, 
Donohue & Bunge, 2006; Rowe, Hughes, Eckstein & Owen, 2008). In order to decide if one 
region performs more abstract mental operations than the other (e.g. processing task rules), 
the direct test would involve looking at information encoding in the respective areas (see 
Experimental Section I). It has been stressed that only revealing the representational 
content can take the understanding of mental processes to the next level (Haynes, 2009; Mur 
et al., 2009). The basic methodological principles of multivariate pattern classification 
techniques will be described in the following paragraph. A more detailed description of the 
exact method used in the present studies will be given in each methods section separately. 
 
2.2.5 Methodological principles of pattern classification 
 
A number of different approaches for the analysis of fMRI activation patterns have been 
introduced in recent years, the most important ones will be described here. The fMRI data 
usually undergoes individual movement correction but no further normalisation or smooth-
ing in order to preserve as much of the original information as possible (Formisano et al., 
2008; Haynes & Rees, 2006; Mur et al., 2009; see Op de Beeck, 2010, and Kamitani & 
Sawahata, 2010, for a discussion about the effects of spatial smoothing). The next step 
always involves defining a set of voxels that constitutes the patterns (feature selection). The 
activation values from the selected voxels are combined to a feature vector (for an overview 
see Pereira, Mitchell & Botvinick, 2009). In principle, it is possible to use activation 
patterns from all voxels in the brain for classification (e.g. Polyn, Natu, Cohen & Norman, 
2005). This approach, however, results in a very high-dimensional feature vector and 
therefore in a great proportion of noise, considering that only the minority of voxels will 
  
 21 
carry task-related information; it might also lead to over-fitting. Several approaches have 
been suggested to reduce the dimensionality of high-dimensional feature vectors, including 
principal components analysis (PCA) (Mourão-Miranda, Bokde, Born, Hampel & Stetter, 
2005), taking the most discriminative voxels only or taking the most activated voxels only 
(Mitchell et al., 2004). The latter approach risks missing voxels that display weak but stable 
biases, which could have enhanced the classification performance if included. One could 
also define a region of interest (ROI) according to anatomical or functional criteria (Mur et 
al., 2009). Others used a combination of anatomically defined regions and voxel sampling 
by activation strength (Haynes & Rees, 2005a; Kamitani & Tong, 2005). It has to be 
ensured, however, that voxel selection and pattern classification are performed on inde-
pendent data-sets to avoid circularity (Kriegeskorte, Simmons, Bellgowan & Baker, 2009). 
Unfortunately, these approaches do not allow a search for local information encoding 
without making presumptions. An elegant way to overcome this was introduced by 
Kriegeskorte and colleagues (2006). These authors constructed a searchlight cluster with a 
fixed radius around each voxel in the brain and analysed the activation patterns contained 
within them. By doing so, the classification accuracy achieved from each of these clusters 
could be examined. This approach results in 3-dimensional brain maps of decoding accura-
cies, which are then normalised to standard space, spatially smoothed and can be subjected 
to group-level analyses (Haynes et al., 2007; Mur et al., 2009; Soon et al., 2008). This 
method was used for the present studies and will be described in greater detail in the sepa-
rate method sections. 
For the analysis, it is generally possible to take the data from each individual trial 
and sort them according to the experimental conditions (Haynes & Rees, 2005a; Haxby et 
al., 2001; Kamitani & Tong, 2005) or to apply a GLM for each voxel first, (using HRF or 
Finite Impulse Response, FIR, based modelling) and perform pattern classification on the 
resulting parameter estimates (beta-images) (Haynes et al., 2007; Mourão-Miranda, 
Reynaud, McGlone, Calvert & Brammer, 2006; Soon et al., 2008). Additionally, each time 
point in a trial can be included as a different feature (Mitchell et al., 2004; Mourão-Miranda, 
Friston & Brammer, 2007). Subsequently, the complete data-set is split into a “training data 
set” and a “test data set”, which have to be acquired independently (Haynes & Rees, 2006; 
Norman et al., 2006). In its simplest case, the data-set is split in half, e.g. odd and even runs. 
A correlation analysis is computed between the pattern vectors from both sets and each 
pattern is assigned to the condition with which it displays the highest correlation (Haxby et 
al., 2001). Other approaches more strongly stress the prediction aspect. The pattern vectors 
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from the training data-set are subjected to a classifier or decoder, which learns to distinguish 
between activation patterns relating to different experimental conditions. In order to do so, 
the patterns are treated as points in multidimensional space with as many dimensions as 
voxels contained in the pattern. The classifier has to estimate a decision boundary, or more 
precisely a decision hyperplane, in order to optimally separate pattern exemplars of different 
conditions from the training data set. In principle, the learned classifier is a model for the 
relationship between features and class labels (Pereira et al., 2009). In a second step, the test 
data set is used to test if the decision hyperplane can successfully classify independent data 
(Haynes & Rees, 2006; Mur et al., 2009; Norman et al., 2006). Cross-validation has to be 
performed to obtain a better estimation of the classification accuracy and to control for 
over-fitting. This can be done by dividing the data into independently acquired sub-sets 
from each functional run such that each run serves as the independent “test run” once. The 
final decoding accuracy is calculated as the average percentage of correct classifications 
from all cross-validation steps (Haynes & Rees, 2006). For a detailed illustration of this 
procedure see Figure 3-2 of the first study.  
 There are several mathematical algorithms used for decoding, each designed to find 
an optimal decision hyperplane for the classification problem (for detailed overviews see 
Formisano et al., 2008; Mur et al., 2009; Pereira et al., 2009). The most common classifiers 
are linear classifiers because these are simpler and non-linear approaches have not been 
shown to be superior (e.g. Cox & Savoy, 2003) and are additionally difficult to interpret 
(Pereira et al., 2009). Simple correlation approaches rely on minimum distance classifica-
tion. They use the distance (e.g. Euclidian distance) between the test data example and the 
training data sets for each experimental condition (Pereira et al., 2009). This can be depicted 
by imagining the single vectors as dots in multidimensional space (often illustrated in a two-
dimensional coordinate system; see Mur et al., 2009). The centroids from both sets (vector 
‘clouds’ for each experimental condition) are simply connected using a straight line. A 
linear decision hyperplane (boundary) is placed orthogonal to the centroid connection line 
and divides it in the middle.  
A different approach is linear discriminant analysis (LDA) (e.g. Haynes & Rees, 
2005a; Kamitani & Tong, 2005) that projects each vector on a single linear discriminant 
dimension, which replaces the connection line between centroids. To obtain the decision 
hyperplane, the covariance of the vectors is taken into account such that it optimises the 
ratio of between-condition variance (which should be high) and the within-condition 
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variance (which should be low). This method, however, requires multivariate-normal 
distributions of each condition (Mur et al., 2009).  
In the past years, support vector machine (SVM) classifiers have proven to be pow-
erful in classification of fMRI activation patterns (Haynes & Rees, 2006; Haynes et al., 
2007; Mourão-Miranda et al., 2005; 2006; Soon et al., 2008). This method works by a 
similar principle to the LDA, but does not assume multivariate normality. It differs, how-
ever, in how the decision hyperplane is set. Vector weights are computed, indicating the 
importance of each vector for the prediction. The support-vectors, the closest points in 
space between conditions, are taken to define a margin around the decision hyperplane such 
that the distance between the separating hyperplane to the nearest training samples is 
maximized (Formisano et al., 2008). Optimally, the decision hyperplane is then set in the 
middle of the margin, which, in turn, is set in a way that it extends to the closest vectors on 
both sides without including them. If no solution can be found that completely separates 
both conditions, it is possible to flexibly define the number of vectors to be ignored that 
would be misclassified in the training data-set. This method is not much affected by changes 
far away from the decision boundary but strongly affected by changes of the support vectors 
(Mur et al., 2009). Classification using SVMs can also be extended to more than two 
conditions, e.g. by calculating all pair-wise classifications and indentifying the most fre-
quently chosen one. 
 
2.2.6 The application of multivariate pattern classification 
 
Pattern classification on fMRI data was first applied in the visual domain. Specifically, the 
question of how the brain encodes objects in the occipital and ventral temporal cortex led to 
great debate (e.g. Aguirre, Zarahn & D’Esposito, 1998; Downing, Jiang, Shuman & Kan-
wisher, 2001; Edelman, Grill-Spector, Kushnir & Malach, 1998; Epstein & Kanwisher, 
1998; Epstein, Harris, Stanley & Kanwisher, 1999; Kanwisher, McDermott & Chun, 1997; 
Spiridon & Kanwisher, 2002). It was the use of pattern classification, however, that re-
vealed the distributed nature of object category encoding in those regions (Haxby et al., 
2001). These authors concluded that an unlimited number of categories and single objects 
could be encoded in the activation patterns with many voxels contributing to the coding. 
Cox and Savoy (2003) used SVM classifiers and demonstrated that decoding accuracies 
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were even higher if patterns were not restricted to voxels that showed the strongest BOLD 
signal during object presentation. Furthermore, training and testing on different exemplars 
of objects from the same category led to comparably good results (Cox & Savoy, 2003). In 
the following years, pattern classification has been increasingly used in the perceptual 
domain of object-, face-, scene- and motion recognition (e.g. Eger, Ashburner, Haynes, 
Dolan & Rees, 2007; Downing, Wiggett & Peelen, 2007; Haushofer, Livingstone & Kan-
wisher, 2008b; Kay, Naselaris, Prenger & Gallant, 2008; Kriegeskorte, Formisano, Sorger 
& Goebel, 2007; Kriegeskorte et al., 2008; Op de Beeck, Torfs & Wagemans, 2008b; 
O’Toole, Jiang, Abdi & Haxby, 2005; Peelen, Wigget & Downing, 2006; Peelen & Down-
ing, 2007; Schwarzlose, Swisher, Dang & Kanwisher, 2008; Shinkareva et al., 2008; 
Spiridon & Kanwisher, 2002; Sterzer, Haynes & Rees, 2008; Walther, Caddigan, Fei-Fei & 
Beck, 2009; Weber, Thomson-Schill, Osherson, Haxby & Parsons, 2009; Williams et al., 
2007; 2008), as well as saliency (Bogler, Bode & Haynes, in prep.), colour encoding 
(Brouwer & Heeger, 2009) and odour perception (Howard, Plailly, Grueschow, Haynes & 
Gottfried, 2009). 
Another fascinating application was in the investigation of subjective experiences, 
such as the awareness of visual contents. Kamitani and Tong (2005) used multivariate 
decoding to predict the orientation of simple stimuli composed of lines from activation 
patterns in early visual cortex during passive viewing. Furthermore, these authors could 
predict participants’ covert attention to one of two overlaid line orientations. Using a similar 
approach, Haynes and Rees (2005a) could even predict the orientation of stimuli that were 
rendered invisible by masking from activation patterns in primary visual cortex (V1). This 
was a powerful demonstration that information can be encoded in – and decoded from – 
brain activity without the participants having conscious access to that information. The 
same authors have also demonstrated the converse by predicting changes in the content of 
conscious experiences while visual stimulation was kept constant using a binocular rivalry 
task (Haynes & Rees, 2005b).   
Recently, the application of multivariate pattern classification was extended to 
higher cognitive processes, such as memory (Harrison & Tong, 2009; Polyn et al., 2005; 
Serences, Ester, Vogel & Awh, 2009), navigation (Hassabis et al., 2009), deception (Davat-
zikos et al., 2005), decision making (Hampton & O’Doherty, 2007; Li, Ostwald, Giese & 
Kourtzi, 2007; Pessoa & Padmala, 2007; Serences & Boynton, 2007; Tusche, Bode & 
Haynes, 2010), number representation (Eger et al., 2009) and the storage and formation of 
intentions (Bode et al., in prep.; Haynes et al., 2007; Soon et al., 2008; Soon, He, Bode & 
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Haynes, in prep.) While the functional columnar organisation of early visual cortex is 
comparably well investigated, the functional organisation of higher cortical areas (e.g. 
involved in cognitive control) is still poorly understood. These recent studies, however, 
gave rise to the notion that higher cognitive processes, which were of interest for the present 
work, can indeed be decoded from local patterns of brain activity. Here, it was concluded 
that this approach would allow the investigation of rule-based behaviour as well as percep-
tual decision making, given its sensitivity for information about objects, the content of 
conscious experiences and decisions. By using a searchlight approach (Haynes et al., 2007; 
Kriegeskorte et al., 2006) the search for information encoding did not have to be restricted 
to pre-selected brain regions. The following experimental sections will link these detailed 










3.1 Theoretical background 
3.1.1 Task-sets and task switching 
 
One simple form of responding to a stimulus, which will be the starting point for the present 
work, is following a rule. In this case, there are no degrees of freedom for the acting agent 
because the response is clearly predefined by the context and the stimulus. Hence, if the rule 
is not willingly violated, there is no real decision process involved. For example, in road 
traffic (context) we respond to the red traffic light (stimulus) by stopping (response) and to 
the green light (alternative stimulus) by walking (alternative response). In our every day 
life, rule-based behaviour is very common; it allows for highly automated processes based 
on useful associations between context cues and the adequate responses (Bunge, 2004). In 
most situations, however, our behaviour is not as predefined as in the case of traffic lights. 
Crossing the street in Germany, for example, requires first looking to the left, whereas in 
Australia it requires looking right. Hence, responses to stimuli are often context-dependent, 
requiring a switch between multiple motor behaviours associated with the same stimulus. 
The term task-set is used to refer to this prospectively configured combination of percep-
tual, mnemonic and motor processes in an abstract form (Sakai, 2008). Flexible rule usage, 
swift interpretation of environmental cues and the ability to switch between adequate 
responses are key features of human (and primate) behaviour; hence much research has 
“Life is the only game in which the object of the game is to learn the rules” 
(Ashleigh Brilliant; http://www.ashleighbrilliant.com) 
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focused on task-switching. In task switching, the agent needs to flexibly adjust its behaviour 
according to the current rule. This ability requires flexible reconfiguration of the flow of 
information through the brain. Perceptual information that enters the primary sensory areas 
needs to be routed into different motor responses depending on current tasks (or other 
context information), which also have to be encoded in the brain.  
Early behavioural studies showed that participants needed additional time whenever 
they switched from one simple task to another (Jersild, 1927). These switch costs were 
reduced but not eliminated when the preparation of the alternative task was facilitated by 
longer stimulus-response delays using fixed task sequences (Monsell, 1996; Rogers & 
Monsell, 1995; Spector & Biederman, 1976) or variable cue-target intervals (Meiran, 1996). 
These residual costs were often attributed to the process of task-set reconfiguration but the 
exact sources are still under debate (see e.g. Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Rubinstein, Meyer & 
Evans, 2001). One explanation states that inhibition effects from the preceding trial result-
ing from strong associations between the same stimulus and the other motor response are 
affecting the current trial (Allport, Styles & Hsieh, 1994; Allport & Wylie, 1999). Impor-
tantly, many of these interpretations point to the conclusion that task-set reconfiguration can 
only be finally completed after the stimulus is presented and not beforehand (De Jong, 
2000; Monsell, 2003). Hence, it can be assumed that different processes operating on the 
abstract level of task-sets contribute to rule-guided task preparation at different points in 
time. 
 
3.1.2 The neural substrate of task-sets 
 
In recent years, task switching has become a frequently used method for research on the 
neural mechanisms underlying cognitive control and rule-based behaviour (Bunge, 2004; 
Bunge & Wallis, 2007; Sakai, 2008). It has been suggested that the lateral prefrontal cortex 
(PFC) is involved in guiding flexible behaviour (Badre & D’Esposito, 2007; 2009; Badre, 
Hoffman, Cooney & D’Esposito, 2009; Constantinidis, Williams, Goldman-Rakic, 2002; 
Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Miller & Cohen, 2001). Signals from PFC could bias compet-
ing activity in other regions of the brain, thereby guiding behaviour from top-down (Miller 
& Cohen, 2001). In support of this, the human PFC is approximately twice as large as 
would be expected for nonhuman primates with a neocortex of equal size and it is also more 
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complexly folded (Passingham, 1973; Striedter, 2004; Zilles, Armstrong, Moser, Schleicher 
& Stephan, 1989), pointing to an involvement in high-level cognitive functions. Addition-
ally, PFC is highly interconnected with all sensory association cortices, motor structures, 
basal ganglia, thalamus and several regions in temporal and parietal cortex, which may 
allow it to play a key role in the integration of information (Miller & Cohen, 2001).  
Monkeys are also generally capable of performing tasks that require high levels of 
cognitive control and have therefore been intensively studied using single cell recordings in 
several sub-regions of PFC. In such studies, monkeys usually perform a simple task (e.g. 
tilting a joystick in one of two directions or performing a delayed saccade to a preceding 
stimulus) according to one or several given task rules while the activity of single neurons is 
recorded. The tuning of such neurons is then assessed according to their firing rates during 
particular phases of the trial. For rule-guided behaviour, PFC neurons were identified that 
showed tuning to the visual properties of behaviourally relevant stimuli (Funahashi, Chafee 
& Goldman-Rakic, 1993; Hoshi, Shima & Tanji, 2000; Hoshi & Tanji, 2004), even when 
these had to be kept in memory during a delay period (Constantinidis, Franowicz & Gold-
man-Rakic 2001a; 2001b), as well as neurons tuned to visual properties of stimuli that were 
not even relevant for the selection of behaviour (Quintana & Fuster, 1999). Other PFC 
neurons were tuned to motor responses while a different set of neurons encoded the predict-
ability of the correct response (Quintana & Fuster, 1999). In other studies, PFC neurons 
were found that changed their tuning properties according to the abstract task rules 
(Amemori & Sawaguchi, 2006; Asaad, Rainer & Miller, 2000), encoded reward expecta-
tions and upcoming responses (Hoshi, Shima & Tanji, 1998; Hoshi et al., 2000; Wallis & 
Miller, 2003), encoded the monkeys’ certainty about the correct sequence of action (Aver-
beck, Sohn & Lee, 2006) or directly encoded the abstract rule (Johnston, Levin, Koval & 
Everling, 2007; Kusunoki, Sigala, Gaffan & Ducan, 2009; Sigala, Kusunoki, Nimmo-Smith, 
Gaffan & Duncan, 2008; Wallis, Anderson & Miller, 2001). Remarkably, PFC neurons in a 
wide range of sub-regions seem to be capable of encoding all possible aspects of rule-
guided task preparation, making it difficult to pinpoint – and generally questions – any 
functional regional specialisation (Duncan, 2001; Sigala et al., 2008).  
There is also evidence that posterior parietal cortex (PPC) plays an important role in 
cognitive control (Quintana & Fuster, 1999). Parietal cortex has been less intensively 
investigated than prefrontal areas in this context but recent studies demonstrated the exis-
tence of neurons sensitive to abstract rules in several parietal sub-regions in the monkey 
brain (Freedman & Assad, 2006; Gail & Andersen, 2006; Gottlieb, 2007; Oristaglio, 
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Scheider, Balan & Gottlieb, 2006; Stoet & Snyder, 2004, 2007; Toth & Assad, 2002). This 
also led to new hypotheses that parietal cortex plays a much more active role in task recon-
figuration than previously thought (Singh-Curry & Husain, 2009). 
In humans, several brain areas have been shown to be activated during preparation of 
externally cued tasks, including lateral PFC, intraparietal sulcus (IPS), the pre-SMA and the 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (Brass & von Cramon, 2002, 2004a, 2004b; Brass et al., 
2003; Bunge, Hazeltine, Scanlon, Rosen & Gebrieli, 2002; Braver, Reynolds & Donaldson, 
2003; Crone et al., 2006; Dosenbach et al., 2006; Dove et al., 2000; Forstmann, Brass, Koch 
& von Cramon, 2005; Kimberg, Aguirre & D’Esposito, 2000; Rowe et al., 2008; Rush-
worth, Paus & Sipila, 2001, Rushworth, Hadland, Paus & Sipila, 2002a; Rushworth, Pass-
ingham & Nobre, 2002b; Sohn, Ursu, Anderson, Stenger & Carter, 2000; Toni, Schluter, 
Josephs, Friston & Passingham, 1999; Yeung, Nystrom, Aronson & Cohen, 2006). In line 
with findings in monkeys, a fronto-parietal network emerges as being important for rule-
guided behaviour. However, it is still heavily debated as to which brain areas correspond to 
which processing stages from stimulus representation to response execution. For example, 
using fMRI ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) and dorsolateral prefrontal (DLPFC) 
were found to be differentially activated depending on the task domain (Sakai & Pass-
ingham, 2003; Sakai & Passingham, 2006; Yeung et al., 2006). Others suggested that 
DLPFC is generally more involved in rule-based response selection while anterior VLPFC 
plays a key role in the retrieval of rule knowledge; posterior VLPFC, pre-SMA and parietal 
cortex may be involved in rule maintenance and the transformation of rules into action 
codes (Bunge, 2004). Brass and von Cramon (2002; 2004a; 2004b) dissociated the visual 
properties of a rule cue and its abstract meaning and could show that a sub-region of 
VLPFC, the inferior frontal junction (IFJ), was important for the selection of task relevant 
information. These authors assumed that the IFJ might be a key region in cognitive control 
across different tasks (Brass, Derrfuss, Forstmann & von Cramon, 2005a; Derrfuss, Brass & 
von Cramon, 2004; Derrfuss, Brass, Neumann & von Cramon, 2005). More abstract opera-
tions, such as task management or abstract mental operations, were suggested to be carried 
out by anterior frontopolar cortex (FPC) (Badre & D’Esposito, 2009; Bunge, 2004; 
Koechelin & Hyafil, 2007), while ACC and the anterior insula / operculum were discussed 
to constitute a core task-set system that regulates activity in other brain regions (Dosenbach 
et al., 2006). The specific role of the prefrontal sub-regions, however, is far from clear; 
competition and interaction of representations of rules, stimuli and responses may also take 
place within the same brain regions (Sakai, 2008).  
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Parietal cortex is most commonly thought to play a subordinate role in cognitive 
control, mainly linked to storage of stimulus-response (S-R) associations, attention and 
response preparation (Brass & von Cramon, 2002, 2004a, 2004b; Brass, Ullsperger, Kno-
esche, von Cramon & Phillips, 2005b; Bunge, 2004; Crone et al., 2006; Rushworth et al., 
2001). There is also much debate regarding the roles of different prefrontal and parietal 
areas in time, i.e., from the retrieval of a general rule, to its associations with response 
representations and to the final motor preparation (Brass and von Cramon, 2004a, 2004b; 
Brass et al., 2005a; Braver et al., 2003; Bunge, 2004; Bunge et al., 2005). In most studies, it 
has also remained unclear whether brain activity related to task switching reflected the 
specific encoding of the task, or whether it instead reflected unspecific, global processes 
that did not differentiate between tasks.  
 
3.1.3 The goal of the present study 
 
The present fMRI study investigated how information about task-sets builds up across time 
when participants are cued to use different rules to guide their behaviour. Being able to 
pinpoint the temporal sequence of information encoding would allow conclusions to be 
drawn about two important aspects of task preparation: first, identifying the content of 
information stored in a specific brain region could shed light on the specific processes in 
which a particular region is engaged. Second, knowing the time at which a specific region 
holds that information would help clarify its role in preparing rule-guided behaviour. 
Specifically, multivariate pattern classification (Haynes & Rees, 2006; Norman et al., 2006) 
was used to disentangle the encoding of task-sets, target stimuli and motor responses 
(Passingham, Toni & Rushworth, 2000). Multivariate decoding has been successfully 
applied to analyse high-order cognitive functions beyond visual representations from 
patterns of brain activity including prefrontal cortex (Hampton & O’Doherty, 2007; Haynes 
et al., 2007; Li et al., 2007). Additionally, it can be used to track the built-up of decisions 
across multiple brain regions over time (Soon et al., 2008). In the present study, a task was 
used that required participants to alternate between two simple task-sets based on a visual 
cue presented prior to each trial. The task was temporally staggered and required two 
different mappings of visual stimuli to motor responses. Using this procedure, it was 





3.2.1 Task-switching experiment 
Participants 
 
Seven male and seven female participants took part in the study and gave written informed 
consent to the test procedure. The experiment was approved by the local ethics committee 
and was conducted according to the Declaration of Helsinki. All participants were right-
handed and had normal or corrected to normal visual acuity. Data from two participants 
were excluded due to poor task performance in one case and technical problems in re-
cording responses in the other case. The final sample consisted of five male and seven 




All stimuli were created using MATLAB 7.0 (The MathWorks, Inc.) in combination with 
the Cogent toolbox (http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/Cogent). During the experiment, stimuli 
were presented via a projector (resolution 1024x768 pixel, 60Hz) that projected from the 
head-end of the scanner onto a screen. Participants viewed the projection through a mirror 
fixed on the head coil. The visual angle was  = 0.72° for cues and  = 7.15° for target 
stimuli. The target stimuli consisted of dynamic colour patterns that yielded strong re-
sponses in colour and motion responsive regions without semantic associations (Figure 3-1). 
Each pattern was based on a superposition of phase-randomised sinusoids that was used to 
index colours in a circular colour map. These moving coloured patches were animated by 
smoothly varying the phase, which created the impression of pulsation: for each stimulus, 
ten single frames of these patterns were shown in rapid succession, each a slightly warped 
rendering of the preceding one. This series of 10 frames (700 ms) was repeated six times for 
the duration of 4200 ms, thus creating the impression of smooth, wave-like movement. For 
manual responses, a custom-made MR-compatible joystick was used which allowed left and 
right movement only. The joint of the joystick was adjusted until participants reported a 
comparable amount of effort to move it in each direction. The joystick was fixed on an MR-
  
 33 
compatible plexiglass construction, the surface functioning as a table. This construction 
allowed for the adjustment of the joystick table in every desired angle to ensure that each 
participant’s arm rested in a comfortable position and to avoid any additional movement 




The experiment used a variant of a classical task-switching paradigm (Dove et al., 2000). 
One of two possible cues was given at the beginning of each trial. This cue represented the 
rule that specified which stimulus-response mapping had to be established between the two 
possible target stimuli and the two responses (therefore it defined the task-set). This yielded 
a total of four conditions (see Figure 3-1). Every run started with a 5600 ms presentation of 
a black screen with a white cross in the centre, upon which the participant had to fixate. At 
the beginning of each trial, one of the two task cues was presented for 1400 ms in the form 
of a letter (“A” or “B”) indicating the active rule. Cue “A” instructed the participant to 
move the joystick to the left for target 1 and to the right for target 2. Conversely, cue “B” 
reversed the mapping, indicating that participants should move a joystick to the right for 
target 1 and to the left for target 2 (see Figure 3-1). The cue was followed by a 2800 ms 
delay during which the fixation cross was shown. After this interval, one of the two target 
stimuli was presented for 4200 ms in the centre of the screen with the fixation cross super-
imposed. Participants were instructed to observe the target stimulus for the entire period of 
its presentation, but not to respond yet. Subsequently, once the target stimulus disappeared, 
participants were allowed to respond according to the task rule. The response period lasted 
for 2800 ms. This procedure allowed the de-correlation (and hence dissociation) of task-
sets, stimuli and responses because either stimulus could lead to either response, depending 
on the instructed rule. To familiarise the participants with the joystick and the test proce-
dure, a 20-minute training session outside of the scanner was conducted one or two days 
prior to the fMRI experiment. In the MRI-scanner, the participants were instructed to fixate 
throughout all stages of the experiment. The experiment consisted of four runs, each repeat-
ing the four different conditions 16 times, resulting in 64 trials in total. The order of the four 
conditions was repeatedly pseudo-randomised in blocks. After every 16th trial (4 blocks) 




Figure 3-1: Experimental paradigm. Every task-set contained two stimulus-response mappings. Cue “A” 
indicated that a joystick should be moved to the left after presentation of target stimulus 1 and to the right after 
presentation of target stimulus 2 (picture above). Cue “B” indicated the reverse mapping (picture below). In each 
trial, one of the two cues (“A” or “B”) was presented for 1400 ms to indicate the active rule, followed by a delay 
of 2800 ms. Subsequently, one of the two target stimuli was presented for 4200 ms. Participants responded 




A Siemens TRIO 3T scanner (Erlangen, Germany) with standard head coil was used to 
acquire gradient-echo EPI functional MRI volumes of the whole brain (42 axial slices, 
repetition time TR = 2800 ms, echo time TE = 30 ms, resolution 3x3x2 mm3 with 1 mm 
gap). Within each of the four runs, 278 images were acquired for each participant. The first 





The data were subjected to three pattern classification analyses. Each of them was designed 
to identify brain regions carrying information about one of the three routes of information 
processing, namely the target stimuli, motor responses or task-sets. This approach goes 
beyond conventional univariate analysis, since it was designed to discriminate between the 
individual representations within a class of experimental conditions, which may be too 
similar for the mean signals to show any differences (see Appendix A, Univariate analysis). 
A Finite Impulse Response (FIR) model was used as implemented in SPM2 
(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/). A high-pass filter with a cut-off of 128 s removed low 
frequency drifts in the time series at each voxel. The model was conducted based on motion 
and slice timing corrected data that was neither normalised nor smoothed. By not smoothing 
the data, the sensitivity for information encoded in fine-grained spatial voxel patterns was 
maximized (Haynes and Rees, 2005a; Kamitani and Tong, 2005). For the FIR model each 
trial was subdivided into eight distinct time bins of 2800 ms (= 1 TR) covering a total of 
22400 ms. In each of these time bins, the cortical response was estimated separately by one 
parameter. This allowed the build-up of informative pattern signals to be analysed across 
time. A “searchlight” approach was implemented to analyse activity patterns at each brain 
location (Haynes et al., 2007; Kriegeskorte et al., 2006). This approach allowed the search 
for informative voxels in an unbiased fashion across the whole brain. Modifying the ap-
proach by using a FIR model, it was possible to estimate the information not only for each 
location but also for each time point separately (Soon et al., 2008). The general procedure is 
illustrated in the following for one time bin but was computed separately for each of the 
eight time bins. 
First, the task-sets were decoded from brain activity. A spherical cluster of N sur-
rounding voxels (c1…N) within a radius of four voxels was created around a voxel vi. The 
FIR-parameter estimates for these voxels were extracted separately for both task-set condi-
tions at a given delay for each run. They were then transformed into pattern vectors for each 
condition for each run of each participant. These vectors represented the average spatial 
response patterns to the given task-set condition from the chosen cluster of voxels (Figure 
3-2a). In the next step, multivariate pattern classification was used to assess whether infor-
mation about the experimental condition was encoded in the spatial response patterns. For 
this purpose, the pattern vectors for three of the four runs were assigned to a “training data 
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set” that was used by a linear support vector machine (SVM) pattern classifier (Müller, 
Mika, Rätsch, Tsuda & Schölkopf, 2001) with a fixed regularisation parameter C = 1. First, 
the classifier was trained on this data to identify patterns corresponding to each of the two 
task-set conditions (LIBSVM implementation, http://www.csie.ntu.edu.tw/~cjlin/libsvm). It 
was then used to classify independent data from the last run (“test data set”). Cross-
validation (4-fold) was achieved by repeating this procedure independently with each run 
acting as the test data set once, while the other runs were used as training data sets (Figure 
3-2b). The decoding accuracy was assessed by averaging the results of all four classification 
iterations and was assigned to the central voxel vi of the cluster. It therefore reflected the 
accuracy of classification based on the given spatial activation patterns of this particular 
local cluster. Classification accuracy significantly above chance implied that the local 
cluster of voxels encoded information about the task-sets, whereas chance level perform-
ance implied no information. The same analysis was then repeated with the next spherical 
cluster, created around the next spatial position at voxel vj. Again, an average decoding 
accuracy for this cluster was extracted and assigned to the central voxel vj. By repeating this 
procedure for every voxel in the brain, a 3-dimensional map of decoding accuracies for each 
position could be created (Figure 3-2c). Furthermore, because the complete classification 
process was performed for each time bin separately, independent accuracy maps were 
available for each time bin.  
The resultant accuracy maps were normalised to a standard stereotaxic space (Mont-
real Neurological Institute EPI template), re-sampled to an isotropic spatial resolution of 3 x 
3 x 3 mm3 and smoothed with a Gaussian kernel of 6 mm full width at half maximum 
(FWHM) using SPM2. This allowed a random-effects group-level analysis, computed on a 
voxel-by-voxel basis, to test the decoding accuracy for each position in the brain statisti-
cally across all participants (Haynes et al., 2007) and to track the evolution of decoding 





Figure 3-2: Multivariate pattern classification: a) Extraction of voxels for classification: Parameter estimates 
for all voxels in spherical cluster (radius = 4 voxels) around voxel vi were calculated separately for each of the 
two conditions (here illustrated for target stimuli, functioning likewise for task-sets and responses). Subse-
quently, they were transformed into two pattern vectors. b) Classification: Pattern vectors of all runs but one 
were assigned to a “training data set”, the remaining run was assigned to a “test data set”. A linear support vector 
pattern classifier was trained on the “training data set” and subsequently applied to classify the “test data set” as 
belonging to one of the two conditions (here illustrated for two voxels where the decision boundary is located in 
2-dimensional space. With N voxels in a spherical cluster, the decision boundary is located in N-dimensional 
space). For cross-validation, the classification procedure was repeated for all runs providing the “test data set” 
separately. The decoding accuracy was the average accuracy [%] across all cross-validation steps. c) Searchlight 
approach: After data extraction (I), pattern classification and cross-validation (II), a new local spherical cluster 
(radius = 4 voxels) was constructed around the adjacent voxel vj. The classification process was repeated for all 
voxels serving as the central voxel of a “searchlight”-sphere once (III). Using this procedure, a 3-dimensional 
brain map of decoding accuracy values was created.  
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3.2.2 Control experiment with fixed stimulus-response mappings 
 
A small control study was conducted in order to investigate whether regions engaged in 
cognitive control (beyond visual and motor cortex) were also involved when task-sets were 
fixed and no flexible switching between rules was required. Notably, in this case stimuli and 
responses were always correlated and their encoding cannot be dissociated.  
 
Participants and experimental procedure 
 
Five healthy, right-handed participants with normal visual acuity took part and gave written 
informed consent to the test procedure. For one participant, functional data was not com-
pletely recorded because of technical problems. Data from the remaining four participants 
(2 female; mean age 28.5; range 25-34 years) is reported here.  
The experiment consisted of five runs in which four different visual target stimuli 
were presented, similar to those used in the task-switching experiment (see Figure 3-6a). 
Every run started with a fixation period of 5600 ms, followed by the presentation of one of 
the four stimuli in the centre of the screen for 11200 ms with the fixation cross superim-
posed. Participants were instructed to fixate and not to execute a response until the target 
stimulus disappeared. Subsequently, participants were instructed to respond using one of 
four buttons on a response device (operated by the index- and middle fingers of both hands; 
response period 5600 ms). The mapping between target stimuli and response buttons was 
fixed during the experiment. The presentation order of the four stimuli was pseudo-
randomised such that no stimulus was repeated on the consecutive trial. In sum, all stimuli 
were shown ten times in each run, resulting in 40 stimuli per run and 200 stimuli in total.  
The scanning procedure was identical to the task-switching experiment, except that 
242 images were acquired for each run. For analyses, the fMRI data were again motion 
corrected and re-sampled (3 x 3 x 3 mm3). A GLM was used as implemented in SPM2 that 
consisted of eight boxcar regressors, each convolved with a canonical HRF. The first four 
regressors modelled the target stimuli, and the last four regressors modelled the motor 
responses (button presses). Again, a searchlight pattern classification analysis was imple-





In the task-switching experiment, participants performed well with a low error rate of 2.6% 
(standard deviation SD 5.0; range 0 to 5.9% of 64 trials per run). Only trials with correct 
responses were included in the following analyses.  
The present study investigated whether distinct stages of information processing could 
be decoded from brain responses. Specifically, multivariate pattern classification was applied 
to each area in turn to assess whether it was possible to decode which of the two task-sets, 
target stimuli and motor responses were engaged on a particular trial (chance level was 
always 50%). First, the encoding of the task-sets was investigated. Each trial began with the 
presentation of a task cue indicating which rule to use in determining the response. A se-
quence of encoding stages for the task-sets could be found (Figure 3-3, top row). In an early 
phase, only visual cortex encoded task-cues above chance, peaking with up to 63% decoding 
accuracy. Subsequently, it was possible to decode which specific task-set was engaged from 
high-level control regions in parietal and prefrontal cortex. Specifically, decoding was first 
possible from left IPS (peaking at 60% accuracy) even before target presentation, followed by 
left posterior VLPFC (peaking at 56%). The third region encoding the task-sets was located in 
the anterior part of left VLPFC and showed significant accuracy only very late (peaking at 
58%), around the time of response execution (Figure 3-4). The position of peak decoding 
accuracy in posterior VLPFC was anterior and ventral to the IFJ found by Brass and col-
leagues (Brass and von Cramon, 2002; 2004a; Derrfuss et al., 2005). The two regions showed 
no overlap. 
 The next analysis was conducted to reveal brain regions encoding the identity of the 
target stimuli over time (Figure 3-3, second row). Regions showing above chance decoding 
accuracy throughout target stimulus presentation were located in bilateral visual cortex, 
with a peak accuracy of 72%. Interestingly, a region in prefrontal cortex, the left anterior 
VLPFC, also showed significant decoding accuracy, again in a later processing stage, 





Figure 3-3: Decoding the task-sets, target stimuli and motor responses over time. The parameter estimates 
from the FIR model were used for 3 independent multivariate searchlight pattern classification analyses 
(spherical voxel clusters with radius = 4) to decode information about task-rules (upper row), target stimuli 
(second row) and motor responses (third row) over time. The FIR model consisted of eight time bins, each of 
which had a length of 2800 ms to model the entire duration of each trial. The cue was presented at the beginning 
of each trial (onset 0 sec), followed by the target stimulus (onset 4.2 sec) and the motor response (onset 8.4 sec). 
To account for the temporal delay of the BOLD signal the decoding time bins were shifted by 2 volumes (i.e. 
time bin 1 is the earliest that could reflect cue related activity). Time bin 3 coincided with the target stimulus 
presentation, and time bin 4/5 with the motor response (bottom row). A perfect match between events and time 
bins cannot be postulated since the time bins cover a period of 2.8 seconds each, and the delay of the BOLD 
response can only be coarsely estimated. The task cues were found to be encoded bilaterally in visual cortex 
(visCor) (bin 1; p < .00001 uncorrected; here displayed for left hemisphere). Information about task-sets then 
shifted to the left IPS (bin 2; p < .0001 uncorrected), the pVLPFC (bin 3; p < .001 uncorrected) and finally the 
aVLPFC (bin 4; p < .001 uncorrected). Target stimuli were encoded bilaterally in visual cortex (bin 3-5; p < .05 
FWE corrected; here only displayed for left hemisphere) and left aVLPFC (bin 4-5; p < .001 uncorrected). 
Responses could be decoded bilaterally (here only displayed for left hemisphere) from SMA, primary motor 
cortex (motCor) and left medial occipitotemporal sulcus (not displayed) (bins 3-5; p < .05 FWE corrected). For 
BIN 1 BIN 2 BIN 3 BIN 4 BIN 5
Target 
Stimuli
visCor [-15 -96 3]
Accuracy = 72 % 
aVLPFC [-51 33 -12]
Accuracy = 56 % 
Motor
Responses
motCor [-39 15 57]
Accuracy = 75 % 
SMA [-18 6 66]






visCor [-18 -78 0]
Accuracy = 63 % 
IPS [-24 -45 42]
Accuracy = 60 % 
pVLPFC [-48 12 21]
Accuracy = 56 % 
aVLPFC [-51 33 3]
Accuracy = 58 % 
0 5.6 8.4 11.2 14.0 16.8
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better visualisation, decoding accuracies are displayed with a threshold of p < .001 uncorrected for task-rules and 




Motor responses could be decoded from spatial activation clusters in motor-related brain 
regions including bilateral primary motor cortex and bilateral premotor cortex with a peak 
accuracy of 75% (Figure 3-3, third row; for details see Appendix A, Figure A-3). All 
regions showed a similar characteristic information time course: the peak in accuracy 
corresponded to the period of early stimulus decoding, and then slowly decreased back to 
chance level. This result is not surprising since participants could prepare the response from 
Figure 3-4: Information time courses for task-set 
decoding. Displayed are mean decoding accuracy and 
standard errors for the left IPS (upper part), the left 
posterior VLPFC (middle part) and the left anterior 
VLPFC (lower part) over time. The cue was presented at 
the beginning of each trial (onset 0 sec), followed by the 
target stimulus (onset 4.2 sec) and the motor response 
(onset 8.4 sec). To account for the temporal delay of the 
BOLD signal the decoding time bins were shifted by 2 
volumes (i.e. time bin 1 is the earliest that could reflect cue 
related activity). The IPS showed an early peak in 
decoding accuracy before the presentation of the target 
stimulus (time bin 2; p < .0001 uncorrected). Decoding 
accuracy in posterior VLPFC slowly increased in the same 
time bin without reaching significance and peaked during 
early stimulus target presentation (time bin 3; p < 0.001 
uncorrected) and gradually decreased to baseline in the 
next bins. Task-sets could be decoded from left anterior 
VLPFC during the fourth time bin only (p < 0.001 
uncorrected). The time course from visual cortex related to 
the cue presentation is not shown in this figure. Coordi-
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the moment the target stimulus was presented, but were instructed not to execute until the 
target stimulus presentation had ceased.  
Comparing the amplitude of the BOLD signal across time bins to the time course of 
information encoding (decoding accuracies) revealed that these did not necessarily corre-
spond (Figure 3-5). Especially for motor responses it could be observed that while informa-
tion about the action to be performed was already present in motor areas during early 
stimulus presentation, the BOLD amplitude showed a peak not before response execution. 
Prefrontal and parietal regions showed an even stronger de-correlation between activation 
and information time courses (also see Appendix A for detailed univariate analysis). The 
process-relevant information at a given time point was therefore encoded in fine-grained 
spatial activation patterns rather than in the mean signal in single voxels. 
 Given previous findings by Asaad, Rainer and Miller (1998) that lateral PFC can 
encode combinations of stimuli and rules, it was also investigated whether the four individ-
ual rule-stimulus combinations could be decoded from prefrontal and parietal cortex. Spatial 
activation patterns in prefrontal and parietal areas that were predictive for task-sets and 
stimuli were found to exhibit a tendency to encode specific combinations of rules and target 
stimuli. This trend, however, did not reach significance (for details see Appendix A, Table 
A-4 and Figure A-4). 
In order to assess whether the information in prefrontal cortex about target stimuli 
was also present in a simpler visually guided experiment, the data of the control experiment 
was analysed. In this study, the stimulus-response mappings were kept constant, meaning 
that no switch between task-rules was required. The error rate was very low with 0.63 % for 
all trials in the whole experiment (mean 1.2 errors out of 200 trials; SD = 1.30). Target 
stimuli and correlated motor responses could only be decoded from bilateral visual cortex 
(65% decoding accuracy) and motor cortex (54% decoding accuracy) where chance level 
was 25% (Figure 3-6). Contrary to the task-switching experiment, there were no regions in 
prefrontal cortex from which decoding of visual stimuli was possible, suggesting that 
prefrontal information about target stimuli was specific to tasks that required alternation 
between different stimulus-response mappings. Furthermore, these results suggest that in 
the task-switching experiment, the encoding of visual properties of the cue itself cannot 






Figure 3-5: Averaged decoding accuracies and FIR contrast estimates. The graph shows the overall BOLD 
response amplitude (solid grey lines; +/- SE) for those central searchlight voxels that demonstrated the highest 
accuracy for decoding stimuli and motor responses (dark bars; +/- SE (a) visual cortex [-15 -96 3]), (b) motor 
cortex [-39 -15 57]), and task rules (bright bars; +/- SE (c) IPS [-24 -45 42], (d) pVLPFC [-48 12 21], (e) 
aVLPFC [-51 33 3]) averaged across all participants. The cue was presented at the beginning of each trial (onset 
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temporal delay of the BOLD signal the decoding time bins were shifted by 2 volumes (i.e. time bin 1 is the 
earliest that could reflect cue related activity). The visual cortex showed strong activations with the presentation 
of the target stimulus (bin 3) while the motor cortex was strongly activated during the response period (bin 4-5). 
Interestingly, the information time course in motor areas already peaked in time bin 3, corresponding to the time 
of motor preparation and not execution. This finding supports a partial dissociation of the time course of 
information and overall response amplitude. Regions encoding the task rule did not show a strong increase in 
BOLD signal across the trial. This emphasizes the notion that information about rules was encoded in fine-
grained spatial activation patterns rather than in the mean BOLD signal in single voxels. This comparison of 
time courses (information vs. BOLD signal) demonstrates the additional benefit of using multivariate analyses to 
pinpoint different roles of the same brain regions in cognitive processes over time.  
 
 
Figure 3-6: Decoding fixed task-sets in the control experiment. a) Paradigm of fixed task-sets experiment: 
One of four different stimuli was presented, each associated with a fixed response button (operated by middle 
and index finger of each hand). Decoding the four different target stimuli and their correlated motor preparation 
revealed accuracies above chance (25%) in bilateral visual cortex (peak at MNI [21 -90 0] with 65% decoding 
accuracy; SE 4.16; p < .000001 uncorrected) and bilateral motor cortex (peak at MNI [33 -12 48] with 54% 
decoding accuracy; SE 1.34; p < .05 FWE corrected). For better visualisation all decoding accuracies are 
displayed with p < .001 uncorrected. b) Flexible task-sets (taken from task-switching experiment): Other regions 
such as aVLPFC, pVLPFC and IPS, which encoded stimuli or task-rules in the main experiment (red circles) 
using flexible task-sets, were not found to predict the fixed task-sets in the control experiment. Only visual and 
motor areas were the same in the task-switching experiment and the control experiment (green circles).  
Fixed Task-Sets
Visual Cortex 
Accuracy = 65 %
Motor Cortex
Accuracy = 54 %
b)a)
1 2 3 4









Owing to multivariate pattern classification, this study provides new insights into the 
information flow through the brain during the preparation of rule-guided behaviour. It 
demonstrated a shift of task-set information encoded in the brain over time. First, with the 
presentation of one of two visually distinct task cues, their identity could be decoded from 
visual cortex. After cue presentation, the information about task-sets shifted to different 
brain regions. The left IPS showed an early, transient peak in encoding of task-set informa-
tion, while a slower build-up of information encoding could be observed in left posterior 
VLPFC, approximately coinciding with the presentation of the target stimulus. Finally, 
approximately during the execution of the motor response, task-sets could be decoded from 
a distinct area in left anterior VLPFC. Interestingly, it was also possible to decode the 
identity of visual target stimuli from anterior VLPFC. However, this was only possible 
when participants needed to flexibly switch between different task rules, and not when the 
task rule was fixed as in the control experiment.  
 
3.4.1 Prefrontal cortex and rule-guided behaviour  
 
Several studies on task-switching demonstrated the involvement of a parietal and lateral 
prefrontal network in cognitive control, including the areas identified in the present study 
(Asari, Konishi, Jimura & Miyashita, 2005; Chiu & Yantis, 2009; Brass & von Cramon, 
2002, 2004a, 2004b; Brass et al., 2003; Braver, et al., 2003; Bunge et al., 2002, Bunge, 
Kahn, Wallis, Miller & Wagner, 2003; Dove et al., 2000; Rowe et al., 2008; Sakai & 
Passingham, 2003, 2006; Sohn et al., 2000). Activation related to cognitive control in PFC 
has been reported bilaterally but more often in the left hemisphere, matching the present 
results (e.g. Badre & Wagner, 2007; Brass & von Cramon, 2002, 2004b; Dove et al., 2000). 
Lateral prefrontal cortex is thought to be a generic region for executive control, guiding 
behaviour from top-down (Miller & Cohen, 2001). The specific roles of prefrontal sub-
regions, however, are highly debated. The VLPFC in general has been linked to context 
processing (Badre & D’Esposito, 2009). In particular, it has been suggested that anterior 
VLPFC is responsible for the controlled retrieval of abstract rules (Badre and Wagner, 
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2005, 2007; Bunge et al., 2003; Bunge, 2004) or general maintenance of cognitive control 
(Braver et al., 2003). Posterior VLPFC, on the other hand, is thought to process contextual 
information of a rule (Brass & von Cramon, 2004b) or to represent and maintain the task-
sets (Braver et al., 2003; Bunge, 2004; Sohn et al., 2000). In line with these interpretations, 
in the present study posterior VLPFC might have maintained the active task-set for the final 
response selection. This could be demonstrated by directly showing that abstract rule 
information was encoded in posterior VLPFC during the time period in which the decision 
for a response had to be made. 
Other prefrontal regions that have been reported to be involved in cognitive control 
but were not found in the present study are DLPFC and FPC (Badre & D’Esposito, 2009; 
Bunge, 2004; Koechlin, Corrado, Pietrini & Grafman, 2000; Koechlin & Hyafil, 2007; 
Sakai & Passingham, 2003, 2006). It has been suggested that DLPFC is also involved in 
rule maintenance, while FPC is involved in moderating task-specific activations in other 
prefrontal regions (Sakai and Passingham, 2003, 2006). The latter studies, however, re-
quired participants to switch between different task domains, such as spatial versus verbal 
tasks, or semantic versus visual processing, and might therefore not be directly comparable 
to the present study. Others also found pre-SMA and SMA to be involved in task switching 
and cognitive control (Brass & von Cramon, 2002; Braver et al., 2003; Dosenbach et al., 
2006; Rushworth et al., 2002). These regions have been discussed as core regions for motor 
preparation and sensory-motor associations (Picard & Strick, 2001), for linking cognition 
and action (Nachev, Kennard & Hussain, 2008) as well as for the initiation of voluntary 
action (Cunnington, Windischberger, Deecke & Moser, 2002; Cunnington et al., 2005; 
Haggard, 2008). However, abstract task-set information was not found to be encoded in the 
pre-SMA or the SMA in the present study, instead it encoded the motor responses. In 
agreement with this, it has recently been shown that the pre-SMA only encoded the timing 
of freely paced decisions rather than the content of such (Soon et al., 2008). It has also been 
argued that pre-motor cortex performs the execution of rules on a non-abstract level (Badre 






3.4.2 Parietal cortex and rule-guided behaviour 
 
Compared to PFC, the role of IPS in cognitive control is less well established. Classical 
models on posterior parietal cortex (PPC) functions do not focus on cognitive control but on 
the dorsal visual pathway, processing spatial information (Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982), 
providing “vision for action” (Milner & Goodale, 1993) or being related to different kinds 
of attention (Rizzolatti & Matelli, 2003). For cognitive control, the PPC is discussed as 
playing a subordinate role and either being related to response preparation (Bunge et al., 
2002; Bunge, 2004) or to attention (Forstmann, Brass, Koch & von Cramon, 2006; Rush-
worth et al., 2001). It has been suggested that the IPS provides stimulus-response associa-
tions rather than abstract rules (Brass & von Cramon, 2002, 2004a, 2004b). Several recent 
findings, however, question this view as the present study does.  
It has been shown that a region in left parietal cortex, overlapping the IPS found in 
the present study, is directly involved in switching between task rules (Crone et al., 2006). 
The authors suggested that parietal cortex might be involved when there is a need to control 
sets of stimulus-response mappings (Crone et al., 2006; see also Braver et al., 2003). 
Furthermore, it has been difficult to identify a clear dissociation between prefrontal and 
parietal regions in establishing task-sets using classical univariate fMRI analyses. The IPS 
showed an activation profile very similar to that of prefrontal regions during task prepara-
tion (Brass and von Cramon, 2002, 2004a, 2004b; Crone et al., 2006; Rowe et al., 2008). 
Rowe and colleagues (2008) found parietal as well as lateral prefrontal areas to be involved 
in switching between rules and switching between responses made under single rules 
without any hierarchical order between the two areas. Instead, these authors suggested that 
both prefrontal and parietal cortex guide behaviour together. Bilateral posterior parietal 
cortex, predominantly the left IPS, has also been found to be involved in cognitive set-
shifting using the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST), even when spatial task compo-
nents were eliminated (Asari et al., 2005). Recently, it has been suggested that a domain-
independent mechanism for reconfiguration of task-sets and cognitive control is located in 
PPC (Chiu & Yantis, 2009). Current models of PPC functions have been revised based on 
recent meta-analyses (Singh-Curry & Husain, 2009). These authors conclude that classical 
models focussing on visual and attentional functions of PPC (predominantly the inferior 
parietal lobe, eventually extending to the IPS in humans; see Orban et al., 2006) fail to 
account for the variety of tasks in which parietal regions have been demonstrated to be 
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engaged. According to their model, the PPC functions as the centre of a control network in 
which different information competes, and sensory information, motor information as well 
as task-goals and reward-related information are integrated. Its primary purpose is to keep 
the cognitive system in a goal-focussed and task-engaged state (Singh-Curry & Husain, 
2009). In order to fulfil these functions, which were classically attributed to the PFC alone, 
PPC must encode abstract rule information, as demonstrated by the present study.  
 
3.4.3 The temporal sequence of information encoding 
 
Extending previous findings, the present study was able to reveal the time at which informa-
tion about task-sets emerged in different regions of parietal and prefrontal cortex. A tempo-
ral sequence of task-set information encoding could be demonstrated, starting with an early, 
transient encoding in IPS before target presentation and then followed by a more sustained 
encoding of task-sets in posterior VLPFC. The finding that abstract rules could be read out 
from the IPS first suggests that the IPS might be able to provide abstract input to prefrontal 
cortical regions rather than only being engaged in response processing (Brass et al. 2005b; 
Bunge 2004). Evidence from human EEG and fMRI studies has so far yielded conflicting 
results about the relative timing of parietal and prefrontal cortex in establishing task-sets 
(e.g. Brass et al., 2005b; Buschman & Miller, 2007; Forstmann, Ridderinkhof, Kaiser & 
Bledowski, 2007). In contrast to the present results, a previous EEG study found that 
activity in PFC might arise earlier than in IPS, suggesting that the IPS would be subordinate 
to PFC in cognitive control (Brass et al., 2005b). On the other hand, there is evidence from 
a study using event-related potentials in a free selection task that parietal activation arises 
earlier than frontal activation (Forstmann et al., 2007). This questions the notion of a strict 
hierarchy from frontal to parietal areas. The inconsistent findings regarding the temporal 
order of signals in prefrontal and parietal cortex might simply reflect differences in the tasks 
studied. Moreover, none of these previous studies investigated the encoding of task-related 
information, hence, could not distinguish between unspecific activation (for example, 
related to preparatory arousal) and specific encoding of task-sets in these regions. 
The present finding of early task-set information in parietal cortex is supported by 
single cell electrophysiology studies in monkeys that demonstrated rule sensitive neurons in 
parietal cortex (Freedman & Assad, 2006; Gail & Andersen, 2006; Gottlieb, 2007; 
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Oristaglio et al., 2006; Stoet & Snyder, 2004, 2007; Toth & Assad, 2002). Neurons in 
medial and lateral IPS could be found that only responded to abstract rules in task switch-
ing, showing their highest selectivity in a delay after cue presentation and before target 
stimulus presentation (Stoet & Snyder, 2004, 2007), comparable to the present study. The 
authors argued that these neurons directly encode the abstract upcoming task (“cognitive 
set”). Likewise, Gail and Andersen (2006) implemented a task switching paradigm to 
perform multivariate decoding on a population of neurons in the monkey IPS. They found 
that the abstract rule could already be predicted before the current target stimulus was 
presented, suggesting a direct involvement of IPS in cue-to-goal transformations at an 
abstract level. Notably, the temporal flow of information in the fronto-parietal network has 
only rarely been addressed in electrophysiological studies. Recordings were typically made 
only from one brain region, either lateral PFC (Wallis et al., 2001) or the IPS (Gail & 
Andersen, 2006; Stoet and Snyder, 2004, 2007). FMRI studies in humans might also fail in 
this respect if conventional voxel-wise analyses of activation are used. In contrast, substan-
tial contributions of different areas in cognitive control over time could instead be encoded 
in spatial patterns of activation, which do not necessarily coincide with supra-threshold 
activation (Haynes & Rees, 2006; Norman et al., 2006). This interpretation is supported by 
the finding that only multivariate pattern classification, rather than univariate analyses, 
revealed the time courses of areas involved in cognitive control in the present study. Impor-
tantly, early encoding of task-set information in the IPS does not rule out the possibility that 
parietal cortex is later engaged in processes related to attention and response preparation as 
suggested by others (Brass & von Cramon, 2002; Brass et al., 2005b; Bunge et al., 2002; 
Bunge, 2004; Crone et al., 2006; Rushworth et al., 2001). 
The activity levels and temporal dynamics in the fronto-parietal network might also 
depend on how well-learned the rules are. It has been shown that monkey PFC neurons are 
more strongly activated for new rules compared to familiar ones (Asaad et al., 1998). Using 
fMRI in humans, the right (but not left) VLPFC was found to be more activated during the 
processing of newly learned rules compared to well-known ones (Donohue, Wendelken, 
Crone & Bunge, 2005). Similarly, Wallis and Miller (2003) found that the contribution of 
PFC was weaker and occurred later compared to pre-motor cortex using a paradigm in 
which rules were well practised. These findings suggest that PFC is less involved with well-
learned rules. In the present study, the rules were very well learned and participants hardly 
made any mistakes. This might explain why, despite being highly reliable, the overall 
decoding accuracy in VLPFC was lower than in other informative regions. The results 
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might also be a reflection of differences in the anatomical-functional micro-architecture of 
cortical columns. The structure to function relationship in lateral PFC might involve dy-
namic, adaptive re-coding as suggested previously (Duncan, 2001; Kusunoki et al., 2009). 
Thus, the exact locus of information encoding in PFC might vary more strongly across 
participants compared to other regions. 
One functional interpretation of the early task-set encoding in parietal cortex might 
be that PPC acts as a control hub directly engaged in reconfiguring task goals (Singh-Curry 
& Husain, 2009). In order to keep attention directed to the task goal or to actively reconfig-
ure mappings, a brain region necessarily has to encode highly abstract rule information at a 
very early stage of task preparation. This is exactly what was found in the present study. 
Rubinstein and colleagues (2001) suggested a formal model of task switching in which two 
separable components of cognitive control can be identified, namely goal shifting and rule 
selection. Goal shifting is thought to provide the information about the current task for other 
components of the cognitive system. This can take place in a potential delay between the 
indication of the upcoming task and the target stimulus. Subsequently, rule selection is 
externally triggered by the presentation of the target stimulus and is thought to load the 
current rule into working memory. This stepwise processing of rule information is thought 
to prevent interference that might occur if more rules were active in working memory 
(Rubinstein et al., 2001). With respect to this framework and considering the PPC model of 
Singh-Curry and Husain (2009), it could be speculated that the IPS is involved in goal 
shifting. Subsequently, task-set information from the IPS could serve as input for further 
processing in VLPFC. This region might then perform the rule selection and utilise the 
current rule to select a response once the target stimulus is successfully identified (Brass & 
von Cramon, 2004a, 2004b; Bunge, 2004). This interpretation is also supported by the 
finding that all motor regions encoded the upcoming motor response simultaneous to the 
peak of task-set encoding in posterior VLPFC and not in IPS.  
Finally, anterior VLPFC encoded the task-set as well as the identity of the target 
stimulus around the time of the motor response. The motor response could not be decoded 
from VLPFC, matching recent findings from single-cell recordings in monkeys for fixed 
and flexible task rules (Kusunoki et al., 2009). The coincidence of visual information and 
rule information in VLPFC suggests that it plays an important role in making the final 
decision to act. Anterior VLPFC has been suggested to be involved in top-down controlled 
retrieval of plans or relevant semantic knowledge from memory (Badre & Wagner, 2007). 
Hence, this region might initiate a final check of the validity of the planned motor response 
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with respect to the target stimulus and the rule. Recently, anterior medial PFC has been 
demonstrated to encode decisions during the preparation of voluntary action (Haynes et al., 
2007; Soon et al. 2008). One might speculate that in a similar manner, during the prepara-
tion of exogenously cued action, the anterior lateral PFC is involved in retrieving the 
stimulus and the rule from memory when it comes to the final decision to act. Another 
explanation for the present result would be an involvement of anterior VLPFC in a post-
execution assessment of the appropriateness of the motor response with respect to the rule. 
 
3.4.4 Methodological considerations 
 
An important limitation of fMRI compared to electrophysiology is that its poor temporal 
resolution requires specific experimental paradigms to reveal onset differences between 
cognitive processes. One option to optimise the deconvolution of task components would 
have been the usage of a conventional GLM fitting the HRF instead of using FIR modelling. 
This, however, would also have excluded the possibility of time-resolved decoding. Inter-
estingly, it has been shown in monkeys that while populations of prefrontal neurons main-
tained their selectivity for task rules during different phases of a task-switching experiment, 
the underlying patterns were only reliable within single phases and were orthogonal across 
task phases (Sigala et al., 2008). In other words, the use of pattern classification should 
greatly benefit from time-resolved modelling of separate task-phases as achieved by FIR, 
because patterns (for each task component) cannot be expected to stay the same across 
different stages of task preparation.  
To reveal onset differences between cognitive processes in the present study, the 
pacing of events was deliberately slowed by introducing long delays (4.2 s) between the 
onsets of cues and targets as well as between targets and responses. Although fMRI is not 
perfectly suited to resolving sub-second processes, it has previously been shown for longer 
time scales that the latency of the haemodynamic response appropriately reflects the infor-
mation flow in different regions in cortical networks (Formisano & Goebel, 2003). Thus, 
latency differences in the order of a second or more are considered to reflect the true neural 
order (Formisano & Goebel, 2003; Huettel & McCarthy, 2001). Given that the present study 
used onset differences as large as 4.2 s, it can be assumed that any small differences in 
haemodynamic latency in different brain regions cannot disqualify the observed temporal 
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order of their involvement. Since fine-grained spatial activation patterns form the basis for 
decoding, the same conclusion holds for the temporal order of information encoded in these 
regions. Nevertheless, because the haemodynamic delay can only be estimated, it cannot be 
excluded that some activation patterns were already established in one time bin but were at 
that stage still too weak to be detected by the analyses. This raises the question of whether 
the later onset of information in prefrontal cortex might be due to poor sensitivity of the 
method to early signals. The interpretation of negative results must therefore be made with 
care. Although it is possible that pattern classification lacked the sensitivity to reveal any 
early signals in PFC, the method clearly does not lack sensitivity in general because it does 
reveal information in PFC at later stages of processing. This again speaks for the validity of 




The present results substantially extend previous findings by resolving the build-up of 
specific task-related information over time. This goes beyond the mostly indirect evidence 
of other human fMRI studies and shows that activation in these areas does not simply reflect 
unspecific processes related to task-learning and task-switching. Hence, it is could be 
demonstrated that cued rules can be decoded from human parietal and prefrontal cortex. The 
data suggest a tentative model of information flow in establishing task-sets. IPS first pro-
vided updated representations of the active abstract rule. This information was then shifted 
to posterior VLPFC, which maintained the representation and biased the response selection 
as soon as the target stimulus was presented. From there on, the upcoming response was 
encoded in motor areas. Around the time of the final motor response, patterns in anterior 
VLPFC in turn encoded the task-set and the target stimulus, suggesting a role in making the 
final decision to act. Importantly, using multivariate decoding the substantial involvement 
of parietal cortex at an early stage of task preparation could be revealed, which might have 
been overlooked with conventional analyses. In summary, the present study demonstrated 
that a network of lateral prefrontal and posterior parietal cortex encodes abstract rule 




4 Experimental Section II: Perceptual  





4.1 Theoretical background 
4.1.1 The formal elements of perceptual decision making 
 
In every-day life, we have to flexibly adapt our behaviour to the objects we perceive in the 
environment around us. An appropriate reaction on stimuli firstly requires successful 
perception, thus perceptual decision making. For example, we would not sit on an object 
that we identified as a piano but rather on a chair. It is unclear, however, if there is one 
perceptual decision making system that operates under all conditions of perceptual ambigu-
ity. Models of perceptual decision making typically assume a sequence of neural processing 
stages that begins with a sensory representation of the stimulus and then proceeds to com-
pute the perceptual choice at some higher level (Britten, Shadlen, Newsome & Movshon, 
1992; Britten et al., 1996; Gold & Shadlen, 2000; 2001; 2007; Heekeren et al., 2008; Leon 
& Shadlen, 1998; Mountcastle, Talbot, Sakata & Hyvärinen, 1969; Parker & Newsome, 
1998; Shadlen, Britten, Newsome & Movshon, 1996; Smith & Ratcliff, 2009). This idea has 
been formalised using probabilistic models of statistical inference and likelihood functions 
(Gold & Shadlen, 2007; Jazayeri & Movshon, 2006; Smith & Ratcliff, 2004; 2009). One 
common model assumes that perceptual hypotheses (“I see a piano” or “I see a chair”) are 
“Devine, si tu peux, et choisis, si tu l'oses.”  
(Guess if you can, and choose if you dare.) 
(Pierre Corneille, Léontine, Héraclius, 1646, act IV, scene IV) 
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tested using the noisy representations in visual areas (evidence), considering a certain 
probability or likelihood given by the context, to calculate the decision. A decision variable 
(DV) represents the aggregation of evidence, prior hypotheses and values. This DV is 
shifted during the decision process towards a criterion (for an overview about how to 
express this model mathematically see Gold & Shadlen, 2001). The decision criterion is the 
rule used to determine how much evidence has to be collected before a decision can be 
made one way or another (Gold & Shadlen, 2007). In some cases, additional evidence 
processed in a short time-window after the criterion is reached might even be used to 
reverse the decision (Resulaj, Kiani, Wolpert & Shadlen, 2009). Models typically assume 
that incoming evidence will shift a single DV from a neutral mid-position to the one side or 
the other over time until it reaches the criterion for one decision (symmetric random walk 
model or Wiener diffusion model). Alternatively, separate processes for individual DVs for 
each decision could compete for reaching their respective criterion (race model or dual 
diffusion model; for an overview about models see Gold & Shadlen, 2003; 2007; Smith & 
Ratcliff 2004; 2009; for urgency-gating models see Cisek, Puskas & El-Murr, 2009; Dit-
terich, 2006).  
The implicit assumption is that perceptual decision making under different levels of 
visibility always operates based on the same sensory mechanism. One of the simplest 
models is the classical signal detection theory (SDT) model of perceptual decision making 
(Green & Swets, 1966; Parker & Newsome, 1998; Swets, 1961). It assumes that even under 
the same presentation conditions, the internal representation will never be exactly the same, 
due to external (e.g. exact number of photons reaching the retina) and internal noise factors 
(e.g. non-zero level neural responses even without stimulation). The discriminability of two 
stimuli therefore depends on the overlap between the sensory distributions evoked by these 
different stimuli in the visual system. For clearly distinguishable stimuli, these distributions 
will be relatively distinct and not strongly overlapping, which facilitates accurate perceptual 
choices by placing the decision criterion in an optimal position along the sensory contin-
uum. When stimuli are not discriminable, they are believed to have overlapping sensory 
distributions and the trial-by-trial noise fluctuations in the sensory signal rather than marked 
differences in sensory signal determine whether it falls to one or the other side of the 
criterion (Shadlen et al., 1996; Swets, 1961). The decision process will then produce errors 
and close-to-chance-level performance. If this model were true, it would mean that the 
sensory signals predictive for high visibility choices would also be predictive for low 
visibility choices. Before an alternative model will be considered, the next paragraph gives 
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an overview about neuroscientific research on perceptual decision making and its reference 
to this framework. 
   
4.1.2 The neural basis of perceptual decision making 
 
Studies using single-cell recording in monkeys used the concept of choice probabilitiy (CP) 
to determine the neurons’ relationship to the monkeys’ choices independent from the 
presented stimuli (e.g. Britten et al., 1996; Newsome, Britten & Movshon, 1989; Nienborg 
& Cumming, 2009; Shadlen et al., 1996; Uka, Tanabe, Watanabe & Fujita, 2005). The 
neuron’s CP indicates the probability with which an independent observer would be able to 
correctly predict the monkey’s perceptual choice from this neuron’s firing rate on a given 
trial, knowing only the neuron’s firing characteristics for the possible decisions. In the 
classical task, monkeys were presented with random dot motion for one or two seconds. The 
monkeys watched dots on a screen; the dots were replaced with every monitor refresh. The 
coherence in replacement of dots was used to systematically vary the magnitude of per-
ceived movement to the left or to the right, usually including a neutral (non-coherence) 
condition (Britten et al., 1996). In early studies, recordings were made in extrastriate medial 
temporal area (MT) in the visual system. Weak but significant positive CPs were found for 
MT neurons even if stimuli did not contain any real motion, suggesting a link between the 
firing of neurons and the monkeys’ perceptual choices independent from the real stimulus 
motion. Others extended these findings by identifying neurons for very fine perceptual 
decisions (Jazayeri & Movshon, 2006; 2007; Purushothaman & Bradley, 2005). Accord-
ingly, Salzman, Murasugi, Britten & Newsome (1992) showed that micro-stimulation of 
neurons in monkey area MT favoured perceptual choices about random dot motion for the 
preferred direction of the stimulated neuron. Given the independence of neurons’ firing 
from real stimulus motion in these studies, the findings can be interpreted as evidence that 
the same neural system computes perceptual choices for stimuli of all visibility levels. 
However, the decision making system for motion is unlikely to be solely located in 
area MT. The choice probabilities found by Britten and colleagues (1996) were rather weak, 
suggesting that other regions contribute to a distributed decision making system that is more 
strongly involved in the decision process itself. Accordingly, others demonstrated that 
sensory areas are likely to be modulated by top-down processes during early processing 
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stages (Nienborg & Cumming, 2009). In line with these findings, it was assumed that 
further decision-related computations are carried out by frontal and parietal areas, as well as 
by motor structures, which might plan the upcoming actions (Gold & Shadlen, 2000; Kim & 
Shadlen, 1999; Shadlen & Newsome, 2001). Most importantly, the monkey lateral intrapa-
rietal area (LIP) was shown to be involved in the integration of collected evidence over time 
and in target selection for saccades (Huk & Shadlen, 2005; Roitman & Shadlen, 2002; 
Shadlen & Newsome, 2001). For other modalities, similar distributed neural systems have 
been proposed, such as primary and secondary somatosensory cortex and premotor cortex 
for vibro-tactile frequency (flutter) discrimination (Deco, Pérez-Sanagustín, de Lafuente & 
Romo, 2007; de Lafuente & Romo, 2005; Hernández, Zainos & Romo, 2000; 2002; Romo 
et al., 2002; Romo, Hernández & Zainos, 2004; Salinas, Hernández, Zainos & Romo, 2000; 
for a review see Romo & Salinas, 2003) and MT and the inferior temporal cortex (IT) for 
fine grained depth perception (e.g. Uka & DeAngelis, 2003; 2004; Uka et al., 2005). A 
clear-cut classification of sensory areas, motor areas and abstract decision areas within these 
perceptual decision making networks, however, seems to be an oversimplification; integra-
tion towards a decision might require direct ongoing modulation of sensory input (Kim & 
Shadlen, 1999; Romo & Salinas, 2003; Shadlen & Newsome, 2001).  
 
4.1.3 Networks for perceptual decision making 
 
An often neglected possibility is that different neural processes might determine the re-
sponse when participants are confident about their perception of a stimulus, as compared to 
conditions when they are not. For instance, for visual stimuli presented under high versus 
low visibility conditions, different networks in prefrontal and parietal cortex became more 
active (Dehaene et al., 1998; Heekeren et al., 2004). It has also been shown that different 
processing streams can be differentially influenced by stimulus visibility (Fang & He, 
2005). Under high visibility conditions there is also higher subjective confidence in the 
accuracy of a decision (Kiani & Shadlen, 2009; Kunimoto, Miller & Pashler, 2001) and less 
conflict between different response alternatives (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter & Cohen, 
2001), whereas low visibility and uncertainty might involve different brain areas, require 
additional processes and introduce decision latencies (Philiastides & Sajda, 2006; Philias-
tides, Ratcliff & Sajda, 2006). There is also evidence for more recurrent processing (Philias-
tides & Sajda, 2006; Supèr, Spekreijse & Lamme et al., 2001; VanRullen & Koch, 2003) 
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and higher functional integration within visual cortex for high compared to low visibility 
(Haynes, Driver & Rees, 2005). The picture is further complicated by the fact that not all 
sensory information in the brain is available to guide a response (Haynes & Rees, 2005a) 
and that behaviour can be influenced by stimuli that fail to reach awareness (Vorberg, 
Mattler, Heinecke, Schmidt & Schwarzbach, 2003). Taken together, this raises the question 
of whether the brain might compute decisions in a fundamentally different way under 
conditions of high and low visibility. Although several previous electrophysiological studies 
have investigated the influence of visibility on decision-making signals, these typically 
focussed on only few selected brain regions and are thus not suitable for identifying any 
differential roles between large-scale networks under high versus low visibility (e.g. Britten 
et al., 1996; Gold & Shadlen, 2000; Kim & Shadlen, 1999; Nienborg & Cumming, 2009; 
Purushothaman & Bradley, 2005; Shadlen & Newsome, 2001). 
Studies using fMRI in humans could demonstrate the involvement of larger networks 
in perceptual decision making (Heekeren et al., 2004; Ho, Brown & Serences, 2009; Philias-
tides & Sajda, 2007; Shulman, Ollinger, Linenweber, Petersen & Corbetta, 2001; Tosoni, 
Galati, Romani & Corbetta, 2008; for a review see Heekeren et al., 2008). Some studies 
used multivariate pattern classification on fMRI data to decode participants’ perceptual 
choices (Li et al., 2007; Pessoa and Padmala, 2007; Serences & Boynton, 2007). In one 
study, participants were presented with random dot motion, which was dissociated from real 
motion or attended motion. When the motion was unambiguous (clearly visible), nearly all 
visual areas from V1 to the human MT complex (hMT+) encoded the perceived motion 
(Serences & Boynton, 2007). Perceived motion for ambiguous stimuli that did not contain 
real motion could only be decoded from hMT+ (to V3a), confirming findings of electro-
physiology studies (Britten et al., 1996). It is important to note, however, that motion 
stimuli require the integration of information across longer time periods (Leon & Shadlen, 
1998; Mazurek, Roitman, Ditterich & Shadlen, 2003) and might easily lead to illusionary 
perception. This renders them problematic for the investigation of decision making under 
different levels of stimulus perceivability. Other fMRI studies in humans also have focused 
on selected brain regions from the visual system and prefrontal cortex when comparing high 
and low visibility conditions (Serences & Boynton, 2007; Williams et al., 2007). Thus, it 
remains unclear whether visibility might change the influence of specific brain regions on 




4.1.4 Perceptual decisions about objects 
 
In order to reduce the complexity of perceptual decisions processes, the component of long 
temporal integration can be eliminated by using static images, e.g. of different object 
categories (Philiastides et al., 2006; Philiastides & Sajda, 2006; 2007). Object classification 
still involves several processing stages (e.g. Humphreys, Price & Riddoch, 1999; Riddoch 
& Humphreys, 2003) but the integration of sensory information in static images towards a 
perceptual decision will take place within ~ 500 ms, depending on the difficulty (Philias-
tides & Sajda, 2006). Using static object images also has the advantage that the respective 
sensory regions for objects, the ventral and lateral-occipital complex (LOC) in occipital and 
inferior temporal cortex, are well investigated (e.g. Haushofer et al., 2008b; Haxby et al., 
2001; Ishai, Ungerleider, Martin, Schouten & Haxby, 1999; Malach et al., 1995; Op de 
Beeck et al., 2008b; for reviews see Grill-Spector, 2003; Grill-Spector & Malach, 2004). 
There are other ventral high-level visual areas adjacent to the LOC that were discussed to be 
specialised for subclasses of object stimuli, e.g. the fusiform face area (FFA), the parahip-
pocampal place area (PPA) and an area for body parts (Aguirre et al., 1998; Epstein & 
Kanwisher, 1998; Epstein et al., 1999; Downing et al., 2001; Kanwisher et al., 1997; 
Spiridon & Kanwisher, 2002; Reddy & Kanwisher, 2006; Spiridon, Fischl & Kanwisher, 
2006). There is much debate, however, whether the whole object sensitive occipito-temporal 
cortex is organised in distinct modules for different object categories, clustered by shared 
processes (Gauthier, Tarr, Anderson, Skudlarski & Gore, 1999; Gauthier, Skudlarski, Gore 
& Anderson, 2000; Tarr & Gauthier, 2000), topographical eccentricity (Malach, Levy & 
Hasson, 2002) or object form, encoded in a distributed and overlapping fashion (Cox & 
Savoy, 2003; Eger et al., 2008; Haxby, Hoffman & Gobbini, 2000; Haxby et al., 2001; 
O’Toole et al., 2005). It was also suggested that the LOC represents objects mainly by the 
arrangement of their parts (Haushofer, Baker, Livingstone & Kanwisher, 2008a; Hayworth 
& Biederman, 2006; Op de Beeck et al., 2008b). A recent review comes to the conclusion 
that a non-additive combination of distinct weak maps of all these different properties could 
result in very pronounced selectivity profiles in some sub-regions of the ventral object-
vision pathway. The combinations of these maps might then appear as specialised modules 
in functional imaging studies (Op de Beeck, Haushofer & Kanwisher, 2008a). 
It has further been proposed that in object recognition, inferior temporal cortex 
might act as a ‘connection centre’, or multiplexer, for context associations that activate 
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candidate object representations from which high-level areas could choose in a second 
processing step (Bar, 2004; Bar et al., 2006). Some fMRI studies also linked the LOC cortex 
directly to perceptual decisions about objects (Grill-Spector et al., 2000; Li et al., 2007; 
Philiastides & Sajda, 2007; Walther et al., 2009; Weber et al., 2009; Williams et al., 2007). 
In one study, the correlation between the classifier’s and participants’ classification errors 
of natural scenes, which contained typical objects, was high in LOC, pointing to a direct 
behavioural relevance of information encoded in LOC (Walther et al., 2009). In another 
study, Grill-Spector and colleagues (2000) presented their participants with masked images 
from different categories, using different image durations to achieve different levels of 
visibility. Activation in the LOC showed the highest correlation with recognition perform-
ance and was therefore assumed to be necessary for successful object perception (Grill-
Spector et al., 2000). Williams and colleagues (2007) were able to predict the category of 
successfully identified masked object images from the LOC but not when identification 
failed. These findings point towards a differential involvement of the LOC in perceptual 
decisions for different visibility conditions. No study, however, directly addressed the 
encoding of the decision outcome in comparison to the presented objects. Therefore, these 
studies again did not reveal whether a sensory region such as the LOC is always involved in 
perceptual decisions or if different neural systems might be engaged for high and low 
visibility. 
 
4.1.5 The goal of the present study 
 
The present study sought to directly investigate whether visibility has an effect on which 
brain regions determine a participant’s perceptual choice. In the present study, participants 
were asked to make perceptually based decisions about the category of weakly or strongly 
masked visually presented objects from three different categories. Static images were used 
to avoid extended temporal integration. To investigate the relationship between stimulus 
visibility and choices, the true object categories were dissociated from participants’ choices 
in the low visibility condition. Additionally, the motor responses were dissociated from the 
category decisions. This avoided confounds of choice and response direction that were 
inherent in most classical perceptual decision making studies in monkeys (e.g. Britten et al., 
1996; Huk & Shadlen, 2005; Shadlen & Newsome, 2001). Multivariate pattern classifica-
tion (Haynes & Rees, 2006; Norman et al., 2006) was used to predict the outcome of 
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perceptual decisions from brain activity under high and low visibility. This approach 
allowed neural encoding and choice performance to be directly linked and is conceptually 
close to choice probabilities in single-cell studies of perceptual decision making (e.g. 
Britten et al., 1996). First, a searchlight approach (Haynes et al., 2007; Kriegeskorte et al., 
2006) was applied to identify those brain regions that were maximally informative of 
choices under different visibility conditions. In a second step, the results were further 
elaborated using independent localizer scans to investigate the encoding in object-sensitive 




4.2.1 Masking experiment 
Participants 
 
Nineteen participants (10 female, mean age 26.1; range 23-31) took part in the study. All 
were right-handed, had normal or corrected to normal visual acuity and gave written in-
formed consent to the fMRI procedure. Data from two participants were excluded from all 
analyses due to excessive head movement. Data from another three participants were 
excluded because their categorisation performance did not differ between the two visibility 
conditions, suggesting a lack of attention to the task or the use of illegitimate strategies (e.g. 
one participant reported having used rapidly blinking in order to render the mask ineffec-
tive). The data from the remaining fourteen participants (8 female, mean age 25.8; range 23-




The stimuli were pictures of objects from two categories – pianos and chairs – as well as 
phase-randomised noise images serving as a non-object category. The categories were 
selected as they demonstrated comparable and optimal visibility characteristics under 
different masking conditions in behavioural pre-tests (Appendix B, Behavioural pre-tests I). 
Object stimuli were created from freely available pictures from the Internet or custom-made 
photographs using Adobe® Photoshop Version 7.0. Following Grill-Spector and colleagues 
(2000), the images showed objects in different natural backgrounds. All images were 
transformed into grey-scaled versions with a size of 400 x 400 pixels. The overall contrast 
(object to background) was kept approximately constant for all stimuli by matching the 
spectra and eliminating extreme contrast values. Thirty stimuli were created for each object 
category from which 24 were selected for the experiment (see Appendix B, Behavioural 
pre-tests III and Figure 4-1a for examples of the stimuli). The noise category also contained 
24 stimuli consisting of scrambled phase textures with the same power spectra as the 
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pictures from both object categories (see Appendix B, Figures B-3 to B-5 for all stimuli). To 
create the noise images, a two-dimensional Fourier transformation was performed on all 
stimuli from each object category (pianos, chairs). As in previous studies their phase maps 
were scrambled by adding a random value of +/- 1.75* to each phase angle (Malach et al., 
1995). The resulting phase maps were then transformed back to images and were contrast-
normalised. Two different scrambled masks were used as pre- and post-mask. Masks were 
constructed by dividing every target image into 10 x 10 squares, each 40 x 40 pixels. 
Subsequently, 100 of these squares were randomly chosen from the pool of all scrambled 
target images, such that they did not contain any clearly identifiable parts of objects. For 
both masks, 100 squares were reorganised into new 400 x 400 pixel scrambled images with 




During the fMRI experiment, stimuli were presented in the middle of the screen. Partici-
pants were required to fixate a white cross that was superimposed at the centre. Each trial 
consisted of a brief “standing wave” (Macknik & Livingstone, 1998) of the same mask-
target-mask sequence repeated four times to increase signal-to-noise level, extending the 
total duration of visual stimulation to 2668 ms (Figure 4-1c; see also Appendix B, Behav-
ioural pre-tests II). In both high and low visibility conditions the target images were pre-
ceded by a 167 ms pre-mask and followed by a post-mask of variable duration. The target 
image was shown for 16.7 ms (1 frame) under low visibility followed by a 483.3 ms post-
mask. Under high visibility it was shown for 66.7 ms (4 frames) followed by a 433.3 ms 
post-mask. Thus, the visibility conditions were defined by the ratio of target and post-mask 
duration (Grill-Spector et al., 2000). Each trial was followed by a response mapping screen 
that displayed three letters as response options (“K” Klavier = piano, “S” Stuhl = chair, “M” 
Muster = noise). Participants had to indicate the category of the object they believed they 
had seen by pressing one of three buttons using the index-, middle- and ring finger of the 
right hand. The position of letters assigned to the buttons was pseudo-randomised in order 
to avoid confounds of categorical choices with motor responses. Each button served as the 
correct response button equally often, separately for each visibility condition. Note that 
using this technique, motor responses could not be prepared until the response mapping 
screen appeared after stimulus presentation. Participants were encouraged to take their best 
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guess if they could not identify or were unsure about an object’s category, rather than not 
responding at all. The response mapping screen was presented for a pseudo-randomised 
duration, completing the total trial duration of 5000 ms, 7000 ms or 9000 ms. In each run all 
24 images from each of the three categories (pianos, chairs and noise) were shown in 
random order, under either of the two visibility conditions. Thus, participants were pre-
sented with 72 trials per run which was repeated for 6 runs in randomised order resulting in 
432 trials for the experiment. Altogether, each image was presented three times under each 
visibility condition in the entire experiment. Presentation during the experiment was con-
trolled by the Cogent toolbox (http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/Cogent) for MATLAB 7.0 (The 
MathWorks, Inc.). The stimuli were presented via a projector (resolution 1024x768 pixel, 
60Hz) that projected from the head-end of the scanner onto a screen. Participants viewed the 
projection via a mirror fixed onto the head coil. Using stimuli 10 x 10 cm in size and a 
distance of approximately 70 cm between the participants’ head and the screen, the esti-




Functional MRI volumes of the whole brain were acquired using a Siemens TRIO 3T 
scanner (Erlangen, Germany) with a standard head coil (42 axial slices, TR = 2800 ms, echo 
time TE = 30 ms, resolution 3 x 3 x 2 mm3 with 1 mm gap). Within each of the six runs, 182 
volumes were acquired for each participant using gradient-echo EPI. The first two volumes 





Figure 4-1: Experimental paradigm and examples of stimuli and masks. a) 24 different stimuli from three 
categories (pianos, chairs, noise) were used in the experiment (four example images of each category are 
displayed here). b) Masks were created by randomly scrambling the target images and constructing two new 
mask images of 10 by 10 tiles. c) Target images were preceded by a 167 ms pre-mask and followed by a post-
mask of variable duration. The target image was shown for 16.7 ms (1 frame) under low visibility followed by a 
483.3 ms post-mask. Under high visibility it was shown for 66.7 ms (4 frames) followed by a 433.3 ms post-
mask (left side). The flashed sequence of masked target images was presented four times in direct succession 
(right side), resulting in 2668 ms total presentation duration. Each trial was followed by a response mapping 
screen with a pseudo-randomised order of response buttons associated with the categories in order to avoid 
confounds of categorical choices with motor responses. The response mapping screen was presented for a 
pseudo-randomised duration, completing the total trial duration of 5000 ms, 7000 ms or 9000 ms.  
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Analysis of behavioural data 
 
Behavioural data was analysed by calculating hit rates as well as a visibility index for each 
category and each visibility condition, similar to the d-prime (d') for the two-condition case 
in SDT (Green & Swets, 1966). For this, the percentage of hits and false alarms for each 
condition of each category was transformed into z-values.  
d' = z (hits) – z (false alarms) 
High values corresponded to high visibility and low values indicated low visibility. The 
maximum value that could be achieved by 100% hits and no false alarms was d' = 7.44. On 
the other hand, a minimum in visibility cannot be easily specified because possible system-
atic confusion between categories would lead to a high number of false alarms, which, in 
turn, would produce negative values for d'. True invisibility, on the other hand, would 
produce a hit and false alarms rate at chance level, which would be indicated by a d' = 0. 
Note that this only holds true if there are no missing responses, so in general d' should be 
interpreted as an estimation rather than a direct measurement of visibility.  
 
Multivariate pattern classification 
 
Multivariate pattern classification (Haynes & Rees, 2006; Norman et al., 2006) was per-
formed on the fMRI data in order to identify brain regions encoding information about 
participants’ choices and object categories. For both procedures, data were subjected to two 
individual pattern classification analyses, one for high and one for low visibility. For the 
analyses of participants’ category choices, one participant had to be excluded as she never 
selected the “noise” category in the low-visibility condition during one run.   
As a precursor to the decoding analyses, a general linear model (GLM) was esti-
mated on an individual subject level based on motion corrected, non-normalised and 
unsmoothed data using SPM2 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/). This GLM yielded 
parameter estimates for each voxel in each participant for all three category decisions 
(pianos, chairs, noise), for each visibility condition and for each run. These parameter 
estimates were used for the following decoding analyses. Both high and low-visibility 
decoding analyses were carried out quasi identically, again using a variant of the “search-
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light approach” (Haynes et al., 2007; Kriegeskorte et al., 2006). This method searched for 
information-encoding regions in the brain in an unbiased fashion, as it tested spatial clusters 
around every voxel separately for their information content. For a given position in the 
brain, a searchlight cluster was defined as a sphere of N voxels (c1…N), with radius of 4 
voxels, constructed around the central voxel vi. For these voxels the GLM parameter 
estimates were extracted for each stimulus category and run, separately for each participant 
and for each visibility condition. A multivariate pattern classification algorithm was then 
applied to decode the stimulus category from these pattern vectors. Specifically, a linear 
support vector pattern classifier (Müller et al., 2001) with a fixed regularisation parameter C 
= 1 was trained on patterns vectors from all runs but one (“training data set”) using the 
LIBSVM toolbox. Based on the training data the classifier estimated an optimal linear 
decision hyperplane to separate the pattern vectors associated with choices for the different 
object categories. Subsequently, this hyperplane was used to predict the categories from the 
pattern vectors of an independent “test data set” taken from the remaining run. A six-fold 
cross-validation was performed by repeating the classification process independently with 
the pattern vectors of each run as the “test data set” and the remaining five runs as the 
“training data set”. The use of independent training and test data sets avoided problems of 
circular inference (Kriegeskorte et al., 2009). The mean probability of correct classification 
was assigned to the central voxel vi of the searchlight cluster and indexed the local decoding 
accuracy. This process was performed for every voxel in the brain by moving the search-
light cluster through all spatial positions. Using this technique, two 3-dimensional maps of 
local decoding accuracy values were obtained (one for “high visibility” and one “low 
visibility”) for each participant. These maps were then normalised to standard stereotaxic 
space (MNI EPI template) and smoothed with a Gaussian kernel of 6 mm FWHM to ac-
count for anatomical variability. Random-effects group-level analyses were then computed 
on a voxel-by-voxel basis to identify searchlight positions where local patterns had signifi-
cant decoding accuracy across all participants (Haynes et al., 2007).  
 
A very similar pattern classification analysis was conducted in order to predict the 
category of the presented objects. The classification procedure was the same as described 
above, only that parameter estimates were obtained from a different GLM that estimated 
regressors for the different presented categories, again individually for each participant and 
each run.  
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The second multivariate pattern classification control analysis was conducted to de-
code the motor responses (button presses) instead of the assigned categories, again sepa-
rately for both visibility conditions. The decoding analysis therefore aimed to confirm that 
the dissociation between response buttons and categories was successful. Again, the classi-
fication procedure was the same as described above, based on GLM parameter estimates for 
the motor responses, individually for each participant and each run.  
Finally, the procedure was repeated for decoding errors versus correct responses. 
This could only be achieved in the low visibility condition because the number of errors in 
the high visibility condition was too small because stimuli and responses were highly 
correlated. Taken together, these analyses ensured that all combinations of a typical confu-
sion matrix in perceptual decision making (see Appendix B, Figure B-6) were systemati-
cally investigated. 
 
4.2.2 LOC localizer experiment 
 
An additional experiment was performed, nominated a priori on the lateral occipital com-
plex (LOC) region. It should be assessed whether the results might change in case the 
analyses were restricted to specialised object processing voxels, using a conventional 
individual-specific LOC localiser (Malach et al., 1995). Independent functional localizer 
scans were used to predefine the LOC region in nine participants from the original sample 
(4 female, mean age 26.3, range 23-31), conducted some weeks later. Regions of interest 
(ROIs) were constructed for the original data from the main experiment and parameter 
estimates of these voxels were re-sampled as a different approach to feature selection for 
multivariate pattern classification.  
 
Stimuli, experimental procedure and data analysis 
 
Stimuli were presented in alternating blocks showing either object stimuli or phase-
randomised noise images (Figure 4-2). Blocks lasted 10000 ms and consisted of 10 object or 
noise images shown in random order, each for 900 ms with a 100 ms gap. Each block was 
followed by a fixation-only period of 10000 ms, prolonged by a pseudo-randomised delay 
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of 3000 ms, 5000 ms or 7000 ms. In one third of all object and noise blocks, one image was 
left out and instead the preceding image was directly repeated. The participants’ task was to 
detect these image repetitions (1-back task). This procedure ensured that participants’ 
attention to the target images was sustained during the whole scanning session. Scanning 
parameters were the same as for the masking experiment, but using 163 volumes acquired 




Figure 4-2: Stimuli used in the localizer experiment. a) Object stimuli b) Phase-randomised noise stimuli. In 
separate object blocks and noise blocks, all images were each shown for 900 ms in a random order, separated by 
100 ms blanks so that each image emerged discretely. In one third of all blocks, one image was left out and 
instead a different image was repeated in direct succession, which was to be detected. This procedure ensured 
that participants’ attention to the target images was constantly sustained. 
 
Data from this independent object localizer were motion-corrected and then co-registered to 
the non-normalised images of the individual participants from the masking experiment 
using SPM2. Two regions were identified that were activated stronger by object images than 
noise images (p < .05 FWE corrected) in each participant. These were the left and right 
LOC (left LOC: average 83 voxels, range 45-159; right LOC: average 79 voxels, range 40-
124). The decoding analyses (participants’ categorical choices and presented object cate-
gories) performed on the data from the masking experiment were then repeated as described 
above but restricted to these conventional LOC voxels. Detailed analyses were performed to 






Behavioural data was analysed by means of d' values. Following an ANOVA for repeated 
measurements that included all combinations of categories and visibility conditions as 
factors [F(5,65) = 30.08; Eta2 = 0.59; p < .001], the differences in d' values between “high 
visibility” and “low invisibility” reached statistical significance for all object categories in 
post-hoc Scheffé-tests correcting for multiple comparisons (pianos: high visibility d' = 2.90, 
SE = 0.30; low visibility d' = 0.69, SE = 0.10; p < .001; chairs: high visibility d' = 3.13; SE 
= 0.30; low visibility: d' = 1.02, SE = 0.11; p < .001; noise: high visibility d' = 2.16, SE = 
0.23; low visibility d' = 1.11, SE = 0.19; p < .01) (Figure 4-3a). The same analysis con-
ducted using hit rates instead of d' values showed highly comparable results (Appendix B, 
Figure B-7). It can therefore be assumed that distinct visibility characteristics for each 
condition were successfully achieved, as was the comparability of the object categories 
within each visibility condition. None of the participants was better at categorising poorly 
visible objects compared to highly visible objects from the same category (Figure 4-3b). A 
control experiment with an independent sample demonstrated that high visibility was 
strongly associated with high decision confidence while low visibility was associated with 




Figure 4-3: Visibility of stimuli. a) Mean visibility indices for both visibility conditions and all three categories. 
Hits and false alarms [%] were transformed into z-values for each category in each visibility condition. The 
difference between z (hits) – z (false alarms) then served as the index of visibility d'. Displayed are mean d' values and 
standard errors for the final sample (N=14). Greater d' values for the “high visibility” compared to the “low 
visibility” condition were achieved for all categories. b) Individual visibility indices for all participants for both 
visibility conditions and all three categories. The graph displays individual d' values for each participant. Solid 
lines: categories in “high visibility” condition (mean 2.73; SE 0.27); dotted lines: categories in “low visibility” 
condition (mean 0.94; SE 0.14). Nearly all participants showed a clear separation between visibility conditions 
(exceptions were participant 4 and 12 in one case). The same category was never perceived better under “low 



































































* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001
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In the next step, searchlight decoding was used to identify brain regions that encoded 
participants’ classification choices (chance level 33%). For the “high visibility” condition, 
the chosen category could be decoded from bilateral LOC (accuracies: left 45%; right 46%; 
Figure 4-4a, green regions). For the low “visibility condition” participants’ choices could 
not be decoded from LOC. Instead, their choices could be decoded from the precuneus, 
which showed a significant decoding accuracy of 45%. This region extended to lateral 
inferior parietal cortex (Figure 4-4a, red regions). The activity patterns underlying the 
category choices were highly unique for each participant (Figure 4-4b; additional illustra-
tions for all participants can be found in Appendix B, Figures B-11 and B-12).  
To further elaborate upon the relationship between the pattern classifier’s classifica-
tion performance and participants’ categorisation performance, correlation analyses of 
confusion matrices (see Walther et al., 2009, for a similar approach) were performed (see 
Appendix B; Figure B-10a for details). This analysis confirmed that regions that displayed a 
high similarity between the pattern classifier’s performance and the participants’ perform-
ance (therefore reflecting similarities in classification errors) were located in bilateral visual 
cortex and LOC when objects were highly visible. For poorly visible objects the correlation 
was highest in a cluster in the precuneus, located close to the cluster found for searchlight 
decoding (Appendix B; Figure B-10b). 
Pattern classification analyses were also conducted to decode the true categories of 
presented objects. These could only be decoded from bilateral visual cortex (accuracies: left 
47%; right 44%), left LOC (50% accuracy) and right LOC (48% accuracy) when objects 
were highly visible (Figure 4-5a). In the low visibility condition the categories could not be 
decoded from any region. The LOC regions for high visibility strongly overlapped with 
those found for decoding of category choices. This was expected since participants’ choices 
for highly visible objects corresponded well with the category of presented objects. Early 
visual cortex, including V1, also encoded the true category of highly visible objects in the 
present study. The wide spread of decoding accuracy in early visual regions might mostly 
be due to stronger differences in low-level features between noise images and real object 
images compared to differences between the real object images (pianos and chairs). In line 
with this assumption, control analyses using pair-wise decoding of only two categories at a 
time confirmed that only the LOC allowed real object images to be decoded. Patterns in 
wide spread regions of the ventral visual stream, however, allowed decoding of noise versus 




Figure 4-4: Whole-brain searchlight decoding results for categorical choices. a) Participants’ perceptual 
choices for all categories (pianos, chairs, noise) were used for pattern classification. Displayed in green are 
regions where a searchlight allowed decoding above chance level for high visibility conditions (chance level 
33% for three categories). This was possible from left (45% accuracy) and right LOC (46% accuracy) with a 
threshold of p < .05 (FWE corrected). Displayed in red are regions where choices could be decoded for the low 
visibility condition. The choices could be decoded from precuneus (accuracy 45%; p < .000001). For better 
visualisation, informative regions are displayed with a threshold of p < .0001. Note the double dissociation 
between regions encoding of choices under high and low visibility. b) Examples of individual spatial activation 
patterns for participants’ choices in the low visibility condition for six participants. Displayed are the searchlight 
clusters (radius = 4 voxels) with the best average decoding accuracy from the main analysis (MNI: -9; -63; 30). 
The colour code indicates which category the voxels preferentially respond to (magenta for pianos, yellow for 
chairs, blue for noise; sup = superior, ant = anterior, R = right). Grey voxels did not show a category-preference 
or were not located in grey matter. Colours are scaled for better visualisation. Informative patterns were unique 




























b) Individual spatial activation patterns for category choices under low visibility









Figure 4-5: Whole-brain searchlight decoding for object categories. a) Decoding of sensory stimulus 
categories (pianos, chairs noise). Displayed in green are clusters from which decoding above chance level (33%) 
was achieved; peak accuracies and standard errors are given for each cluster. In the high visibility condition the 
category of sensory stimuli could be decoded from bilateral LOC (p < .05 FWE corrected; displayed with p < 
.00001 uncorrected for better visualisation) extending into visual cortex. No region could be found to encode the 
category of sensory stimuli in the low visibility condition. b) When the decoding analysis was restricted to real 
object categories (pianos, chairs; plotted here in red; see Appendix B) the informative brain regions were even 
more closely confined to LOC (chance level 50% for two categories) and again only for the high visibility 
condition (p < .00001 uncorrected). c) Example of a spherical voxel cluster (“searchlight”) of one participant for 
the left LOC. Voxels responding preferentially to one category are colour-coded (magenta for pianos, yellow for 
chairs, blue for noise; sup = superior, ant = anterior, R = right). Grey transparent voxels did not show category-
preference or were not located in grey matter. Colours are scaled for better visualisation. As expected, informa-
tive patterns were different for each participant. All coordinates are MNI coordinates.  
 
To ensure that decoding of participants’ choices was not based on motor decisions, addi-
tionally pattern classification analyses were performed to decode the motor response (button 
press) instead of the associated category. As expected from the randomised response 
mappings, no choice-related region showed significant decoding accuracy. The only region 
which encoded the motor responses (peak accuracy 45%) was left motor cortex (since 






































































Figure 4-6: Whole-brain searchlight decoding results for motor responses. Response buttons were random-
ised with respect to the assigned categories to avoid confounds of motor responses with categorical choices. The 
successful dissociation between encoding of choices and motor responses is highlighted by the results of a 
searchlight decoding of participants’ button presses (index/middle/ring finger of the right hand; chance level 
33%). Only the left motor cortex allowed decoding of motor responses for both, the high visibility condition 
(accuracy: 43%; p < .0001 uncorrected, 10 voxels threshold) and the low visibility condition (accuracy: 45% p < 
.000001 uncorrected, 10 voxels threshold) with comparable accuracy (all displayed with p < .0001 uncorrected 
for better visualisation). The regions which were found to encode participants’ abstract category choices (left and 
right LOC for high visibility and precuneus for low visibility) did not allow decoding of motor responses above 
chance. Bars are standard errors. Coordinates are MNI coordinates.   
 
The next step was to compare the average BOLD signal in those voxels that were the centre 
of the most successful decoding searchlight clusters from the LOC and the precuneus. Both 
left and right LOC showed stronger activation (as assessed by BOLD contrast estimates) for 
real objects compared to noise images when they were highly visible. On contrast, the 
activation was lower for poorly visible objects from all three categories, confirming earlier 
findings (Grill-Spector et al., 2000). Despite containing choice-related information, the 
precuneus did not show significant overall differences in average BOLD signal between 




































Figure 4-7: BOLD contrast estimation profiles for all conditions. Event-related differences in BOLD signal 
between all six conditions (pianos, chairs, noise in the high visibility (solid lines) and the low visibility (dashed 
lines) condition) averaged across all 14 participants with standard errors (SE). Time-steps are given in volumes 
(1 volume = 1 TR = 2800 ms), the first volume is time-locked to the onset of stimulus presentation. Time-series 
(here based on data smoothed with a Gaussian kernel of 8 mm FWHM) were extracted for the voxels with the 
highest decoding accuracies for participants’ category choices in the high visibility condition (left and right 
LOC) and the low visibility condition (precuneus). Both LOC regions showed a stronger BOLD response for 
highly visible objects (pianos, chairs) compared to highly visible noise as well as compared to all categories in 
the low visibility condition. The precuneus was not strongly activated for images from any visibility condition.  
 
Comparing the BOLD response (as estimated by a GLM) between visibility conditions 
throughout the whole brain, only the rostral cingulate zone (RCZ) in medial prefrontal 
cortex showed stronger activation for objects from all categories presented under low 
visibility compared to high visibility. Stronger activation for objects presented under high 
visibility compared to low visibility could only be found in LOC and anterior temporal 
cortex (see Appendix B, Univariate Analysis, Figure B-8). No brain region showed a 
difference between correct trials and error trials under low visibility, even with a very 
liberal threshold (p > .01 uncorrected), or when the analyses were restricted to ROIs in LOC 
and precuneus (Appendix B, Figure B-9). Correct versus error trials could also not be 
decoded from any brain region, even when a lower threshold than for the all other analyses 
was used (p > .0001, uncorrected). These results confirm that it is very unlikely that sub-
stantial residual visibility for strongly masked images was present; this should have caused 
some brain region to reflect incorrect categorisation. 
Finally, the decoding analyses were repeated for participants’ category choices and 
object categories but restricted to voxels from conventional LOC ROIs as obtained by the 
independent localizer scans. The results confirmed that the objects’ true categories as well 
as category choices could only be decoded from LOC when objects were highly visible, 































vol 1 vol 2 vol 3 vol 4
Time-steps (volumes)
left LOC [-21 -51 6] right LOC [27 -39 12] Precuneus [-9 -63 30]
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closely matching the results from the searchlight decoding analyses (see Table 4-1; for 
details see Appendix B, Decoding results from conventional LOC ROIs). The lower decod-
ing accuracies for the classification of pianos and chairs might be due to greater similarities 
between low-level features of pianos and chairs compared to both object categories. This is 
in line with the lower statistical values obtained from searchlight decoding of pianos and 
chairs when leaving out the noise trials (see Appendix B, Two-class pattern classification 
for presented objects). Given the smaller sample size of the localizer experiment, this 
analysis also had lower statistical power. Additionally, it has been demonstrated before that 
decoding accuracy drops when only object-selective voxels (defined by univariate analyses) 
are selected for pattern classification, possibly due to redundancy effects within the selected 
voxel set and the elimination of information from weakly activated voxels, which otherwise 
importantly contribute to the patterns (Cox & Savoy, 2003). 
 





T p < 
   M SE   
True Category       
High Visibility LOC L 69 4.2 7.76 .001 
  R 60 4.1 3.42 .01 
Low Visibility LOC L 50 4.0 0.01 .99 
  R 54 3.7 1.55 .16 
Chosen Category       
High Visibility LOC L 65 4.7 5.94 .001 
  R 61 6.0 2.10 .07 
Low Visibility LOC L 52 5.2 0.61 .65 
  R 56 3.6 1.68 .13 
Note: LOC = Lateral-occipital complex (based on individual localizer scans); the results are averaged across all 
pair-wise decoding analyses, separately for high and low visibility (chance level 50%); L = left hemisphere, R = 
right hemisphere; M = mean; SE = standard error. 
 
In summary, it was only for highly visible objects that their identity as well as participants’ 
(correct) category choices could be decoded from the LOC region in inferior temporal 
cortex. In the case of poor visibility, achieved by strong masking, the object category could 
not be decoded from brain activity - but the participants’ categorical choices could nonethe-





This study shows that stimuli and choices during perceptual decision making can be reliably 
decoded from patterns of brain signals. Importantly, it could be demonstrated that different 
mechanisms were responsible for perceptual choices about highly and poorly visible ob-
jects. The maximally predictive brain regions depended strongly on stimulus visibility; a 
clear double dissociation could be revealed between the visibility conditions. The LOC 
encoded the true category of highly visible objects as well as decision outcomes of such. It 
did not, however, encode the object categories or decision outcomes when objects were 
rendered nearly invisible. The drop in information presumably explains the drop in per-
formance for conditions of low visibility. No regions could be found to encode the true 
category of presented objects when these were strongly masked. The precuneus, however, 
encoded choices about poorly visible objects but not highly visible ones. The BOLD signal 
strength in this region did not reflect preferences for any object category. Decisions were 
only encoded in finer grained stable activation patterns. These results demonstrate that 
under certain circumstances, it is possible that perceptual decisions are not based on the 
same sensory signal dimension.  
 
4.4.1 Perceptual decisions about highly visible objects 
 
The present results demonstrate that categorical choices were encoded in object sensitive 
cortex in the LOC for highly visible objects. This is in line with studies showing that the 
LOC can be regarded as a sensory processing area for objects and categories (e.g. Cox & 
Savoy, 2003; Grill-Spector, 2003; Haushofer et al., 2008a; Haxby et al., 2001; Op de Beeck 
et al., 2008a,b; Reddy & Kanwisher, 2006; Schwarzlose et al., 2008). This region extended 
to the medial temporal lobe (MTL), which is highly interconnected with the lateral LOC. It 
has been demonstrated using single-unit recordings in humans that the MTL contains highly 
selective neurons for a variety of categories, pointing to a sparse, invariant and explicit 
representation in the MTL related to memory and conscious perception (Mormann et al., 
2008; Quiroga, Reddy, Kreiman, Koch & Fried, 2005; Quiroga, Reddy, Koch & Fried, 
2007). Given the greater extend in the LOC the whole area will be simply referred to as 
LOC in the following.  
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When a stimulus can be easily be seen, it is difficult to dissociate sensory from 
choice-related signals because participants will choose correctly on most trials and the two 
measures are therefore highly correlated. Accordingly, regions encoding presented objects 
and chosen objects strongly overlapped in the high visibility condition. Highly visible 
objects could additionally be decoded from early visual cortex. Previously, it has been 
demonstrated that activation patterns from V1 to V3 are sufficient to encode literally every 
possible object image (Kay et al., 2008). Others also found that category information could 
be decoded from earlier areas of the visual system (Eger et al., 2008; Walther et al., 2009; 
Williams et al., 2008). In the present study, this can be easily explained by differences in 
low-level visual features, especially between the noise category and the real object catego-
ries (pianos and chairs). It seems most likely that areas from early visual cortex up the 
ventral visual pathway were recruited to process information about the objects, resulting in 
representations about object categories in the LOC.  
The LOC might therefore also be a high-level integration area for perceptual deci-
sions about object categories. Others suggested the existence of a “domain general accumu-
lator” for sensory evidence located in the insula (Ho et al., 2009). Similarly, a “general 
mechanism” for perceptual decision making has been suggested, reflected by a stronger 
difference signal for objects under high visibility compared to low visibility in DLPFC 
(Heekeren et al., 2004). These studies, however, did not explicitly look at choice prediction 
in various brain regions and used different presentation and visibility conditions compared 
to the present study. There is little evidence for the insula or lateral prefrontal cortex acting 
as a general decision maker in the present study (only the correlation analysis of confusion 
matrices showed significant results in DLPFC; see Appendix B) (but see Rorie & Newsome, 
2005; Tosoni et al., 2008 for a general discussion of this model).  
The present findings extended earlier studies substantially by demonstrating a case in 
which the encoding of choice outcomes in LOC was only possible under high visibility. By 
varying the visibility of the visual input, others found that the LOC only encoded object 
information on trials in which participants successfully classified the objects while earlier 
visual regions also contained object information if objects were not correctly identified 
(Williams et al., 2007); but these authors did not directly investigate the encoding of deci-
sion outcomes. In a different fMRI study, activation in LOC was found to strongly correlate 
with the visibility of objects and therefore with participants’ ability to correctly identify the 
objects’ category (Grill-Spector et al., 2000). Using very short target durations of 20 ms, no 
object-related activity was reported for the LOC after subtracting activity related to the 
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mask. The direct encoding of choice-related signals was again not addressed. Another study 
that used pattern classification to compute choice probabilities based on EEG signals also 
did not specifically address any potential changes in choice-predictive topographies depend-
ing on visibility (Philiastides & Sajda, 2006). The present study, however, could demon-
strate that for very short target durations, the LOC did not encode object categories or 
decision outcomes. This clearly speaks against the existence of one self-contained neural 
system for perceptual object decisions of all levels of ambiguity. 
 
4.4.2 Perceptual decisions about poorly visible objects 
 
Several previous near-threshold experiments have studied which brain signals are predictive 
of perceptual choices, either by comparing hits/false alarms with misses/correct rejections 
or by explicitly computing choice probabilities (Bradley, Chang & Andersen, 1998; Britten 
et al., 1996; Gold & Shadlen, 2000; Huk & Shadlen, 2005; Nienborg & Cumming, 2009; 
Kim & Shadlen, 1999; Ress & Heeger, 2003; Serences & Boynton, 2007; Shadlen et al., 
1996; Shadlen & Newsome, 2001; Thompson & Schall, 1999; Williams et al., 2007). 
Importantly, however, the degree to which different networks might be involved in percep-
tual choices under high and low visibility has remained unclear. The most important finding 
in the present study is that the LOC did not encode the perceptual choices for poorly visible 
objects; they were instead encoded in the precuneus. This clear double-dissociation in 
decoding demonstrated that different neural systems were involved. This contradicts the 
assumptions of SDT (Green & Swets, 1966), which predicts that decisions about perceptual 
entities should be based on the same dimension of signal, even in the absence of useful 
sensory information. In temporal accumulation models, choices under low visibility are 
dominated by a random walk that is based on trial-by-trial fluctuations in the underlying 
sensory signals (Mazurek et al., 2003). The variability in decisions is then thought to be 
dominated by “noise” (Faisal, Selen & Wolpert, 2008). This noise could be related to 
changes and random processes in single neurons (e.g. electrochemical and biochemical 
fluctuations) and in the respective sensory network (Faisal, et al., 2008), driving the random 
walk towards one decision threshold or another. Accordingly, using choice probabilities, it 
has repeatedly been demonstrated that decisions about random dot motion could be pre-
dicted from the same neural populations in area MT, LIP and DLPFC, independent of the 
real stimulus motion and even in the absence of any real motion in the stimulus (Britten et 
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al., 1996; Huk & Shadlen, 2005; Kim & Shadlen, 1999; Shadlen & Newsome, 2001). These 
findings suggested one self-contained neural system for all levels of perceptual ambiguity 
(Gold & Shadlen, 2007), which is not supported by the present results.  
The applicability of one single system for perceptual decisions is, however, subject 
to question. First, in the abovementioned studies, recordings in monkeys were usually made 
in one cortical region only (Gold & Shadlen, 2000; Huk & Shadlen, 2005; Kim & Shadlen, 
1999; Shadlen & Newsome, 2001). The involvement of a different decision system for poor 
visibility therefore might have been easily overlooked. Second, recent models acknowledge 
that the information flow between sensory regions, parietal and prefrontal integration areas 
and motor regions appears to be continuous and reciprocal such that the decision is not the 
end-product of the computation of a central decision maker (Gold & Shadlen, 2007; Nien-
borg & Cumming, 2009; Tosoni et al., 2008). Hence, perceptual decision making appears to 
be more dynamic than initially thought, which might also permit interactions with a differ-
ent network for poor visibility. Additionally, unlike the present study, signal detection 
models are designed for stimuli that require temporal accumulation of evidence over time 
(Cisek et al., 2009; Mazurek et al., 2003). Moving dot patterns in most studies were always 
visible for several seconds, which gave the participants the possibility to gather a relevant 
percept that could be interpreted, even illusory. The static object images used in the present 
study required little spatio-temporal integration (for a similar argument see Philiastides & 
Sajda, 2006) as object classification is usually a very fast and highly automated process 
(Bowers & Jones, 2008; Grill-Spector & Kanwisher, 2005; Mack, Gauthier, Sadr & 
Palmeri, 2008). It was demonstrated with the present study that under these conditions, 
decision making under high and low visibility can involve a switch between different 
cortical networks. 
Several possible confounds have to be considered before a possible mechanism for 
perceptual decision making with insufficient visual input is discussed. First, the strongly 
masked objects might have been visible enough to be processed at a conceptual level, given 
that hit rates and d' values slightly exceeded chance level in some cases. It has been argued 
that only a d' value of zero is sufficient for true invisibility (Schmidt & Vorberg, 2006). 
Additionally, regions in parietal cortex, as part of the dorsal visual stream, can also process 
shape (Sereno & Maunsell, 1998) and object information (Konen & Kastner, 2008), thereby 
might reflect some residual visibility in the positive decoding results. Contradicting this 
argument, however, the masking procedure used in the present study was comparable to 
other studies in which objects were successfully rendered invisible (Grill-Spector et al., 
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2000; Quiroga, Mukamel, Isham, Malach & Fried, 2008). It might have been even stronger 
due to the use of shorter target durations and stronger sandwich-masking (Appendix B, 
Figure B-2). Moreover, if the precuneus did indeed process the barely visible objects on a 
visual basis (and furthermore at a category level) it should have shown some information 
encoding for poorly visible objects or categorisation errors, which was not observed. All 
participants reported they often felt they were purely guessing as they did not see the 
objects. The subjective experience of low decision confidence might therefore activate a 
different network (see Appendix B, Figure B-13).  
Another concern might be that participants gave up on the task and responded in a 
random manner. Hence, the double dissociation between encoding in LOC and precuneus 
would only be due to different kinds of decisions, namely object related decisions under 
high visibility and motor decisions under low visibility. This explanation, however, can be 
ruled out because motor responses could not be prepared beforehand and decisions and 
motor responses were dissociated due to the use of pseudo-randomised response mapping 
screens. Additional control analyses clearly demonstrated that motor responses could not be 
decoded from choice-related brain areas under any visibility condition. It can therefore be 
concluded that participants always made category decisions instead of random button 
presses. 
Furthermore, it could also be argued that sensory regions must be the origin of the per-
ceptual decision because it is possible to evoke perception in the absence of sensory informa-
tion via micro-stimulation in sensory cortex (e.g. Britten & van Wezel, 1998; Murphey & 
Maunsell, 2007; Murphey, Maunsell, Beauchamp & Yoshor, 2009; Salzman, Britten & 
Newsome, 1990; Salzman et al., 1992). In successful direct cortical stimulation, however, the 
information is actually present because it is artificially induced in the sensory area and is 
again sufficient to make a perceptual decision. Hence, this argument does not contradict the 
present findings since decisions were made in the absence of such information in decision-
related areas in the present study. 
 
4.4.3 A mechanism for internal decisions 
 
It is proposed here that in the low visibility condition, participants might have purely 
guessed when stimuli were presented close to the perceptual threshold. Without access to 
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substantial sensory evidence for either choice alternative, they faced a symmetry situation. 
Thus, trial-by-trial choices could be based on a dedicated symmetry-breaking network rather 
than on noise fluctuations in sensory signals. This network would come into play as soon as 
the participants believe the information to be insufficient. Previous studies have shown 
differences in large-scale cortical activity patterns under different visibility conditions 
(Dehaene et al., 1998; Fang & He, 2005; Heekeren et al., 2004; Philiastides et al., 2006; 
Philiastides & Sajda, 2006). These different networks are often believed to reflect uncer-
tainty or effort but instead they might reflect neural mechanisms that are actively involved 
in symmetry-breaking. The present study is therefore compatible with the data obtained in 
these studies. The precuneus could be part of the neural substrate of the symmetry-breaking 
network and produce random internal decisions. Accordingly, recent fMRI studies using 
multivariate pattern classification found that the precuneus encoded decision outcomes for 
intended free decisions, even in the absence of a visual task (Soon et al., 2008; in prep.). 
Participants had to freely decide whether they wanted to press the left or right button at a 
time of their choosing (Soon et al., 2008) or decide upon a simple mathematical operation to 
be performed (Soon et al., in prep.). It was possible to predict the decision outcomes from 
activation patterns in the precuneus / PCC as well as from anterior medial prefrontal cortex 
(MPFC), even seconds before participants were aware of making a decision. It is worth 
noting that the precuneus cluster found by Soon and colleagues (2008) was located anterior 
to the present results but demonstrated substantial overlap when the same statistical thresh-
olds were applied (see Appendix B, Figure B-16). Others found regions in inferior parietal 
lobe / precuneus involved in internally selected actions compared to externally cued ones 
(Jenkins et al., 2000) or focussing on one’s own intentions (den Ouden, Frith, Frith & 
Blakemore, 2005). It also has been demonstrated that posterior parietal areas are involved in 
the formation of free decisions in monkeys (Cui & Andersen, 2007; Pesaran, Nelson & 
Andersen, 2008) and intentions in humans (Desmurget et al., 2009). The precise localization 
of effects within this region can be rather widespread depending on the exact nature of the 
task (e.g. den Ouden et al., 2005). These studies support the hypothesis that low visibility 
required participants to switch to a mechanism that breaks the symmetry, allowing a deci-
sion to be made when sensory input is unreliable, absent or irrelevant. The precuneus could 
act as a generator for internal random decision outcomes. It is well suited for this purpose, 
because it has one of the most complex columnar cortical organisations and has been 
discussed to be involved in the implementation of a wide range of higher-order cognitive 
functions (Cavanna & Trimble, 2006). The precuneus has reciprocal connections to several 
  
 83 
regions in medial and lateral parietal cortex as well as prefrontal cortex including DLPFC, 
SMA and pre-SMA (Cavanna & Trimble, 2006), the latter of which were also discussed to 
be involved in the generation of self-initiated action (Haggard, 2008; Soon et al., 2008).  
The present findings require a modified conceptual framework for perceptual deci-
sion making. The classical model assumes that sensory evidence for the given alternatives is 
collected, leading to the decision. The decision, in turn, triggers the (motor) response (e.g. 
Gold & Shadlen, 2007). Others, however, assumed that central (rather than peripheral) noise 
fluctuations between large-scale attractor networks are essential during near-threshold 
decision making (Deco & Romo, 2008). When no sufficient evidence can be collected, or 
sensory information is equal for each alternative, the response selection process might still 
be routed into one decision or the other, such that a random decision must be made (Romo 
& Salinas, 2003). Note that this model does not require the temporal accumulation of 
signals towards a threshold in sensory regions. Decisions with negligible input might rather 
be based on the current state of a different system, which, in turn, is determined by random 
noise factors. It could further be speculated that the switch from perceptual decisions to 
random decisions could be achieved by neurons signalling the absence of a detectable 
stimulus (e.g. Deco et al., 2007). It has been suggested that the positive detection of sub-
threshold input might allow systems that rely on strong noise fluctuations to determine a 
response (Faisal et al., 2008). Such a scenario would be plausible when no extended tempo-
ral integration of information takes place and no substantial build-up of decision biases can 
be expected. Interestingly, this model is similar to a model proposed for voluntary decision 
making, which assumes that if sensory stimuli fail to generate sufficient information for a 
response, a free decision is required (Haggard, 2008).  
 
4.4.4 Alternative mechanisms 
 
There are, however, some alternative accounts for the precuneus involvement in the present 
decision task. The medial part of inferior parietal cortex has been reported to work in 
concert with its lateral counterparts in spatial and abstract mental imagery (Fletcher et al., 
1995; Knauff, Fangmeier, Ruff & Johnson-Laird, 2003). Other work also identified the 
precuneus as being related to episodic memory retrieval (Addis, McIntosh, Moscovitch, 
Crawley & McAndrews, 2004; Fletcher, Shallice, Frith, Frackowiak & Dolan, 1996; Tulv-
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ing et al., 1994). The involvement of the precuneus could alternatively be explained by the 
generation of mental images of objects as a substitute for visual information. It could be 
speculated that these images were then compared with templates from recent memory 
traces. This explanation, however, has several shortcomings. First, it contradicts self-reports 
of the participants who agreed in great consensus on simply having guessed if they did not 
see the objects. This makes it unlikely that any strong mental images were created. Second, 
the precuneus was more often found to be involved in self-related episodic memory (Lund-
strom et al., 2003; Lundstrom, Ingvar & Petersson, 2005) or self-related prospective mem-
ory (Burgess, Quayle & Frith, 2001) rather than simple item recall. Third, visual imagery is 
believed to involve networks that are required for perception (Kosslyn, Ganis & Thompson, 
2001; O’Craven & Kanwisher, 2000). If visual imagery were relevant, one would expect an 
involvement of LOC rather than a near-perfect double dissociation between visible and 
invisible conditions. Therefore, it seems more likely that the decisions themselves were 
internally generated, thus made with a high self-reference.  
If symmetry-breaking leads to internal decisions, partially resembling free decisions, 
one would also expect prefrontal areas to be involved in this process; specifically, the 
medial and anterior PFC were often found to be involved in free decision making and 
internal action selection (Cunnington et al., 2002; 2005; Haggard, 2008; Haynes et al., 
2007; Lau et al., 2004a; Lau, Rogers & Passingham, 2007; Soon et al., 2008; in prep.). 
However, while activation in medial prefrontal cortex at the border of RCZ and SMA / pre-
SMA was stronger for the low visibility condition than for the high visibility condition in 
the present study, this area did not encode the decision outcomes. This is in line with results 
from Soon and colleagues (2008; in prep.) where the pre-SMA encoded the timing, but not 
the outcome of the decisions. In the present study, timing aspects could not be teased apart 
because of the temporal proximity of visual presentation and decisions, excluding the use of 
time-resolving FIR models. It is likely that the SMA / RCZ activation in the present study 
was simply related to decision uncertainty under low visibility (Nachev et al., 2008). In 
summary, it can be assumed that internal guessing decisions and intended free decision 
share some neural substrate but they might not be completely identical. This question is 





4.4.5 Conclusion  
 
It was demonstrated that the brain might switch between two different decision networks 
depending on whether visual stimuli are easy or difficult to see. For clearly visible objects, 
decision-relevant information might be contained in specialised sensory regions in the LOC. 
In the absence of sufficient perceptual input, the decisions rely on neural populations in the 
precuneus, distinct from those for perceptual decisions made with certainty. This interpreta-
tion is in line with findings showing that the precuneus was also a key region for free 
decisions. The precuneus therefore might act as the brain’s symmetry breaker and generator 














5.1 Theoretical background 
5.1.1 The general framework of free decisions 
 
Imagine a card game in which one wins by picking the higher card of two alternatives. Most 
of us would agree that, if we had to choose between two covered cards without seeing their 
faces, it would be a completely free decision. Would it be different, however, if the faces 
were shown so briefly that we could not identify the cards and had to guess? The previous 
study (Experimental Section II) demonstrated a case in which visual information about 
objects was so well masked such that it became insufficient for perceptual decision making. 
Contrary to assumptions derived from SDT (Green & Swets, 1966), it could be shown that 
those decision outcomes were not encoded in the sensory system (LOC) anymore but in a 
different region, namely the precuneus. The precuneus was assumed to be part of a symme-
try-breaking network, which comes into play in the absence of sufficient visual input. Given 
that other studies linked the precuneus to free decisions (e.g. Soon et al., 2008) it was 
“So I only mean I am free in the sense that it’s not you who is determining 
my actions; it’s not blind force or destiny; it’s my upbringing, and my genes, 
and my predilections, and my desires. All of this, plus some random compo-
nent depending on fluctuation and noise in my brain, comes together in 
making a decision one way or the other way.” 
(Christof Koch in S. Blackmore (2006), 
Conversations on Consciousness, p. 131) 
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assumed that the participants guessed instead of using residual visual input. Guessing might 
therefore be an internal decision, similar to free decisions. However, it has also been 
demonstrated before that free decisions were additionally encoded in medial and anterior 
PFC (Haynes et al., 2007; Soon et al., 2008), which was not observed in the previous study. 
The goal of the present study was to investigate these differences and similarities and to 
directly compare guesses with free decisions. 
When talking about free decisions, it is necessary to give a clear definition of “free” 
decisions in a neuroscientific context, as this is subject of a great, sometimes highly pas-
sionate debate in natural science and philosophy (e.g. an der Heiden & Schneider, 2007; 
Blackmore, 2006; Chiang, 2005; Dennett, 2003; Haynes, submitted; Heisenberg, 2009; 
Libet, 2004; Prinz, 2006a; Searle, 2004). The everyday meaning of “free” in this context is 
often related to a decision that “I” (meaning the experienced “self”) make as opposed to 
(automatic) reactions of the brain and body. This dualistic dichotomy is scientifically 
unlikely and is more related to properties of our language as well as to how we experience 
our selves as socially acting agents (Dennett, 1991; Prinz, 2003; 2006a). In the context of 
neuroscientific research, free decisions were defined as decisions that are maximally non-
stimulus driven, the opposite to simple reflexes (Haggard, 2008). It has been pointed out 
that in experimental situations that lack any stimulation, participants also have no motiva-
tion to choose one alternative over the other, which is a rather unnatural case (Haggard, 
2009). On the other hand, only a situation in which no choice alternative is more valuable 
than the other satisfies the requirements for the definition of a free decision (Haggard, 
2008). The assumption of a determined world seems to contradict “truly” free decisions 
(Haynes, submitted), but even determinism does not rule out the possibility of free decisions 
(depending on the definition of a free decision) (Dennett, 2003). However, as already 
acknowledged by Thorndike (1911; cited by Haggard, 2008), voluntary behavior might be 
organised in loops rather than in single chains of events, as they do not need an initial cause; 
a free decision might be best described as “intelligent interaction with the animal’s current 
and historical context”. Nevertheless, certain brain regions are involved in computing these 





5.1.2 The neural basis of free decisions 
 
The starting point of neuroscientific research on free decisions was the discovery of the 
Bereitschaftspotential (BP), or readiness-potential (Kornhuber & Deecke, 1965). It de-
scribes a slow negative potential shift in EEG activity preceding voluntary movement. It has 
been shown that the BP also precedes the conscious awareness of initiating the movement 
by several hundreds of milliseconds (Libet, et al., 1983; Libet, 1985). The origin of the BP 
seems to be located in the SMA / pre-SMA and anterior cingulate motor areas (CMA) (Ball 
et al., 1999; Deecke, Lang, Heller, Hufnagel & Kornhuber, 1987). Several studies further 
demonstrated that the pre-SMA is a key region for focusing on self-initiated actions (Cun-
nington et al., 2005; Haggard & Eimer, 1999; Lau et al., 2004a; Lau, Rogers & Passingham, 
2006; Nachev, Rees, Parton, Kennard & Husain, 2005; Nachev, Wydell, O’Neill, Husain & 
Kennard, 2007) and that pre-SMA and rostral SMA were more strongly activated when 
participants performed self-initiated movements compared to externally cued ones (Deiber 
et al., 1999; Jenkins, et al., 2000). Others found activation differences for this contrast in the 
adjacent rostral cingulate zone (RCZ) (Forstmann et al., 2006; Mueller, Brass, Waszak & 
Prinz, 2007) or showed that RCZ and pre-SMA differed only in the onset of activation 
(Cunnington et al., 2002). Lau and colleagues tried to isolate the neural basis of intention 
and execution for self-initiated movements and demonstrated that focusing on the onset of 
upcoming intentions activated the pre-SMA (Lau et al., 2004a) while attending to the motor 
execution activated the RCZ, especially the CMA (Lau, Rogers, Ramnani & Passingham, 
2004b). None of these studies, however, directly demonstrated the encoding of specific 
decision outcomes in these brain regions as achievable with multivariate decoding methods 
(see Haggard & Eimer, 1999, for a different approach to infer causality via detecting co-
variations of potential causes and effects). Hence, these regions might play a role in free 
decision making different to computing the final decision outcome. 
Other prefrontal areas that have been reported to be important for free decision mak-
ing were located anterior to the pre-SMA. Fronto-polar cortex (FPC) has been suggested to 
represent the most abstract contents of cognition (Badre & D’Esposito, 2009). This region 
was discussed to be involved in keeping a pending action plan active while another task is 
performed (Koechlin et al., 2000; Koechlin & Hyafil, 2007). Recent decoding studies linked 
medial FPC to the generation of free decisions (motor decisions as well as abstract ones), 
long before these reach awareness (Bode et al., in prep.; Soon et al., 2008; in prep.). Medial 
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prefrontal cortex (PFC), anterior to the pre-SMA, was found to be activated during veto-
decisions (Brass & Haggard, 2007). Outcomes of free decisions maintained in memory 
during a delay period could also successfully be read out from medial PFC (Haynes et al., 
2007). 
 Medial PFC, however, was not found to encode participants’ guesses in the previous 
study; decoding was only possible from a region in the precuneus extending to lateral 
posterior parietal cortex (PPC). Accordingly, others have shown that the pre-SMA might be 
more involved in the timing of free decisions rather than encoding the decision contents 
(Soon et al., 2008; in prep.). Studies using single-cell recordings in monkeys recently linked 
neurons in PPC to movement intentions (Quiroga, Snyder, Batista, Cui & Andersen, 2006). 
Correlations of spikes and local field potentials (LFPs) between neurons in PPC and dorsal 
pre-motor cortex were found to be greater when monkeys made free decisions compared to 
simply following instructions (Pesaran et al., 2008). The authors concluded that this could 
mirror an exchange of information between these regions when making a free decision. A 
recent study impressively demonstrated that direct electrical stimulation of human PPC 
evoked strong motor intentions (Desmurget et al., 2009). Stimulation of pre-motor cortex, 
however, did not lead to any urge to move; instead it directly triggered movements, which 
were not even perceived by the participants. 
Taken together, recent findings suggest that a network involving medial prefrontal 
cortex as well as posterior parietal cortex (extending to the precuneus and posterior cingu-
late cortex), is involved in the generation of voluntary decisions. While precuneus / PPC 
were also found to encode guessing decisions in the previous study, medial prefrontal 
regions were not. On the one hand, this suggests a shared neural mechanism for guesses and 
free decisions located in parietal cortex; on the other hand, there might be important differ-
ences, reflected by differential involvement of medial PFC. However, no study so far has 
directly compared the encoding of guesses and intended free decisions using the same 
paradigm. 
 
5.1.3 The goal of the present study 
 
Many studies investigated internal, free decisions rather indirectly by asking participants to 
think about their intentions instead of acting according to them and also did not control for 
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the influences of personal values and attitudes (e.g. Blakemore, den Ouden, Choundhury & 
Frith, 2007; den Ouden et al., 2005). Others successfully implemented tasks in which the 
choice alternatives did not differ in value, but differed from the previous study in terms of 
stimuli and decision timing (Mueller et al., 2007; Soon et al., 2008; in prep.). The present 
study was conducted to achieve a direct comparison between random guessing decisions (in 
a perceptual decision making task as implemented in the previous study) with intended free 
decisions using the same visual stimulation and decision entities. This allowed the investi-
gation of whether the same neural mechanisms were recruited in both situations.   
 A second shortcoming of the previous masking study was that residual visibility of 
strongly masked objects could not be fully ruled out. Many studies have demonstrated that 
visual information can be processed in the brain without reaching awareness and can 
influence behavior (e.g. Dehaene et al., 1998; Fahrenfort, Scholte & Lamme, 2007; Fang & 
He, 2005; Haynes & Rees, 2005a; Van Gaal, Ridderinkhof, Fahrenfort, Scholte & Lamme, 
2008; Vorberg et al., 2003; for classical masking studies see also Bachmann, 2006; Breit-
meyer & Stoerig, 2006). The involvement of the precuneus / PPC could in principle be 
explained by weak visual input to object selective regions in the dorsal visual cortex (Konen 
& Kastner, 2008). To rule out this possibility, in the present study the low visibility condi-
tion was replaced by a true invisibility condition: only strongly masked non-meaningful 
noise images were presented, which served as neutral stimuli while all decisions were made 
between two object categories (pianos and chairs) as choice alternatives. 
The experimental procedure was similar to the previous study. Participants either 
had to categorise the presented object as being a piano or a chair (as in the previous study) 
or they had to spontaneously and freely choose one of the two categories. The same multi-
variate decoding techniques (Haynes & Rees, 2005; Haynes et al., 2007; Kriegeskorte et al., 
2006; Norman et al., 2005) were applied as for the previous study to analyse the data. It was 
tested whether decision outcomes from guessing and intended free decisions were based on 
the same neural patterns in any brain region, as hypothesised for the precuneus / PPC. For 
this, an unbiased whole-brain cross-condition pattern analysis was performed, testing for 
inter-changeability between the underlying activation patterns for guesses and free decision 
outcomes. Finally, the results of the pattern classification analyses were compared to those 






Sixteen participants took part in the fMRI experiment and gave written informed consent to 
the test procedure. The experiment was approved by the local ethics committee and was 
conducted according to the Declaration of Helsinki. Participants were told that they took 
part in a decision making experiment but were not informed about the crucial experimental 
manipulations. All participants were right-handed and had normal or corrected to normal 
visual acuity. No participant indicated to be a professional musician (or to be directly 
related to one) or took part in earlier experiments presented here. Only one participant 
indicated after the experiment that he had noticed the missing object images and therefore 
stopped doing the task as instructed. This participant’s data was excluded from all analyses. 
The remaining sample consisted of seven female and eight male participants (mean age 25 




The experiment implemented a categorisation task with either highly visible objects or 
poorly visible ones (similar to the previous study) and a free decision task. For the categori-
sation task under high visibility (hereafter referred to as HV), the target stimuli needed to be 
fairly visible objects. For this, standardised grey-scaled images of pianos and chairs were 
presented using a moderate masking procedure (see Appendix C, Behavioural pre-tests). For 
the categorisation task using invisible objects (IV) and the free decision task (FD), the target 
stimuli must not contain meaningful object stimuli, yet should nonetheless create the 
illusion that there is indeed an object stimulus presented, albeit difficult to detect. For this, a 
phase-randomised scrambled pattern image was presented, which was additionally strongly 
masked. It was therefore guaranteed that participants’ decisions were pure guesses or free 
choices, without any residual visibility influencing either process. The object stimuli (HV) 
were taken from the previous study (see Experimental Section II for details) and were 
comprised of 24 grey-scaled images per object category, displaying pianos and chairs with 
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natural backgrounds (size 400 x 400 pixels). Stimuli were again masked using scrambled 
checkerboard-masks of 10 x 10 cells (each 40 x 40 pixels) for strong sandwich-masking (see 
Experimental Section II and Appendix B for details). To create the non-object target stimuli 
used for the IV and FD conditions, one of the (non-meaningful) mask images was randomly 
chosen for a two-dimensional Fourier transformation. The phase map was scrambled by 
adding a random value of +/- 1.75 *  to each phase angle. Subsequently, the new phase 
map was read back using an inverse Fourier transformation with the unchanged power 
spectrum. The resulting image was completely neutral in terms of its shape and visual 




The paradigm operated with three experimental conditions (Figure 5-1b):  
1. Perceptual categorisation task for moderately masked, highly visible object images of 
pianos and chairs (HV);  
2. Perceptual categorisation task for strongly masked (invisible) noise images, which 
also had to be categorised as pianos or chairs (IV) and  
3. Free decision task (FD) in which participants had to choose object categories (pianos 
or chairs) independent from the visual presentation (of invisible noise images)  
 
Participants were given written instructions first, explaining that they had to perform two 
different kinds of task, a perceptual categorisation task and a free decision task, indicated 
by the colour of the fixation cross in the beginning of each trial. Participants were not told 
that in the IV and FD trials, no object images were actually presented. During the FD task, 
participants were instructed to look at the screen but to spontaneously choose the category 
that first came to their mind, independent of the presentation. Additionally, it was pointed 
out that they should not change their mind during the trial but always keep the first decision. 
Most importantly, participants were instructed to initially choose an object category instead 
of a response button to ensure that a semantic rather than a motor decision was made, 
comparable to the perceptual categorisation task. The instruction text balanced the words 
“piano” and “chair” with respect to the order of their appearance to avoid biasing partici-
pants’ subsequent decisions. Participants were asked to make a decision on each trial, even 
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if uncertain (in categorisation trials). In this case, they were instructed to follow their 
intuition or to guess rather than not to respond.  
Participants were told to fixate upon a cross in the middle of the screen throughout 
the entire experiment. Upon the start of each trial, the task cue was given via a change in the 
colour of the fixation cross during the 750 ms before target presentation. A red cross 
indicated a perceptual categorisation trial; a green cross indicated a free decision trial. In 
half of the perceptual categorisation trials, moderately masked images of pianos and chairs 
were presented (HV); in the other half, only the neutral noise image was presented between 
strongly effective masks (IV). In free decision trials (FD), again only the strongly masked 
noise image was presented. Depending on the condition, the target image was presented for 
66.7 ms (highly visible object) or 16.7 ms (noise image). The sequence of masked images 
(pre-mask 150 ms; post-mask 500 ms minus target image duration) was shown three times 
in direct succession to prolong the overall visual stimulation and to enhance the ratio of 
signal to noise in fMRI data acquisition (compare Experimental Section II). Finally, a 
response-mapping screen was presented for 2000 ms. Participants indicated their choice by 
pressing one of two response buttons (right index- and middle finger), corresponding to the 
position of the letters “K” (“Klavier”, German for piano) and “S” (“Stuhl”, German for 
chair), which were presented on either side of the fixation cross. The position of letters was 
pseudo-randomised on a trial-by-trial basis, separately for all three experimental conditions. 
This procedure ensured that motor responses were dissociated from participants’ category 
choices. Following the response mapping screen, the white fixation cross was shown again, 
completing a jittered delay of seven, eight or nine seconds per trial (Figure 5-1a). Partici-
pants performed six runs (72 trials per run). In each run, 48 trials were perceptual categori-
sation trials (24 HV, 24 IV) and 24 were free decision (FD) trials. The same object image 
was never shown twice in one run. The order of object images was individually randomised 
for each participant. Participants first performed ten practice trials outside the scanner. 
During the fMRI experiment, stimuli were presented using a projector (resolution 1024x768 
pixel) placed at the head-end of the scanner, projecting onto a screen behind the partici-
pants’ heads. They watched the stimulation via a mirror attached to the head coil. The 
estimated angle of vision was  ~ 7.2° for all stimuli. The presentation was carried out using 
the Cogent toolbox for MATLAB 7.0 (The MathWorks, Inc.). After the experiment, partici-
pants completed a self-administered questionnaire, which asked about the levels of per-
ceived difficulty, adherence to the instructions and the timing of the free decisions 




Figure 5-1: Experimental paradigm and conditions. a) Left side: A pre-mask was presented for 150 ms, 
immediately followed by the target image, which was a piano or a chair (HV) or a noise image (IV, FD). Noise 
images were shown for 16.7 ms, object images were shown for 66.7 ms. The post-mask duration was calculated 
as 500 ms minus target duration, resulting in 433.3 ms (HV) and 483.3 ms (IV, FD). The sequence of masked 
images was directly repeated three times (right side), preceded by a cue (750 ms), indicating the task via the 
colour of the fixation cross (red = categorisation task; green = free decision). The total duration of this presenta-
tion was 2700 ms, followed by a response-mapping screen (2000 ms) with a pseudo-randomised order of 
response buttons associated with the categories to avoid confounds of categorical choices with motor responses. 
Subsequently, a fixation period completed the total trial duration of 7000 ms, 8000 ms or 9000 ms. b) Each 
experimental condition was presented in one third of all 72 trials per run: 24 trials categorisation task with highly 
visible object images of pianos and chairs (HV; left side); 24 trials categorisation task with strongly masked 
noise images, which also had to be classified as pianos or chairs (IV; middle); 24 trials free decision task with 
strongly masked noise images (FD; right side) in which participants had to choose object categories independent 
from the presentation. Participants were not aware that in IV and FD trials no objects were shown. Trials from all 
three conditions were presented in an individually randomised order for each run and each participant. 
target object
piano or chair 66.7 ms
or noise image  16.7 ms
post-mask
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Functional imaging was conducted on a Siemens TIMTrio 3T scanner (Erlangen, Germany) 
with a standard head coil. Gradient-echo EPI functional MRI volumes of the whole brain 
were acquired (42 axial slices, TR = 2800 ms, echo time TE = 30 ms, matrix size 64 x 64, 
voxel size 3 x 3 x 2 mm3 with 1 mm interslice gap). In each of the six functional runs, 208 
EPI volumes were acquired for each participant. The first two images of each run were 




Data analysis was performed separately for the HV, the IV and the FD condition. In order to 
minimise the risk of false positive results, there were restrictions as to which participants 
and which runs were included in the following analyses. Participants were only included in 
the analysis for the HV condition if their performance exceeded 80% for both object catego-
ries in more that half of the runs (> 3 runs) and did not drop below 70% overall for any 
category. Participants’ data were excluded from the analyses for the IV and FD condition if 
they were less balanced than a decision ratio of 20:80 (or 80:20; meaning less than 4 trials 
per condition) in a single run. The estimation of decision-related signals was likely to be 
distorted in these cases. If a participant’s choices were strongly imbalanced in more than 
half of the runs, that participant’s data were completely excluded from the analysis. 
The first stage of data processing involved motion correction to the first image of the 
first run using SPM2. No additional normalisation or smoothing were performed at that 
stage in order to maximize the sensitivity for information encoded in the fine-grained voxel 
patterns (Haynes & Rees, 2005a,b, 2006; Kamitani & Tong, 2005). A GLM was then used 
for statistical analyses on the individual subject level. A high-pass filter with a cut-off of 
128 s removed low frequency drifts in the time series at each voxel. Trials were assigned to 
piano- and chair-trials according to the participants’ choices. For each run, the onsets of 
events, beginning with the presentation of the cue, were convolved with the canonical 
haemodynamic response function (HRF), to obtain the regressors. The parameter estimates 
for each voxel position formed the basis of subsequent decoding analyses. 
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Again, a searchlight approach of multivariate pattern classification was used to ana-
lyse the data (Haynes & Rees, 2006; Haynes et al., 2007; Kriegeskorte et al., 2006; Norman 
et al., 2006). The analysis sought to find brain regions that allowed participants’ categorical 
choices to be decoded from fine-grained patterns of activity as measured by the BOLD 
signal. In all cases, participants’ choices were limited to pianos and chairs and chance level 
for correct prediction was 50%. Trials with no decisions were excluded from the analyses. 
The procedure was largely identical to the previous study but will be briefly described 
again. Starting with an arbitrary voxel position vi, a spherical cluster with the radius of four 
voxels was defined around vi containing N surrounding voxels (vi…N). The parameter esti-
mates of these voxels were transformed into two pattern vectors, one for decisions for 
pianos, the other one for decisions for chairs. For each run of each participant, such a pair of 
pattern vectors was extracted. Five of the six pairs of pattern vectors served as the “training 
data set” for multivariate pattern classification analysis. A linear support vector classifier 
(Müller et al., 2001) was used with a fixed regularisation parameter C = 1 (LIBSVM 
implementation). The remaining pair of pattern vectors served as the “test data set” and was 
to be classified based on the classification hyperplane estimated from the training data. The 
procedure was reiterated six times, each time leaving out the pattern vectors of a different 
run to be used as a “test data set”. Thus, a six-fold cross-validation was achieved by averag-
ing the decoding accuracies from all six iterations (or if less than six runs were used, then a 
five- or four-fold cross-validation was performed). The average decoding accuracy [%] was 
then assigned to the central voxel of the searchlight cluster. This procedure was repeated 
using the next searchlight cluster, constructed around the next spatial position at voxel vj. 
After performing this procedure for every voxel in the brain, a three-dimensional map of 
decoding accuracies could be created for each condition (HV, IV, FD) and each participant. 
In a last step, these maps were spatially normalised to a standard stereotaxic space (MNI 
EPI template), re-sampled to an isotropic spatial resolution of 3 x 3 x 3 mm3 and smoothed 
with a Gaussian kernel of 6 mm FWHM using SPM2. The resulting maps were fed into 
random-effects group analyses in order to identify common regions across all participants 
that displayed high decoding accuracies and therefore contained relevant information about 
the participants’ choices. 
In addition, a cross-condition classification analysis was performed for the IV condi-
tion and the FD condition. This analysis aimed at searching for regions in which the activity 
patterns used for the prediction of decision outcomes were interchangeable between the two 
conditions. This means, the patterns from one condition should allow the prediction of 
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decision outcomes from the other condition and vice versa. Finding such a brain region 
would speak for a similar neural code for both decisions. The pattern vectors from one 
condition (e.g. IV) were therefore used to train the classifier to distinguish between choices 
for pianos and chairs, but instead of predicting this participants’ choices in the one remain-
ing run within the same condition, it was used to predict decision outcomes from the left-out 
run for the other condition (e.g. FD) (Figure 5-2). Note that this procedure maximised the 
comparability with the previous analyses (e.g. the number of training and test data sets and 
cross-validation steps) (Walther et al., 2009). Both ways of cross-condition classification 
were performed and an ANOVA was applied followed by an inclusive conjunction test for 
both contrasts. Only regions that successfully supported both directions of cross-condition 
classification were considered significant.  
 Additional control decoding analyses were conducted. The first analysis decoded the 
category of objects presented during HV trials. Trials were therefore modelled according to 
the object category presented. The regressors for pianos and chairs were then used for 
subsequent decoding, which was identical to the analysis described above. A second control 
analysis was conducted to decode the motor responses by using different regressors for left 
and right button positions, i.e., the finger that operated the response box on each trial. This 
served to ensure that the decoding of choices was not confounded with the decoding of 
motor responses. The minimal statistical threshold used for all analyses was p < .0001 




Figure 5-2: Cross-condition pattern classification. The pattern vectors from decision outcomes of the IV 
condition were used to train the classifier to distinguish between choices for pianos and chairs. Instead of 
predicting participants’ choices from the one remaining run within the same condition, it was used to predict 
decision outcomes from the left-out run for the FD condition. The same six-fold cross-validation procedure was 
used as described for the regular decoding analysis and an average decoding accuracy was calculated for the 
respective cluster. Again, a searchlight algorithm was applied; the analysis was repeated for all possible 
searchlight clusters (r = 4 voxels). The resulting 3-dimensional decoding accuracy maps quantified how good 
patterns from IV predicted FD decision outcomes. The same analysis was repeated training the classifier with 
activation patterns from the FD condition and predicting the decision outcomes from the IV condition. The 
normalised decoding accuracy maps from each participant were used for an ANOVA. Only those regions were 













The hit rate for both highly visible pianos (85.2%) and chairs (91.5%) was very high. Only 
one participant showed an exceptionally bad performance for one category (s15 <70% for 
chairs; see Figure 5-3) and was excluded from the decoding analysis for the HV condition. 
Another two participants were excluded from this analysis because they did not reach the 
criterion of >80% hit rate for both categories in at least half of the runs, which challenged 
the assumption that they identified enough objects in these runs.  
In total, participants were highly balanced in their choices for pianos and chairs in 
the IV as well as in the FD condition (Figure 5-4). In the IV condition, participants chose 
pianos in 47.5% and chairs in 51.2% of all trials (1.3% trials missed). In the FD condition, 
participants chose pianos in 51.5% and chairs in 47.5% of all trials (1.0% trials missed). 
The individual performance varied more strongly, but only one participant had to be ex-
cluded from the analyses due to being too imbalanced in more than half of all runs (s5 was 
above the ratio of 80:20 for pianos – chairs). For four participants, data from one run was 
excluded due to imbalanced decisions; for two participants, data from two runs were 
excluded (for details see Appendix C, Choice ratios fMRI experiment). 
The analysis of the questionnaire indicated that participants adhered to the instruc-
tions. The perceptual categorisation task was perceived as being rather difficult and most 
participants believed there to be 3 to 4 levels of difficulty. This confirmed that participants 
did not notice the two-fold scaling of visibility. As instructed, free decisions were reported 
to be made with regard to categories instead of randomly pressing response buttons. Free 
decisions were made early in the trial, which was similar in perceptual decisions. Addition-
ally, in almost all cases, participants reported that they did not recognise any (illusory) 
objects during free decisions. These results confirmed that the experimental manipulations 





Figure 5-3: Mean hit rates for each participant. Hit rates for pianos and chairs are shown for the high 
visibility categorisation condition (HV). Displayed are the mean values [%] across all runs and the standard 
errors (SE) for each participant individually. After excluding participant s15 because of an exceptionally low hit 
rate, the average hit rates were 87.3% for pianos (bright dashed line) and 91.1% for chairs (dark dashed line). 
The difference was not significant (t-test, p > .05). 
 
 
Figure 5-4: Average choice ratios. Ratio of 
choices for pianos and chairs in the invisible 
categorisation condition (IV; left) and the free 
decision condition (FD; right) for all n = 15 
participants. In the categorisation task, participants 
chose pianos in 47.5% and chairs in 51.2% off all 
trials (1.3% trials missed). In the free decision 
task, participants chose pianos in 51.5% and chairs 
in 47.5% off all trials (1.0% trials missed). The 
overall ratios were close to being perfectly 
balanced (50%) in both conditions. See Appendix 
















































Multivariate decoding was used to investigate which brain areas encoded decision outcomes 
in perceptual decision making when object images were highly visible (HV). Decoding 
accuracies significantly above chance level (50%) could be found bilaterally in extrastriate 
visual cortex extending to the LOC, with greater extensions on the right side (see Figure 5-
5a). The peak decoding accuracy was 61%. The same method was applied to decode deci-
sion outcomes for perceptual decision making without visible objects (IV). The analysis 
revealed two regions in medial parietal cortex, mainly located in the right precuneus, which 
encoded the choices (Figure 5-5b). The first cluster extended to the posterior cingulate 
cortex (PCC) and peaked with 61% accuracy. The second cluster was located more dorsally 
and posteriorly, extending laterally to the inferior parietal lobe, peaking with 60% decoding 
accuracy. Decoding accuracies in left precuneus were just below threshold. No further 
regions could be found displaying above chance accuracies for the IV condition. 
 Decoding free decisions (FD) revealed an extended cluster in bilateral anterior 
medial prefrontal cortex. The peak decoding accuracy was 64% (Figure 5-5c). The regions 
in the precuneus, which encoded the decision outcome for the IV task (as well as clusters 
nearby) also displayed high decoding accuracies for free decisions. These, however, missed 
the strict statistical threshold due to higher variance (peaking at 58% accuracy; p = .009). 
When inclusively masked with decoding results form the IV condition (p < .0001 uncor-
rected), a cluster in the precuneus remained marginally significant for free decisions (p < 
.01 uncorrected). For an illustration of the overlap see Figure 5-6. 
 To further investigate the relationship between guessing in perceptual decision 
making (IV) and free decisions (FD), cross-condition classification analyses were con-
ducted. Pattern vectors associated with decision outcomes from the IV task were taken to 
predict those from the FD task and vice versa. Two clusters, again bilaterally located in the 
precuneus, were found to allow bi-directional interchange between the predictive activation 
patterns (Figure 5-5d). One cluster was located close to the second precuneus cluster that 
encoded decision outcomes in the IV task. The other cluster was located more ventral at the 
border between precuneus, cuneus and inferior parietal lobe. The peak decoding accuracy 
was 57%. When the threshold was relaxed, a greater extent of regions in the precuneus 
could be revealed (see Figure 5-6). No other combination of cross-classification analyses 
showed any significant clusters.  
Conventional univariate analyses could not reveal any differences between decisions 
for pianos and chairs for any of the conditions, confirming that information about decision 
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outcomes was only present in the fine-grained patterns of activation rather than reflected in 




Figure 5-5: Decoding decision outcomes using multivariate pattern classification. Displayed are mean 
decoding accuracies and standard errors (SE) for searchlight decoding with a radius of r = 4 voxels. All results 
are displayed using a threshold of p < .001 (uncorrected) for better visualisation. a) Results for perceptual 
decision making for highly visible objects (HV). Decoding accuracies significantly above chance level (50%) 
were found bilaterally in extrastriate visual cortex extending to the LOC with a greater extension on the right 
side (MNI [36 -66 -15]; peak accuracy 61%; p < .0001 uncorrected; MNI [-12 -93 -3]; peak accuracy 58%; p < 
.0001 uncorrected). Decoding IV and FD decisions outcomes did not significantly exceed chance level in these 




c) Predicting free decisions (FD)
b) Predicting guesses for 
invisible objects (IV)
d) Predicting FD from IV decisions
and vise verca 
* p < .0001 uncorrected
** p < .00001 uncorrected
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clusters located in (A) precuneus extending to posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) (MNI [24 -45 18]; peak accuracy 
61%; p < .0001 uncorrected) and (B) precuneus extending to inferior parietal cortex (MNI [30 -63 51]; peak 
accuracy 60%; p < .0001 uncorrected). No other regions were found to encode the decision outcomes in this 
condition. c) Results for decoding free decisions (FD). Decoding accuracies significantly above chance level 
were found in bilateral medial prefrontal cortex (MNI [3 48 21]; peak accuracy 64%; p < .00001 uncorrected). 
Additionally, high decoding accuracies could be found in precuneus but were just short of the statistical 
threshold (MNI [33 -60 45]; peak accuracy 57%; p = .009 uncorrected; not displayed). d) Results for cross-
condition classification for IV and FD. Pattern vectors from decision outcomes for the IV task were taken to 
predict decision outcomes for the FD task and vice versa. Two clusters in bilateral precuneus allowed both 
directions of decoding (C: MNI [6 -84 39]; peak accuracy 55%; p < .000001 uncorrected; D: MNI [-12 -48 48]; 
peak accuracy 57%; p < .000001 uncorrected). 
  
A further decoding analysis was performed to predict the true categories of the objects 
during HV trials. The category of the presented object and participants’ choices were highly 
correlated under high visibility, hence, not surprisingly the strongest cluster was located in 
bilateral visual cortex and LOC, peaking with 61% accuracy in right visual cortex / LOC 
(Appendix C, Figure C-6b). To confirm that the decoding results for participants’ choices 
were not confounded with the motor responses, an additional decoding analysis for button 
presses was performed. It could be shown that for all conditions, the motor responses were 
encoded in left motor cortex only (58% peak accuracy; Appendix C, Figure C-6a) and not in 
any choice-related areas. Further analyses were conducted to ensure that individual differ-
ences in decision balance did not drive the decoding effects. For this, the data was divided 
into groups of more balanced and less balanced participants by median-split and decoding 
accuracies were compared between groups. No differences in decoding accuracies could be 
found between more or less balanced participants. This held true for the whole brain volume 
as well as for the best searchlight clusters in precuneus and MPFC (for details see Appendix 
C, Choice ratios and decoding accuracies).  
 
5.3.1 Comparison to results of the previous study 
 
One remaining question was if the precuneus regions in the present study were comparable to 
the ones found to encode perceptual choices about poorly visible objects in the previous 
study. There was no complete overlap between the single clusters revealed by the respective 
analyses, even when a similar task was performed (Figure 5-6; compare blue: previous study 
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– poorly visible object categorisation, and red: present study – invisible object categorisation). 
One cluster in precuneus / PCC appeared to be spatially isolated, yet it was not functionally 
dissociable. All clusters, however, strongly overlapped with the cluster revealed by Soon et 
al., 2008 (see Figure B-16). The precuneus regions revealed by the previous study overlapped 
with the precuneus regions in the present study that encoded the IV decision outcomes and 
allowed IV and FD cross-classification. Additional analyses using ROIs derived from the 
previous study to analyse the present data yielded a similar encoding profile compared to the 
whole-brain searchlight decoding analyses (for details see Appendix C, ROI analyses). Taken 
together, these parietal clusters formed a patchy but connected ensemble, reaching from 




Figure 5-6: Direct comparison of precuneus regions between both masking studies. Medial views of the left 
and right hemisphere and one posterior view. Blue: The cluster from the previous study that allowed decoding of 
decisions about poorly visible objects. Red: The comparable cluster from the present study (IV). Green: Areas 
from which cross-condition classification between free decisions (FD) and IV was successful. Yellow: Clusters 
from which FD could be decoded in the present study (p < .01, uncorrected; after inclusively masking with IV 
decoding with p < .0001, uncorrected). Orange: Overlap of cross-condition classification (IV and FD) with IV. 
Pink: Clusters encoding only FD in the present study. In summary, searchlight decoding analyses from both 
studies revealed a rather widespread, overlapping cluster in precuneus / PPC. A second, functionally not 
dissociable cluster was located in anterior precuneus / PCC. Both clusters overlapped with the regions encoding 
free decisions revealed by Soon et al. (2008). For comparison a threshold of p < .0001 was used for displaying 
all clusters. p = posterior; a = anterior; l = left; r = right; d = dorsal; v = ventral. Peak coordinates and accuracies 























This study demonstrated that the precuneus was informative about outcomes of guessed 
decisions when visual information was insufficient for a perceptually based decision. It 
therefore confirmed the previous findings by excluding the possibility of any residual 
visibility driving the effects, because a non-meaningful strongly masked noise image 
replaced the object images in a true invisibility condition. A direct comparison between 
guessing and free decisions was achieved by using the same visual stimulation while 
participants freely and spontaneously chose object categories. Decoding accuracies for free 
decision outcomes were highest in aMPFC, but activation patterns in the precuneus were 
found to be interchangeable for guesses and free decisions. Comparing the different clusters 
in precuneus / PPC from which decoding was possible between these studies, a wide-spread 
medial posterior parietal network emerged. This might be the neural substrate of a symme-
try-breaking network, which is engaged during different kinds of internal decision making.  
 
5.4.1 Two modes of perceptual decision making 
 
The present results entirely confirmed the findings about perceptual decision making from 
the previous study. Again, a double dissociation emerged between the LOC, which encoded 
decision outcomes for highly visible objects only, and the precuneus, which encoded the 
decisions made with insufficient visual input (or guessing). These findings are at odds with 
models derived from SDT (Parker & Newsome, 1998; Swets, 1961), which predict that 
decisions about perceptual entities, even invisible ones, should still be based on the same 
dimension of sensory signal. If stimuli cannot be discriminated, trial-by-trial noise fluctua-
tions in the same system should determine the choices. Several studies using single cells 
recordings in monkeys to quantify choice probabilities (e.g. Britten et al., 1996; Huk & 
Shadlen, 2005; Kim & Shadlen, 1999; Purushothaman & Bradley, 2005; Romo et al., 2002; 
2004; Salinas et al., 2000; Shadlen & Newsome, 2001; Uka et al., 2005) suggested the 
existence of neural systems for perceptual decisions for all levels of stimulus ambiguity. 
The present findings, however, strongly support the conclusion of the previous study: that a 
switch from perceptual decisions to internal, stimulus-independent decisions occurs in the 
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absence of sufficient stimulus information. It was argued above that, contrary to classical 
studies using random dot motion or flutter discrimination, extended temporal integration 
was not required with the present paradigm due to the use of static images (Philiastides & 
Sajda, 2006). Under these circumstances a switch to a decision mechanism that generated 
random outcomes was facilitated. This switch could be explained within a framework that 
assumes that if a perceptual decision cannot be made because of insufficient sensory input 
or equal evidence for each alternative, a symmetry-breaking network becomes important. A 
similar model has been proposed for the generation of free decisions (Haggard, 2008). For a 
detailed discussion, see Experimental Section II. 
The finding that decision outcomes about highly visible objects was encoded in the 
LOC is in line with previous studies linking the LOC to the processing of object categories 
(e.g. Grill-Spector & Malach, 2004; Haushofer et al., 2008a; Haxby et al., 2001; Op de 
Beeck et al., 2008a,b; Reddy & Kanwisher, 2006; Schwarzlose et al., 2008), but more 
importantly, to successful object categorisation performance (Grill-Spector et al., 2000; 
Williams et al., 2007). The LOC was more strongly activated for the categorisation task 
with highly visible objects than for the free decision task. Interestingly, there was no 
difference in activation when categorisation of highly visible objects and invisible objects 
were compared. Given that these differences in activation were clearly present in the 
previous study, the reduced number of trials per condition and therefore the limited statisti-
cal power might be an explanation. Accordingly, the decoding effects found in LOC were 
also much weaker compared to the previous study. It might be that the lower proportion of 
highly visible objects presented (50% in the previous study; 33% in the present study) also 
made perceptual decisions seem more difficult in general and reduced effects in the LOC.  
The motor responses were again dissociated from the decisions by using randomised 
response mapping screens. Additional decoding analyses confirmed that motor responses 
were encoded in left motor cortex only, confirming that participants’ decisions were always 
related to the objects, not the buttons. In the previous study, one concern was that residual 
visibility might have been responsible for decision encoding in the precuneus, as it has been 
shown that PPC can process object information (Konen & Kastner, 2008). This issue was 
addressed in the present study by using strongly masked neutral noise images instead of real 
objects to ensure that target images were truly invisible and only the illusion was created 
that objects were presented. By taking this path, it was possible to avoid any concerns 
regarding d' values greater than zero (Schmidt & Vorberg, 2006). Results from the detailed 
post-experimental questionnaire confirmed the effectiveness of this manipulation. It can be 
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concluded that neither the present nor the previous results were significantly influenced by 
residual visibility effecting encoding in the precuneus. The subjective experience of not 
having perceived the objects might be the important factor that triggered the involvement of 
the symmetry-breaking network. 
 There is still the possibility, however, that other mechanisms drove the encoding of 
decisions in precuneus. For instance, the precuneus might have been engaged in mental 
imagery (Fletcher et al., 1995; Knauff et al., 2003) of objects as interpretations of the (non-
meaningful) visual stimulation, driven by the expectation of object images. A comparison 
with images from memory could also have involved the precuneus (Tulving et al., 1994). 
These alternatives cannot be fully dismissed by the present study. However, as argued 
before, mental imagery should have involved the respective sensory systems instead of 
excluding those (Kosslyn et al., 2001). The results therefore strongly support the alternative 
hypothesis: The precuneus might have been engaged in the generation of internal decisions 
with random outcomes rather than in the creation of mental object images.  
The crucial analysis involved identifying brain activity patterns common to guesses 
and free decisions. It was found that a rather wide-spread area in precuneus / PPC demon-
strated those pattern similarity effects and cross-predicted the decision outcomes in both 
directions, even though statistically significant decoding was only possible for guessing but 
barely for free decisions alone. It has to be noted, however, that decoding of free decisions 
from the precuneus was statistically weak but still possible with comparable accuracy. 
Second, the results suggest that the classification hyperplane related to free decisions was 
estimated based on comparably less stable patterns in the precuneus (as demonstrated by the 
classifier’s performance). This hyperplane, if also meaningful for the “guessing” condition, 
should nonetheless be able to successfully classify the more stable patterns underlying 
guesses, which was demonstrated. Likewise, if stable and informative patterns were used to 
estimate a meaningful and applicable classification hyperplane, it should also successfully 
classify weaker patterns in most cases, as observed for classifying free decisions based on 
the hyperplane estimated from guessing. The cross-classification analysis therefore validly 
tested the similarity of the underlying activation patterns.  
Overlaid with the findings from the previous study, a wide-spread, patchy and par-
tially overlapping cluster in precuneus / PPC emerged for internal decisions (see Figure 5-
6). These clusters also strongly overlapped with the cluster revealed for free decisions by 
Soon and colleagues (2008) (also see Appendix B, Figure B-16). As argued before, the 
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precuneus / PPC has also been found to be involved in other internal tasks such as focussing 
on one’s own intentions (e.g. Blakemore et al., 2007; Cavanna & Trimble, 2006; den Ouden 
et al., 2005), internally selecting actions (Jenkins et al., 2000; Mueller et al., 2007), inten-
tional self-processing (Kircher et al., 2000; 2002), prospective memory (Burgess, et al., 
2001), the formation of free decisions (Cui & Andersen, 2007; Pesaran et al., 2008) and 
movement intentions (Desmurget et al., 2009). Taken together, these findings strongly 
support the hypothesis that regions in medial and posterior parietal cortex play a dominate 
role in the generation of intentions and free decisions. The specific role of the precuneus 
could be to break the symmetry of choice alternatives in the absence of sufficient perceptual 
input (guessing) or in the absence of a more valuable alternative (free decisions) in order to 
make an internal decision.  
 
5.4.2 From guessing to free decisions 
 
So far, it was argued that guessing resembles internal free decisions, both resulting from the 
same process of symmetry-breaking. It is obvious, however, that there are also differences 
between these two kinds of decisions: first, a network of brain regions was differentially 
activated during guessing and free decisions. Second, when looking at free decisions, the 
highest decoding accuracies were found in anterior medial PFC while outcomes of guesses 
could not be decoded from this region. Medial prefrontal cortex was also found to be 
activated by the voluntary selection of task-sets (Forstmann et al., 2005; 2006), by self-
related motivational factors (Kouneiher, Charron & Koechlin, 2009) and by reflecting on 
one’s own mental states (Amodio & Frith, 2006). More importantly, widespread anterior 
medial PFC regions have been found to directly encode freely formed intentions to perform 
arithmetic tasks (Haynes et al., 2007). The most anterior part of medial PFC was found by 
Soon and colleagues (2008; in prep.) to encode free decision outcomes. Note that differ-
ences in precise localization might be due to the temporal aspects of the generation of 
decisions, which cannot be resolved here due to differences in modelling. Some processes 
might only be visible when using unconstrained models (such as FIR) and monitoring 
decisions or intentions across longer timescales.  
In the present study, cross-condition classification clearly points towards a shared 
neural substrate of guessing and free decisions in the precuneus. Only free decisions, 
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however, were additionally encoded in medial PFC. These differences might be explained 
by what made the tasks distinct. Both tasks required the generation of an internal decision, 
which was not based on external input and had equally valuable outcomes. Only in the free 
decision task, however, did participants intend to make an internal decision. Likewise, in 
most studies that demonstrated medial PFC involvement, participants were instructed to 
make free decisions and therefore intended to do so (Deiber et al., 1999; Forstmann et al., 
2005; 2006; Haynes et al., 2007; Jenkins, et al., 2000; Mueller et al., 2007; Soon et al., 
2008; in prep.). Contrarily, the categorisation task required participants to select their 
response on the basis of (insufficient) visual input. Even though the behavioural outcome 
was indistinguishable compared to the free decision task, the initial intention was not to 
produce a random decision outcome. A likely interpretation for the differences in encoding 
is therefore that the precuneus is always involved in symmetry-breaking when no choice 
alternative is more likely or valuable. However, only when participants consciously intend 
to make a free decision, the aMPFC is additionally involved in generating the decision 
outcome. This might then be achieved in concert with the precuneus / PPC (Soon et al., 
2008), hypothetically by strong synchronisation between neural activity in medial PFC and 
(medial) PPC (Pesaran et al., 2008).  
 
5.4.3 Posterior parietal cortex and high self-reference 
 
The exact nature of the suggested symmetry-breaking network has to be further investigated 
in the future. It can only be speculated that central noise fluctuations might play an impor-
tant role (Deco & Romo, 2008; Faisal et al., 2008). The extraordinary role of the precuneus 
in self-processing (Cavanna & Trimble, 2006) suggests that self-reference could be the 
linking element. Self-reference is usually given by values and preferences; these mecha-
nisms would guide decisions in most situations. One’s self-related value system is therefore 
a candidate for a symmetry-breaker: in the absence of more or less valuable outcomes, noise 
fluctuations in one part of this system could guide the decisions.  
There is little direct evidence for this hypothesis, even though it has been suggested 
that random value-based decisions could exploit the same mechanisms as random percep-
tual decisions (Gold & Shadlen, 2007). In support of this, some studies have shown that a 
network including the precuneus, posterior cingulate cortex and posterior parietal cortex is 
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involved in value- and reward-based decision making as well as in decision making under 
uncertainty (Hsu, Bhatt, Adolphs, Tranel & Camerer, 2005; Huettel, Song & McCarthy, 
2005; Luhmann, Chun, Yi, Lee & Wang, 2008; McCoy & Platt, 2005; Platt & Huettel, 
2008; Volz, Schubotz & von Cramon, 2004). It has been pointed out that the integration of 
sensory evidence and prior knowledge (e.g. about reward and values) in parietal cortex 
might unify decision systems at their final stages (Glimcher, 2001). PPC might therefore be 
critical for many kinds of value judgements (Kable & Glimcher, 2007; Platt & Huettel, 
2008). For example, Platt and Glimcher (1999) found that a population of neurons in 
monkey parietal cortex was directly involved in decision processes if the outcomes were 
valuable for the decision maker. Using fMRI in humans, Vickery and Jiang (2009) showed 
that a region in the inferior parietal lobe was modulated by feedback in a simple decision 
task, suggesting a role in constructing a value representation under uncertainty. A recent 
study demonstrated that while participants were passively watching images of different cars 
of varying value, subsequent purchase intentions could be decoded from regions including 
PPC / precuneus (Tusche et al., 2010). One interpretation linking these studies and the 
present findings is that the precuneus and PPC are part of an internal decision making 
system that is usually engaged in value- and preference-based decisions. Normally, the 
attachment of values determines the decision outcome. In cases of equal or no valence, for 
instance in guessing as well as equivocal free decisions, noise fluctuations in this system 
could determine a decision and serve as a symmetry-breaker. These interpretations, how-




The present study confirmed that the precuneus encoded guessing when no relevant percep-
tual input was provided. Activation patterns in this region were found to be interchangeable 
with those for free decisions. These findings strengthened the interpretation that the precu-
neus might be part of the neural substrate of a symmetry-breaking network, involved in the 
generation of different kinds of internal decisions with random outcomes. Anterior medial 
prefrontal cortex, however, only encoded decision outcomes when decisions were intended 
to be internal and might therefore be exclusively important for free decisions made without 






6 General Discussion 
 
This final part discusses the implications of the three experimental sections beyond the 
respective discussion sections. A short interpretation of the present results will be given 
within a broader framework of the transformation of stimuli to responses. Methodological 
problems will be addressed, in particular, the limitations and challenges faced by multivari-
ate pattern classification as implemented here. Ideas for future experiments, which resulted 
from the present findings, will then be discussed, finally followed by a concluding sum-
mary. Of course, there would also be much to say about limitations of fMRI in general; 
some problems were already addressed in the introduction to methods section. For more 
detailed discussions, which go beyond the scope of the present work, refer to e.g. Logothetis 
(2002; 2003; 2008), Logothesis and Wandell (2004) as well as Heeger and Ress (2002) for 
the relationship of the BOLD signal and activity of single neurons, Raichle and Mintun 
(2006) for details about brain metabolism, Brett and colleagues (2002) for the problem of 
localisation, Haynes and Rees (2006) as well as Norman and colleagues (2006) for the 
limits of univariate analyses and Kriegeskorte and colleagues (2009) for potential problems 
with circularity in fMRI data analyses in general. 
  
6.1 Information encoding in parietal cortex 
 
The present studies made use of new decoding approaches to investigate different aspects of 
the transformation of stimuli to motor responses. In the first study, the temporal decoding of 
task-sets demonstrated that abstract rules were encoded in the IPS even before a target 
stimulus was presented. Interestingly, rule information in parietal cortex preceded the build-
up of rule information in VLPFC. These findings stressed that a network of prefrontal and 
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parietal regions is involved in rule-guided behavior (e.g. Brass & von Cramon, 2004a; 
2004b; Bunge, 2004; Bunge & Wallis, 2007). This finding clearly goes beyond the current 
literature by demonstrating in humans that parietal cortex also encoded rules in an abstract 
form. So far, this has only been shown in monkeys (e.g. Gail & Andersen, 2006; Stoet & 
Snyder, 2004; 2007). The role of parietal cortex in rule-guided behavior has been hitherto 
undervalued. Many authors focused on PFC (Sakai, 2008) or neglected the similarity of 
activation profiles in parietal cortex compared to PFC (e.g. Brass & von Cramon, 2004a; 
2004b; Crone et al., 2008); only few acknowledged the lack of differences between these 
regions (e.g. Rowe et al., 2008). The present findings also ruled out that the role of parietal 
cortex is restricted just to attention or the preparation of motor responses following abstract 
rule processing in PFC (Bunge, 2004). Parietal cortex might therefore function as an active 
information integration hub, as proposed recently (Singh-Curry & Husain, 2009). The 
second study adds to this view by demonstrating that decision outcomes of guessing in 
perceptual decision making were encoded in posterior parietal cortex, spanning from the 
medial part of the precuneus to the inferior parietal lobe. It was concluded that medial PPC 
is involved in symmetry-breaking and the generation of internal decisions in the absence of 
sufficient perceptual information. This is in line with recent findings demonstrating precu-
neus and PPC involvement in the generation of free decisions (Cui & Andersen, 2007; 
Pesaran et al., 2008; Soon et al., 2008). The third study supported and extended this view by 
showing that local activity patterns in PPC from intended free decisions could be used to 
predict guessing decisions and vice versa. Decoding from medial PFC, however, was 
limited to intended free decisions. Taken together, it was possible to decode different kinds 
of internal decisions from a network of mostly medial posterior parietal regions, which were 
hypothesised to be important for symmetry-breaking. A highly self-referential decision 
context could be the linking element between the PPC and internal decisions, given the 
involvement of PPC in reward- and value-based decisions (Platt & Glimcher, 1999; Platt & 
Huettel, 2008; Vickery & Jiang, 2009). It is therefore believed that the present studies 
provided strong new evidence for the importance of posterior parietal regions in high-level 
cognitive processes related to internal decision making.  
How could PPC (including precuneus) guide the formation of internal decisions? It 
was already speculated that in the absence of values and reward to guide internal decision 
making, noise fluctuations in a part of one’s internal value system, located in PPC, could 
produce random decision outcomes. As mentioned before, a recent study used electrical 
cortical stimulation in human patients and demonstrated that it was possible to evoke the 
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desire or “will” to move different body parts - or even the strong illusion that a movement 
had actually been carried out - by stimulating posterior parietal cortex (Desmurget et al., 
2009). The authors concluded that motor intentions and the awareness of one’s own inten-
tions could arise from activity in parietal cortex. This activity might be used to predict and 
anticipate the consequences of intended actions beforehand, being the basis for the percep-
tion of subsequent movements and the self-ascription of authorship (Desmurget et al., 2009; 
for a related framework see also Wegner, 2003). In a similar manner, the anticipation (and 
understanding) of others’ actions has been suggested to be based on re-enactment of those 
actions in one’s own neural system (Prinz, 2006b). The relevance of Desmurget’s study for 
the interpretation of the present work might be criticised since it only demonstrated the 
induction of motor intentions and not decisions about object categories or other abstract 
decisions. It is, however, unlikely that an arbitrary abstract intention or decision could be 
elicited by cortical stimulation without additionally providing meaningful context. It would 
be reasonable to assume that cortical maps for motor intentions in parietal cortex (Andersen 
& Buneo, 2002) also form the basis for more abstract intentions, which, in turn, could be the 
basis for other internal decisions. These maps might be flexibly re-codable depending on the 
context, similar to what was suggested for PFC (Duncan, 2001). This is likely since, first, 
most abstract decisions are usually closely linked to motor action; and second, it has been 
proposed that evolutionary newer functions coming with cultural development could make 
use of already existing neural structures evolved for more basic but similar functions 
(Dehaene & Cohen, 2007). This explanation would prevent the unlikely assumption that 
single neurons (or EINs) are hardwired for all possible abstract intentions and decisions. 
Importantly, this idea is also supported by recent findings pointing towards the same neural 
substrate for simple motor intentions and abstract intentions in prefrontal cortex and precu-
neus (Soon et al., in prep.).  
In conclusion, the presented studies have illustrated that parietal cortex plays a far 
more active and important role in human decision making and cognitive control than 
assumed so far. This was achieved by providing direct evidence for information encoding in 
parietal cortex. At the same time, recent views stressed capacity limitations of high-level 
prefrontal areas for cognitive control (Koechlin & Hyafil, 2007). The interaction between 
PFC and PPC in controlling behavior (Quintana & Fuster, 1999) might therefore be less 
dominated by PFC than previously thought. While earlier work on PPC predominantly 
focussed on its role in attention and visual processing (e.g. Milner & Goodale, 1993; 
Rizzolatti & Matelli, 2003; Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982), recent research (mostly from 
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studies with monkeys) revealed its role in a variety of high-level cognitive functions such as 
the integration of sensory and cognitive information and motor actions (Gottlieb, 2007), the 
formation of highly abstract intentions and movement plans (Andersen & Buneo, 2002; 
Quiroga et al., 2006), as well as keeping the cognitive system goal-focussed and in a task-
engaged state (Singh-Curry & Hussain, 2009). Of course, the present work does not ques-
tion the well established findings of the tremendous importance of PFC in cognitive control 
and executive functions (e.g. Badre & D’Esposito, 2009; Duncan, 2001; Goldman-Rakic, 
1996; Miller & Cohen, 2001; Passingham, 1995). However, it hopefully inspires future 
research focused on the fronto-parietal network and the fast interplay of processes within 
this system (Pesaran et al., 2008). The application of information decoding approaches for 
human fMRI data could serve as a key tool for the dissociation of different aspects and 
functional specialisation within this network. Specifically, it could be useful when the 
correspondence between monkey and human sub-regions is not clear (Orban et al., 2006; 
Singh-Curry & Hussain, 2009), when the cognitive functions under investigation are 
uniquely human, or when detailed verbal reports about perception or decision certainty are 
required. As demonstrated here, multivariate pattern classification can be used to go beyond 
classical fMRI studies and reveal a direct link between the outcome of high level cognitive 
processes and the underlying neural substrate. This might show important contributions of 
brain areas that would have been overlooked otherwise. On the other hand, it is important to 
be aware of some limitations of this approach that will be discussed in the next paragraph. 
 
6.2 General methodological considerations 
 
The studies presented in this work demonstrated that information about higher cognitive 
processes such as rules and decisions can be decoded from brain activity using a combina-
tion of fMRI and multivariate pattern classification (Haynes & Rees, 2006; Norman et al., 
2006). While the spatial resolution of fMRI is still far from the scale of single neurons or 
EINs, this method breaks through the conventional limits imposed by voxel size (Haynes & 
Rees, 2005a; Kamitani & Tong, 2005; Kamitani & Sawahata, 2010; Swisher et al., 2010). 
Nevertheless, it still can only reveal what was called “a lower bound of information” 
(Haynes, 2009); it must be considered that more information might be encoded in brain 
regions that cannot be revealed with the current methods. An illustration of this limitation is 
  
 117 
when too few neurons (or local EINs) coded for single properties, such that the signals from 
these voxels were dominated by noise. Too little is known about the proportion of informa-
tion-carrying and information-irrelevant neurons that is sufficient for the build-up of stable 
detectable biases within a voxel, given the restrictions on measurement repetitions in a 
typical fMRI experiment. Another problem arises if a population of neurons flexibly 
changed their coding with changes of the task context, as suggested for prefrontal cortex 
(Duncan, 2001). For example, it has been demonstrated that task rules were encoded by the 
same neural populations in PFC, but in orthogonal patterns during different phases of task 
preparation (Sigala et al., 2008). Averaging across activation patterns from different task 
phases – wrongly assuming pattern stability – would make it impossible to decode anything. 
These problems could potentially also arise for parietal cortex in which neurons are tuned 
for several properties in a wide range of sub-regions (e.g. Quintana & Fuster, 1999).  
While pattern classification algorithms are usually trained on the individual activa-
tion patterns of non-normalised images, they are not susceptible to differences in micro-
level brain anatomy between participants. Individual spatial variation of informative clusters 
in the range of several centimetres, however, could be problematic. These individual “hot 
spots” could get lost due to averaging in group-level analyses. A potential solution (as 
performed in the present studies) is to additionally smooth the resulting decoding accuracy 
maps, similar to conventional univariate analyses that face the same localisation problems 
(Brett et al, 2002). So far, searchlight decoding still lacks a comprehensive systematic 
methodological assessment (for a first approach see Kriegeskorte et al., 2006) including 
effects of different smoothing kernels, searchlight radii and potential decoupling of informa-
tion and activation, as observed in the present studies and others (Harrison & Tong, 2009; 
Serences et al., 2009; Soon et al., 2008). It would also be useful to address whether individ-
ual decoding accuracy maps (of prefrontal and parietal regions) might reveal distinguishable 
sub-types of information-to-anatomy mapping on a macro-anatomical level.  
The usability of pattern classification might also depend on the functional organisa-
tion of the brain region under investigation. Such a region-specific lack of power, however, 
could also be problem in conventional univariate analysis and should be less problematic in 
multivariate analyses because many voxels contribute to the activation patterns. Wherever 
multivariate pattern classification is able to successfully decode distinct mental states, it can 
be concluded that information was indeed encoded in this region. Of course, this does not 
imply that the brain uses this information in the same way as it was read out by the rather 
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crude classification algorithm (Haynes & Rees, 2005a), nor does it suggest a higher-level 
‘interpretation area’ elsewhere in the brain, as pointed out before (Haynes, 2009).  
Decoding information from a brain region is still no evidence that the respective re-
gion plays a causal role in the underlying process; the nature of the relationship between 
activity patterns and mental states is – however tempting it is to assume otherwise – still a 
correlative one. In principle, information encoding could be an epi-phenomenon of a non-
detected process elsewhere in the brain. Nevertheless, local activation during decision 
making and decoding of decision outcomes differ in terms of the quality of the revealed 
information. Stronger activation could more easily be explained by general preparatory 
activity, unrelated to the formation of the specific decision outcome. The possibility of spill-
over effects of activation between highly interconnected regions makes it hard to pinpoint 
the role of single areas in cognitive processes, even if cortical excitability is probed directly 
(Bode, Koenecke & Jäncke, 2007; Eisenegger, Herwig & Jäncke, 2005). Demonstrating 
information encoding in a brain region, however, is more likely to point to a causal in-
volvement in the cognitive process. Of course, this argument does not exclude the presence 
of unused information. On the other hand, the latter assumption needs an even greater 
amount of explanation compared to the causal interpretation. Information decoding is 
therefore conceptually closer to the underlying function than detecting activation differ-
ences with univariate methods. However, an experiment should always be referable back to 
psychological models instead of just demonstrating encoding. This can be done by demon-
strating the behavioural relevance of information (Walther et al., 2009; Williams et al., 
2008), the generalisation of information (Eger et al., 2009; Harrison & Tong, 2009: Experi-
mental section III) or temporal or functional double-dissociations (Experimental Section I, 
II, III). 
 
6.3 Future directions 
 
The present studies are believed to provide new insights into the mechanisms of task 
preparation and decision making. They also provide starting points for further research by 
raising new questions. The first study revealed lateral regions in prefrontal and parietal 
cortex encoding task rules in cued task conditions, whereas the last study revealed medial 
PFC and predominantly medial parietal regions encoding participants’ internal decisions. 
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The existence of a general lateral-medial gradient for increased degrees of freedom in 
decision making could be hypothesised, as suggested for PFC (Forstmann et al., 2005; 
Haynes et al., 2007; Kouneiher et al., 2009). One direct test for this assumption is to extend 
the paradigm used for the first study to free decisions. A task cue could either indicate a 
cued decision trial or a free decision trial. In cued decision trials, a second rule cue would 
indicate the rule. In free decision trials, participants would freely choose the rule to apply. 
After each trial, an additional response screen could explicitly ask for the rule used to avoid 
random responses. Additional switch cues could instruct the participants to immediately 
switch from the rule in mind (cued or freely chosen) to the alternative rule during some 
trials. Pattern classification could then be applied to test the following hypothesis: If an 
instructed switch occurred from a cued task rule to the alternative rule, it should be possible 
to decode both rules from the same regions in prefrontal and parietal cortex, which were 
found in the first study. If the switch occurred from a freely chosen rule, however, it could 
be assumed that the instructed switch transforms an initially free choice into a forced choice 
and the switch cue would have the same power as a rule cue. This should be accompanied 
by a shift of task rule information from regions encoding free decision outcomes (medial 
PFC / medial PPC) to regions encoding cued choices (lateral PFC / IPS). Taken together, 
the proposed experiment would elegantly close the loop between the first and the third study 
presented here. 
 Another question resulting from experiments two and three is whether encoding of 
choices in the LOC and the precuneus / PPC depends on trial-by-trial variations in stimulus 
detection or decision certainty. This could be directly tested by establishing a fixed medium 
level of visibility, as done by Williams and colleagues (2007). Unlike this study, however, it 
would be of interest to decode the decision outcomes as in the studies presented here. One 
hypothesis, as predicted by SDT (Swets, 1961), would be that LOC encodes the decision 
outcomes regardless of decision correctness, given that it receives the same (and sufficient) 
amount of visual information on each trial. Fluctuations in choice should then be due to 
trial-by-trial fluctuations in the underlying sensory signal. An alternative hypothesis would 
be that a constant switch occurs between information encoding in LOC and precuneus / 
PPC, depending on the subjective decision certainty (as opposed to its correctness), which 
could involve symmetry-breaking. This could also be investigated using e.g. magnetoen-
cephalography (MEG) or EEG, which have a better temporal resolution than fMRI. Addi-
tionally, the strength of functional coupling between LOC and precuneus could be 
addressed under different conditions of correctness and certainty (Haynes et al., 2005). It 
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would also be worth investigating the possibility of a transition of information encoding 
from one region to the other by using several levels of visibility (e.g. Grill-Spector et al., 
2000). To date, however, it is not clear how relative values of decoding accuracy (reflecting 
information) could be satisfactorily compared. The interpretation of significant differences 
in decoding accuracies between regions is not valid because the underlying BOLD signal 
can differ for various reasons (Logothetis, 2008). Interpreting accuracy differences within a 
region between tasks might also be problematic, because of imperfect reliabilities of the 
measurement tools (for imaging and for pattern classification). Also, to interpret a signifi-
cant drop of information encoding (e.g. as 20% less information) within a region would 
require the unproven assumption of a linear relationship between decoding accuracy and 
neural information encoding. Local information encoding above a certain threshold might 
be sufficient for successful task performance, rendering differences above the threshold 
meaningless. At the moment, in most cases the safest interpretation is to regard information 
decoding as a dichotomy: information is either present or not.  
 Finally, it would be worth testing if the involvement of a symmetry-breaking net-
work generalises to other task contexts. A perceptual decision making task could be used for 
other modalities. Sound discrimination (Binder, Liebenthal, Possing, Medler & Ward, 2004) 
or flutter discrimination (Romo & Salinas, 2003), however, also operate with prolonged 
temporal integration due to long stimulus exposure, rendering these approaches problematic 
for the investigation of the symmetry-breaking network. One radically different approach 
would be to investigate symmetry situations in logical deductive decisions. For example, a 
task similar to the Raven standard progressive matrix test (Raven, 1996) could be imple-
mented. Participants would be asked to select the abstract symbol that is logically the 
missing element in a matrix or an array. In many trials, however, none of the given alterna-
tive solutions would be correct such that participants would have to guess. So long as it is 
possible to keep the choice alternatives the same such that they could be used for decoding, 
this paradigm could test whether the precuneus still encodes guessed decisions, which 
would then point to a general symmetry-breaking mechanism. Again, believing that one did 
not find the correct solution might moderate the involvement of the proposed mechanism.  
These examples illustrate ways to directly test and extend the interpretations drawn 
from the present studies. These approaches could be combined with enhanced methods such 
as optimised classification algorithms, surface-based decoding techniques (Chen et al., in 
prep.), high-resolution fMRI (Kriegeskorte & Bandettini, 2007a; Swisher et al., 2010) or 
ultra high-field fMRI (Bode et al., in prep.; Swisher et al., 2010), which might allow the 
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investigation of finer-scaled activation patterns. The present studies are believed to provide 
an exciting basis for even more sophisticated investigations of human decision making in 
the future. 
 
6.4 Concluding summary 
 
Every day, humans are constantly required to react on stimuli in their dynamically 
changing environment. Appropriate behaviour therefore requires the ability to flexibly adapt 
to environmental cues, such as road signs or traffic lights. Different contexts might require 
different reactions to the same cues; a competence that has been conceptualised as task 
switching. An even more basic precondition is the ability to successfully detect sensory 
stimuli in a noisy environment, i.e., perceptual decision making. Only if, for instance, a stop 
sign can be identified as such in a hail storm, can the car driver act according to the associ-
ated rule. In a series of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiments, this 
present work investigated the neural encoding of these different components along the chain 
from sensory stimuli to behavioural responses.  
The first experiment tracked the information flow from the encoding of task rules (or 
task-sets) to stimuli and to motor responses using a task switching paradigm. Each trial, 
participants were presented with one of two rule cues. These cues defined the joystick 
movement that had to be performed in response to one of two distinct visual target stimuli. 
Multivariate pattern classification (Haynes & Rees, 2006; Norman et al., 2006) was applied 
to the fMRI data in order to search for brain regions that encoded the temporal sequence of 
information about rules, target stimuli and motor responses. It was found that first, preced-
ing the presentation of the target stimulus, the left intraparietal sulcus (IPS) encoded the 
abstract rule. Subsequently, a build-up of rule information was observed in left posterior 
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC), coinciding with the presentation of the target 
stimulus. The target stimuli were encoded in visual cortex. Motor responses could be 
decoded from supplementary and primary motor regions as soon as they could be prepared. 
Around the time of the motor response, the rules and target stimuli were encoded in left 
anterior VLPFC. A comparison with fixed task rules confirmed that information about 
stimuli and rules was encoded in prefrontal and parietal cortex only if a flexible switch 
between task rules was required. This study emphasised the importance of parietal cortex in 
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establishing abstract task-sets during early stages of rule-guided task preparation (Stoet & 
Snyder, 2004; Gail & Andersen, 2006). This function has often been linked to prefrontal 
cortex alone (Bunge, 2004). In the present work, however, encoding in parietal cortex even 
preceded encoding in prefrontal cortex. 
 The second project investigated whether networks for perceptual decision making 
depend on stimulus visibility. Participants categorised images of masked objects as belong-
ing to one of three categories. Multivariate pattern classification of spatial patterns of fMRI 
signals was used to decode the participants’ category choices, separately under high and low 
visibility conditions. From signals in the lateral-occipital complex (LOC), it was possible to 
decode participants’ category choices about highly visible objects but not about poorly 
visible ones. This finding could be replicated using decoding from individual object-
selective regions of interest (ROIs) derived from independent localizer scans. When partici-
pants were trying to classify poorly visible objects, however, the signals encoding the 
choices shifted to the precuneus / posterior parietal cortex (PPC). These findings suggest 
that participants’ choices were based on different neural population signals for low and high 
visibility conditions, challenging current signal detection theory models of perceptual 
decision making (Swets, 1961). These predict that decisions about perceptual entities should 
be based on the same dimension of sensory signal for all levels of visibility. If stimuli 
cannot be discriminated, trial-by-trial noise fluctuations in the same system should deter-
mine the choices. Contrarily, the present findings suggest that the precuneus / PPC might be 
involved in “symmetry-breaking” when no alternative is more supported by sensory evi-
dence. These regions could act as the brain’s generator of internal random decisions in the 
absence of useful perceptual information, comparable to the generation of free decisions 
(Soon et al., 2008).  
 Finally, the last project directly tested whether decisions made by guessing (in 
perceptual decision making with insufficient visual input) resemble intended free decisions 
about the same object categories, using the same visual stimulation. Participants had to 
either guess the presented category or freely select a category, independent from the presen-
tation. In order to avoid biasing participants’ decisions, the target stimuli did not contain 
meaningful object images, yet nonetheless created the illusion that there was an object 
stimulus presented, albeit difficult to detect. Pattern classification was used to search for 
regions in which activation patterns were interchangeable between the two decision condi-
tions. It could be shown that a network in precuneus / PPC encoded outcomes of guessing 
and to some extent free decisions. The activation patterns for both kinds of decisions were 
  
 123 
demonstrated to be interchangeable in this region. The precuneus therefore appears to be 
generally involved in the generation of random internal decisions. Anterior medial prefron-
tal cortex, however, only encoded decision outcomes when decisions were intended to be 
free and might therefore be exclusively important for free decisions made without an 
external frame of reference. 
Taken together, the present work highlights the importance of parietal cortex in con-
trolling both rule-guided (IPS) and self-determined (precuneus / PPC) behavior in humans. 
Parietal cortex functions might be best described within a framework that acknowledges its 
capacity for multi-modal information integration and processing of intentions with high 
self-reference. The present findings also confirmed the power of multivariate pattern 
classification for decoding high-level mental states from brain activity. By directly decoding 
the content of rules and decisions, it is believed that these studies revealed a closer link 
between cognitive mechanisms and brain functions than has been shown in humans before. 
It is hoped that the present work thereby prepared the ground for a deeper understanding of 




Wir leben in einer dynamischen, sich ständig verändernden Welt. Zu jeder Zeit die richtigen 
Entscheidungen zu treffen und Handlungen auszuwählen, hängt maßgeblich von der 
Fähigkeit ab, flexibel auf Hinweisreize (wie z.B. Straßenschilder oder Ampeln) reagieren zu 
können. Verschiedene Situationen verlangen dabei oft unterschiedliche Reaktionen auf 
identische Reize. So erfordert das Überqueren der Straße in Deutschland zuerst die 
Beachtung des Verkehrs von links, in Australien hingegen Aufmerksamkeit für Verkehr von 
rechts. Situationsabhängiges flexibles Reagieren auf identische Reize kann im Rahmen des 
Aufgaben-Wechsel Paradigmas (engl. task-switching) konzeptualisiert und untersucht 
werden. Noch grundlegender ist die Fähigkeit, einen Hinweisreiz unter sub-optimalen 
Bedingungen überhaupt als solchen zu erkennen. So erfordert beispielsweise die 
Wahrnehmung eines Stop-Schildes während eines schweren Hagelsturms zuerst eine 
perzeptuelle Entscheidung. In der vorliegenden Arbeit wurden in einer Serie von 
Experimenten die neuronalen Grundlagen der Verarbeitung dieser Komponenten, von 
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visuellen Reizen bis hin zu adäquaten Reaktionen, mittels funktioneller 
Magnetresonanztomographie (fMRT) untersucht. 
Das erste Experiment bediente sich des Aufgaben-Wechsel Paradigmas, um den 
Informationsfluss, beginnend mit der neuronalen Enkodierung abstrakter Regeln, über 
visuelle Reize, bis hin zur Auswahl einer motorischen Reaktion, zu untersuchen. In jedem 
Durchgang wurde den Teilnehmern eine von zwei Regeln (task-sets; Sakai, 2008) 
vorgegeben, welche die Zuordnung zwischen zwei möglichen visuellen Reizen und zwei 
motorischen Antworten festlegte. Im Folgenden wurde einer der visuellen Reize präsentiert, 
auf den gemäß der aktiven Regel reagiert werden sollte. Mittels Anwendung von 
multivariaten Mustererkennungsverfahren auf die fMRT Daten (Haynes & Rees, 2005; 
Norman et al., 2005) wurde nach Hirnregionen gesucht, welche die zeitliche Abfolge der 
Informationen über Regeln, visuelle Stimulation und motorische Antwort enkodierten. Der 
intraparietale Sulcus (IPS) enkodierte dabei die abstrakte Regel noch bevor der relevante 
visuelle Stimulus präsentiert wurde. Mit dessen Präsentation konnte im Folgenden ein 
Zuwachs an Regel-Information im linken posterioren ventrolateral Präfrontalkortex 
(VLPFC) beobachtet werden. Die visuellen Stimulationsreize selbst waren im visuellen 
Kortex enkodiert. Die motorischen Antworten waren, sobald sie geplant werden konnten, 
aus dem supplementären und primären motorischen Kortex dekodierbar. Während der 
motorischen Antwort schließlich konnten die visuellen Reize und abstrakten Regeln aus 
dem linken anterioren VLPFC ausgelesen werden. Ein Vergleich mit festen Zuordnungen 
von Reizen und Antworten bestätigte, dass Informationen über visuelle Reize und Regeln 
nur dann im präfrontalen und parietalen Kortex enkodiert waren, wenn flexibel zwischen 
Regeln gewechselt werden musste. Diese Studie demonstriert vor allem die Relevanz des 
parietalen Kortex für die Verarbeitung abstrakter Regelinformationen, welche bisher oft 
ausschließlich dem präfrontalen Kortex zugeschrieben wurde (Bunge, 2004). Diese 
Funktionen beziehen jedoch den parietalen Kortex mit ein (Stoet & Snyder, 2004; Gail & 
Andersen, 2006), dessen Beteiligung jener des präfrontalen Kortex sogar vorausgehen kann. 
 Das zweite fMRT Projekt untersuchte die Abhängigkeit neuronaler Netzwerke für 
perzeptuelle Entscheidungen von der Sichtbarkeit visueller Reize. Dafür wurden Probanden 
Bilder von stark oder schwach maskierten Objekten dargeboten, die bezüglich ihrer 
Kategoriezugehörigkeit zu klassifizieren waren. Erneut wurden Mustererkennungsverfahren 
benutzt, um aus lokalen Aktivitätsmustern im Gehirn für beide Sichtbarkeitsbedingungen 
einzeln vorherzusagen, für welche Kategorie sich die Probanden entschieden. Signale aus 
dem ventralen temporalen und okzipitalen Kortex (lateral-occipital complex, LOC) 
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erlaubten dabei die Vorhersage von Entscheidungen für gut sichtbare Objekte, aber nicht für 
stark maskierte Objekte. Es war jedoch möglich, die kategoriellen Entscheidungen für stark 
maskierte Objekte aus dem Precuneus im medialen dorsalen Parietalkortex vorherzusagen. 
Diese doppelte Dissoziation legt nahe, dass Entscheidungen unter hoher und niedriger 
Sichtbarkeit auf verschiedenen Mechanismen (Netzwerken) beruhen. Dieser Befund 
widerspricht Annahmen der Sigal-Entdeckungs-Theorie (Swets, 1961), die vorhersagt, dass 
auch unter niedriger Sichtbarkeit Signale in den gleichen sensorischen Arealen für 
perzeptuelle Entscheidungen ausschlaggebend sein sollten. In diesem Falle sollten zufällige 
Fluktuationen („noise“) im perzeptuellen System statt echtem sensorischen Input eine 
zufällige Entscheidung produzieren. Die Befunde der vorliegendnen Studie sprechen jedoch 
dafür, dass im Falle des Vorliegens unzureichender sensorischer Information (sensorische 
„Symmetrie“ bezüglich der relevanten Alternativen) der Precuneus in die Generierung einer 
zufälligen internalen Entscheidung involviert ist. Diese Interpretation wird durch eine 
kürzlich publizierte Studie gestützt, die zeigen konnte, dass der Percuneus auch an der 
Bildung freier zufälliger Entscheidungen beteiligt ist (Soon et al., 2008).  
 Basierend auf den vorausgegangenen Befunden, testete das dritte fMRT Experiment 
direkt die Vergleichbarkeit der neuronalen Mechanismen von Rate-Entscheidungen, die bei 
unzureichendem visuellem Input getroffen werden, mit geplant freien Entscheidungen 
(Haggard, 2008). Hierzu wurden Probanden in einem Teil der Durchgänge gebeten, erneut 
eine perzeptuelle Entscheidung über die Kategorie von stark maskierten Bildern zu treffen. 
Alternativ sollte in anderen Durchgängen bei gleicher visueller Stimulation eine spontane, 
freie Entscheidung für eine der Kategorien getroffen werden. Um jegliche Beeinflussung 
der Entscheidungen durch das verwendete Stimulusmaterial zu vermeiden, wurde in beiden 
Fällen kein echtes Objekt präsentiert, was durch die kurze Darbietungszeit und starke 
Maskierung jedoch nicht wahrnehmbar war. Erneut wurden Mustererkennungsverfahren auf 
die fMRT-Daten angewendet und Hirnregionen identifiziert, deren Muster regionaler 
Signale die Vorhersage der Entscheidungen erlaubten. Insbesondere war von Interesse, nach 
Regionen zu suchen, in denen die Aktivierungsmuster der Rate-Entscheidungen und der 
freien Entscheidungen eine so große Ähnlichkeit aufwiesen, dass sie austauschbar waren. Es 
konnte erneut gezeigt werden, dass der Precuneus, bis hin zum lateralen posterioren 
Parietalkortex, Rate-Entscheidungen enkodierte, wenn diese unter Abwesenheit nützlicher 
visueller Information getroffen werden mussten. Zusätzlich war diese Region auch begrenzt 
prädiktiv für freie Entscheidungen und zeigte außerdem die vermutete Austauschbarkeit 
neuronaler Muster für Rate-Entscheidungen und freie Entscheidungen. Aus 
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Aktivierungsmustern des medialen anterioren Präfrontalkortex hingegen, konnten wie in 
früheren Experimenten (Haynes et al., 2007; Soon et al., 2008), nur geplant freie 
Entscheidungen vorhergesagt werden.  
Die vorliegende Arbeit demonstriert die große Beteutung parietaler Areale, sowohl 
für die Kontrolle regelgeleiteter Handlungen (IPS) als auch für selbstbestimmte Handlungen 
(Precuneus / posteriorer Parietalkortex). Der parietale Kortex kann somit als multi-modales 
Integrations-Modul verstanden werden, das an der Auswahl von Handlungszielen und 
dessen Aufrechterhaltung, sowie an der Verarbeitung von Intentionen und Entscheidungen 
mit hohem Selbstbezug beteiligt ist. Vom methodischen Standpunkt betrachtet, bestätigt die 
vorliegende Arbeit den großen Nutzen multivariater Mustererkennungsverfahren für die 
Analyse von fMRT Daten, auch für höhere kognitive Prozesse. In den hier vorgestellten 
Studien konnte die Möglichkeit demonstriert werden, aus lokalen Aktivierungsmustern 
direkt vorherzusagen, welche abstrakte Regel ein Proband gerade anwendet oder welche 
Entscheidung er trifft. Diese Methodik erlaubt es, einen stärkeren Bezug zwischen 
menschlichen kognitiven Funktionen und den ihnen zugrunde liegenden neuronalen 
Netzwerken herzustellen als es mit nicht-invasiven bildgebenden Verfahren bislang möglich 
war. Damit verknüft ist die Hoffnung, dass die vorliegende Arbeit auch eine Grundlage für 
weitere Forschung und ein tieferes Verständnis der neuronalen Basis von flexiblen 
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Joystick and custom-made plexiglass table for fMRI 
 
 
Figure A-1: Joystick and custom-made fMRI compatible plexiglass table. a) The joystick was fixed on the 
plexiglass construction using plastic screws. Only left and right movements could be performed. Movements in 
both directions required the same amount of muscle strength, adjustable by using different in-built bridge layers 
b) The plexiglass table comprised two similar parts, each of which featuring striations on the side. Being 
perpendicular to their counterparts, these striations allowed fixing the upper part of the table in every desired tilt 
angle using plastic screws. This assured that the participants’ arms rested in a comfortable position throughout 
the entire experiment. The lower part of the plexiglass table was placed below the scanner mattress, such that 
participants’ weight prohibited any movement of the table (photo: Stephan Liebig). 
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Univariate fMRI data analysis 
 
Only trials with correct responses were included in the univariate data analysis. The fMRI 
data were motion corrected, spatially normalised to a standard stereotaxic space (Montreal 
Neurological Institute EPI template) and re-sampled to an isotropic spatial resolution of 3 x 
3 x 3 mm3 in SPM2. Data were smoothed with a Gaussian kernel of 8 mm FWHM to 
account for anatomical variability and to satisfy the assumption of Gaussian random field 
theory. For statistical analyses, a FWE corrected threshold of p < .05 was used. The analysis 
aimed to find brain regions that were significantly activated during processing of the cue 
(task-set), the perception of the target stimulus and the execution of the motor response. 
Furthermore, the contrasts between the different task-sets, between target stimuli and 
between responses were calculated. A GLM as implemented in SPM2 was used for the 
analyses. It consisted of six boxcar regressors, each convolved with a canonical HRF. The 
first two regressors modelled cue “A” and cue “B”, the third and fourth regressors modelled 
target 1 and target 2, and the last two regressors modelled the responses (left and right). 
The analysis searched for regions with an overall increase in activation during the 
different stages of information processing. During processing of the rule beginning with the 
presentation of the cue, increased activation was found in visual cortex, intraparietal sulcus 
(IPS), the medial frontal gyrus corresponding to supplementary motor cortex (SMA) and 
pre-SMA (Table A-1). During presentation of the target, the visual cortex was also acti-
vated, along with several regions of prefrontal cortex, including the left insula, premotor 
cortex (predominantly left) and left primary motor cortex. This presumably indicates that 
motor preparation was already taking place during the early stages of target stimulus 
presentation (Table A-2). During response execution, activation was increased primarily in 
motor-related areas including primary motor cortex, premotor cortex, basal ganglia and 
cerebellum as well as in temporal cortex (Table A-3). No brain region could be identified 
that was more activated during the presentation of cue “A” compared to cue “B” nor was 
there conversely a brain region that was more activated during the presentation of cue “B” 
compared to cue “A”. The same held true for the comparison of target stimuli as well as 
comparing left and right motor responses (note that both, left and right responses with the 
joystick were performed with the right hand only).  
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Table A-1: General peak activation for cue presentation. 
Anatomical area L/R T-value x y z 
      
Middle occipital gyrus L 8.85 -27 -84 -6 
 R 7.32 30 -84 0 
Calcarine sulcus L 7.86 -15 -93 -6 
 R 7.82 15 -90 -9 
      
Intraparietal sulcus L 7.14 -30 -54 54 
      
Medial frontal gyrus L 6.29 -6 15 51 
 L 6.01 -27 -3 54 
      
Note: The coordinates are given according to MNI space with their T-values. L = left hemisphere, R = right 
hemisphere; all FWE-corrected (p < .05; voxel threshold = 10 voxels). 
 
Table A-2: General peak activation for target stimuli. 
Anatomical area L/R T-value x y z 
      
Calcarine sulcus L 9.63 -15 -90 -9 
Medial occipital gyrus R 8.94 30 -75 -12 
Inferior occipital gyrus R 9.05 36 -79 3 
Cuneus R 7.20 9 -72 12 
 L 5.68 -12 -75 12 
      
Medial superior frontal sulcus L 8.04 -6 -18 51 
Medial superior frontal gyrus L 7.20 -6 0 48 
      
Precentral gyrus L 6.32 -9 -30 54 
 L 7.58 -33 -15 42 
Central sulcus L 6.75 -27 -27 48 
Postcentral gyrus R 5.65 63 -15 39 
      
Insula L 6.40 -42 3 3 
      
Note: The coordinates are given according to MNI space with their T-values. L = left hemisphere, R = right 
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Table A-3: General peak activation for motor responses. 
Anatomical area L/R T-value x y z 
      
Cerebellum L 14.85 -48 -69 -27 
 R 14.41 51 -57 -30 
      
Basal ganglia R 14.81 18 0 27 
 L 6.19 -18 0 -9 
      
Precentral gyrus R 10.73 6 -27 78 
Postcentral gyrus R 8.26 3 -51 72 
 L 7.88 -3 -51 72 
      
Superior temporal gyrus L 7.42 -51 -6 6 
Medial temporal gyrus L 5.88 -66 -48 -3 
      
Note: The coordinates are given according to MNI space with their T-values. L = left hemisphere, R = right 
hemisphere; all FWE-corrected (p < .05; voxel threshold = 10 voxels). 
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Decoding of target stimuli 
 
 
Figure A-2: Decoding target stimuli. The figure shows decoding accuracy [%] of target stimuli collapsed 
across both task-sets, which made it possible to dissociate encoding of stimuli from encoding of motor responses 
(radius = 4 voxels). The graphs show mean decoding accuracies and standard errors over time. Regions dis-
played showed decoding above chance level (50%; voxel threshold = 10 voxels) in time bins 3-5. The cue was 
presented at the beginning of each trial (onset 0 sec), followed by the target stimulus (onset 4.2 sec) and the 
motor response (onset 8.4 sec). It was necessary to account for the temporal delay of the BOLD signal such that 
time bins were shifted by 2 volumes (i.e. time bin 1 is the earliest that could reflect cue related activity). Visual 
cortex encoded the target stimulus from time bin 3 on, peaking in bin 4 (p < .05 FWE corrected). Anterior 
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex showed significant decoding accuracy in time bins 4 and 5, peaking at 56% (p < 
.001 uncorrected). No other regions were predictive above chance for target stimuli in any other time bin. 
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Decoding of motor responses 
 
 
Figure A-3: Decoding motor responses. The figure shows decoding accuracy [%] of motor responses collapsed 
across both task-sets, which makes it possible to dissociate encoding of motor responses from encoding of target 
stimuli (radius = 4 voxels). The graphs show mean decoding accuracies and standard errors over time. The cue 
was presented at the beginning of each trial (onset 0 sec), followed by the target stimulus (onset 4.2 sec) and the 
motor response (onset 8.4 sec). It was necessary to account for the temporal delay of the BOLD signal such that 
time bins were shifted by 2 volumes (i.e. time bin 1 is the earliest that could reflect cue related activity). Regions 
displayed allowed decoding of motor responses above chance level (50%; voxel threshold = 10 voxels) after 
FWE correction (p < .05) in time bins 3-5. Bilateral premotor cortex, bilateral primary motor cortex and left 
medial occipito-temporal sulcus encoded the motor response. All regions showed similar information time 
courses, reaching their maxima in the third or fourth time bin (peak of 77%). No other regions were predictive 
above chance for motor responses in any other time bin. Coordinates displayed are MNI coordinates. 
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Decoding of stimulus-response combinations 
 
In an additional analysis, the question was addressed whether the four individual combina-
tions of rules and target stimuli were also encoded in prefrontal and parietal cortex. Asaad 
and colleagues (1998) demonstrated in monkeys that lateral PFC can encode combinations 
of stimuli and rules. It should be noted that the conditions defined by rule-stimulus combi-
nations can also be regarded as stimulus-response combinations. This analysis therefore 
cannot disentangle target stimuli from motor responses. For this analysis, the fMRI data 
were motion corrected and re-sampled to an isotropic spatial resolution of 3 x 3 x 3 mm3 in 
SPM2 as described for the main analyses. Again, a GLM approach as implemented in SPM2 
was used, consisting of four boxcar regressors modelling the trials according to the rule-
stimulus combination involved. Each regressor was convolved with a canonical HRF. 
Finally, a searchlight pattern classification analysis was implemented (as described in 
methods in Experimental Section I) to decode the four individual combinations of rules and 
target stimuli.  
First, the searchlight clusters in pVLPFC, aVLPFC and IPS that encoded the abstract 
rules and target stimuli were analysed (Table A-4). All regions encoded the individual rule-
stimulus combinations with decoding accuracies between 7 to 12% above chance level 
(25%). Nevertheless, this trend did not reach statistical significance using the same thresh-
old as used for the other analyses reported here (all p > .001 uncorrected). Statistically 
significant accuracies for decoding individual rule-stimulus combinations could only be 
found in visual cortex and pre-motor as well as motor areas (Figure A-4). These findings 
confirm that combinations of stimuli and rules are also simply combinations of stimuli and 
responses, hence, encoded in the respective areas. Further regions, which could also encode 
these combinations, might not have been detectable because of the decrease in statistical 
power due to the increase in distinct conditions (four instead of two as in the main analyses) 
and the decrease of trials per conditions. 
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Table A-4: Decoding rule-target combinations from parietal and prefrontal regions. 
Anatomical area L/R Decoding 
accuracy 
SE T-value x y z 
        
Intraparietal sulcus L 32 % 2.1 2.86 -24 -45 42 
        
Posterior prefrontal cortex L 32 % 2.7 2.05 -48 12 21 
        
Anterior prefrontal cortex (I) L 36 % 4.9 1.97 -51 33 3 
Anterior prefrontal cortex (II) L 37 % 4.1 2.85 -51 33 -12 
        
Note: Listed are only results for the searchlight clusters in IPS, pVLPFC and aVLPFC that showed high 
decoding accuracies for task-sets and target stimuli in the main analyses. Chance level was 25% for four rule-
target combinations. The coordinates are given according to MNI space with their corresponding T-values. L = 
left hemisphere, R = right hemisphere. None of the decoding accuracies significantly exceeded chance level (all 




Figure A-4: Unconstrained decoding 
of rule-target combinations. 
 Decoding was performed using a 
moving searchlight (radius = 4 
voxels). Displayed are mean decoding 
accuracies and standard errors in 
regions showing the highest accuracies 
above chance (25%) as well as corpus 
callosum as a non-significant control 
region. A statistical threshold of p < 
.00001 (uncorrected) and a voxel 
threshold of 10 voxels were used. 
Significant accuracies could be found 
in visual cortex (peak accuracy 46%; 
MNI [-9 -93 7]), pre-SMA (peak 38%; 
MNI [-18 31 32]) and SMA/M1 (peak 
34%; MNI [3 -14 62]). Combinations 
of stimuli and rules are also combina-
tions of stimuli and responses, 
explaining the high accuracies in 



































* p < .00001 (uncorrected)
10 voxels threshold
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Appendix B 
 
Behavioural pre-tests I: Selection of categories and masking procedure 
 
Participants and procedure 
The pre-test aimed at selecting optimal object categories and a masking procedure for the 
fMRI experiment. Ten participants (seven female, mean 24 years, SD = 2.31) took part in 
this experiment. None of them took part in any other pre-test or the final fMRI study. All 
participants were right-handed and had normal or corrected to normal visual acuity. Partici-
pants were paid 7 € for their participation. Stimuli were grey-scaled object images (400 x 
400 pixels) from four different categories (pianos, chairs, shoes, cars) in natural back-
grounds. Their construction is described in the main text (see Methods). Twelve images (out 
of thirty) from each category were used for the experiment. Two different types of masking 
were tested: backward-masking (Grill-Spector et al., 2000) and sandwich-masking, which 
used an additional pre-mask. As characteristics of the mask may be critical determinants of 
the degree of invisibility that can be achieved, differences between two mask compositions 
were additionally examined. For this purpose, every target picture was scrambled into 
random square tiles of either 40 x 40 pixels or 50 x 50 pixels in size (see Methods). The size 
of the tiles in the masks served as an additional experimental condition. For the sandwich-
masking procedure, two different masks with the respective tile size were used. The back-
ward masking procedure required only one mask. In sum, masking conditions tested were 
backward- and sandwich-masking with masks consisting of randomised but non-meaningful 
picture parts, namely 10 x 10 (small) or 8 x 8 (big) tiles.   
Different masking strengths were achieved by varying the target duration with re-
spect to the post-mask duration in all masking conditions. The pre-mask was kept constant 
with 167 ms for sandwich-masking. The four presentation durations of the target stimulus 
were a) 16.7 ms (very short; visible for 1 frame given a monitor refresh rate of 60 Hz) with 
a post-mask duration of 483.3 ms, b) 33.3 ms (short; 2 frames) with a post-mask duration of 
466.7 ms, c) 50.0 ms (long; 3 frames) and a post-mask duration of 450.0 ms and d) 66.7 
(very long; 4 frames) ms resulting in a post-mask duration of 433.3 ms. The masking 
methods (backward vs. sandwich) were used in distinct experimental blocks. The order of 
  xi
blocks was pseudo-randomised between participants. In every block, each of the twelve 
objects from the four different categories was shown once in every visibility condition. This 
equated to a total of 192 trials performed per block. Each trial was followed by a two 
second delay, allowing time for responses. All stimuli were shown on a 17'' TFT screen 
using a Barebone Shuttle Pentium4 personal computer (Megware Computers); the presenta-
tion software used was the Cogent toolbox for MATLAB 7.0 (The MathWorks, Inc.). 
Comparable to the fMRI study the estimated angle of vision of  ~ 0.72° for all stimuli. The 
background was kept a constant dark-grey. Participants had to fixate on the white cross that 
was always superimposed. On each trial, they were instructed to report the category they 
believed the presented object to have by pressing one of four buttons on a response device, 
each randomly assigned to one of the four categories, with their right and left middle- and 
index fingers. In the case that participants could not make a decision or were unsure, they 
were instructed to guess. The data was analysed by calculating a d-prime (d') visibility 
index for each condition as described for the main experiment (see Methods and caption of 
Figure B-1). This procedure allowed a direct comparison of distributions of visibility 
characteristics between the experimental conditions for each category. 
 
Results 
The distribution of visibility indices for the different categories in each visibility condition 
are shown in Figure B-1. Because of the low number of participants and the explorative 
nature of the pre-test, no statistical tests were performed. From visual inspection it became 
obvious that sandwich-masking led to stronger masking and less visibility in all conditions. 
Sandwich-masking showed a gradual increase in visibility with increasing target duration 
and seemed to be the more appropriate procedure. In general, cars and shoes were detected 
more easily compared to pianos and chairs, even under strong masking conditions. Partici-
pants’ self-reports also led to the conclusion that the characteristic shapes of cars and shoes 
were detected too easily. Chairs and pianos demonstrated better and highly similar visibility 
characteristics and were selected for the fMRI experiment. Target durations of 16.7 ms and 
66.7 ms were selected for the fMRI experiment because they facilitated a maximum differ-
ence in object visibility. Since the difference in tile sizes of the masks did not lead to 
substantial differences, the one tending to yield slightly better masking properties was 
selected, namely the mask comprised of 40 x 40 pixel tiles. 
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Figure B-1: Visibility characteristics of categories and masking procedures. a) Sandwich-masking using 400 
x 400 pixel masks comprised of 10 x 10 tiles (each 40 x 40 pixels), randomly chosen from different images. 12 
target images from four categories (cars, chairs, shoes, pianos) were tested in a perceptual category detection 
task. Displayed are mean d' values [d' = z(hits) – z(false alarms)] and standard errors for four visibility condi-
tions (target durations of 16.7 ms, 33.3 ms, 50.0 ms, 67.7 ms; post-mask duration 500 ms minus target duration; 
pre-mask duration was kept constant at 167 ms) for N=10 participants. b) Sandwich-masking as described for (a) 
but using masks comprised of 8 x 8 scrambled image tiles (50 x 50 pixel). c) Backward-masking using a 400 x 
400 pixel mask comprised of 10 x 10 scrambled image tiles (40 x 40 pixel) shown directly after target image 
presentation. d) Backward masking as described for (c) using a 400 x 400 pixel mask comprised of 8 x 8 squares 
of scrambled image pieces (50 x 50 pixel). Since the gradual increase of visibility was best in sandwich-masking 
and target durations of 16.7 ms and 66.7 ms gave best separation between conditions, these were selected for the 
fMRI experiment. Pianos and chairs were found to be most comparable and hardest to detect; these were also 
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a) Sandwich-mask (400 x 400 pixel)
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Behavioural pre-tests II: Repetitive masking 
 
Participants and procedure 
Additional behavioural pre-tests were conducted to test a four-time repetition of target and 
masks in rapid succession to extend the total visual stimulation duration without substan-
tially changing the visibility characteristics (Macknik & Livingstone, 1998).  
The sample consisted of ten right-handed participants with normal visual acuity 
(seven female, M = 23.9, SD = 2.69). None of the participants took part in any other pre-test 
or the final fMRI study. Participants were paid 7 € for their participation. Sixteen masked 
stimuli from three object categories (chairs, pianos and noise) were presented using repeti-
tive backward-masking and repetitive sandwich-masking in separate blocks (masks 10 x 10 
scrambled tiles). Two visibility conditions (high: target 66.7 ms, post-mask 433.3 ms; low: 
target 16.7 ms, post-mask 483.3 ms; chosen from pre-test I) were used, resulting in 96 trials 
in total per block. Every presentation of masked targets was repeated four times in direct 
succession before the participants were allowed to respond (three seconds response delay). 
The task and setting was the same as for the first pre-test (see above). Responses (left 
middle and index fingers, right index finger) were randomly assigned to the three categories 
on a trial-by-trial basis.  
 
Results 
Statistical analyses were not performed due to the small pre-test sample; however, the 
general pattern of visibility characteristics using the different masking procedures was 
similar to those obtained in the first pre-test. While the visibilities achieved using sandwich 
masking were very low and uniform for all categories, the indices for backward masking 
were already high using 66.7 ms target duration (Figure B-2). Visibility indices might have 
plateaued and showed a ceiling effect using backward masking. Values around d' = 5 can be 
considered nearly perfect, at which point the masking can be assumed ineffective. In 
summary, optimal masking could only be achieved using repetitive sandwich-masking. 
Additionally, considering the more balanced distribution of mean d'-values between catego-
ries using repetitive sandwich-masking, this approach was confirmed to be the most suitable 




Figure B-2: Visibility of object categories using repetitive masking. Shown are the d' values (for n=10 
participants) for a) backward-masking (only post-mask, duration of 500 ms minus target duration) and b) 
sandwich-masking (duration of 167 ms for the pre-mask and 500 ms minus target duration for the post-mask), 
for two different target durations (16.7 ms and 66.7 ms). While the visibility achieved using sandwich-masking 
was still reduced for 66.7 ms target duration (right side), visibility showed a ceiling effect using backward-
masking (left side). Optimal masking could only be achieved in the condition of 16.7 ms target presentation with 
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Behavioural pre-test III: Selection of target stimuli 
 
The purpose of the third pre-test was to select object images from a pool of images for each 
category that showed distinct visibility characteristics under the final two masking condi-
tions, such that the highest degree of comparability was maintained across categories. 
  
Participants and procedure 
An independent sample of nine participants (5 female, M = 26, SD = 3.5) participated in 
this pre-test. They were also exclusively right-handed, had normal or corrected to normal 
visual acuity and were paid 7 € for their participation. The general procedure and material 
was exactly the same as in the second pre-test but using the repetitive sandwich-masking 
approach only (see pre-test II). The final two visibility conditions used target durations of 
16.7 ms (low visibility: post-mask duration of 483.3 ms) and 66.7 ms (high visibility: post-
mask duration of 433.3 ms). 30 target objects of each category were presented once per run 
in both visibility conditions, resulting in 180 trials. The order of trials was individually 
randomised for each participant and each run. All participants performed two experimental 
runs. 
The overall percentage of hits was calculated for each object in all three categories. 
Note that for single-object analyses, false alarms were impossible to calculate. Only objects 
that showed substantially different visibility characteristics under the two visibility condi-
tions were selected for the fMRI experiment while objects showing exceptional visibility 
characteristics were discarded. More specifically, objects had to be classified correctly in 
more that 55% of all cases under high visibility and in more than 25% but not more than 
75% under low visibility. Objects that were misclassified even more often were considered 
systematically misleading and were therefore discarded. Some objects were dismissed 
because of too characteristic picture properties (according to subjects’ reports). 
 
Results 
A complete overview of the visibility characteristics is given in Table B-1. The best 24 




Table B-1: Descriptive statistics (hits) for criteria-based selection of target objects. 















1 44.44 100.00 61.11 100.00 27.78 77.78 
2 38.89 72.22 61.11 100.00 22.22 55.56 
3 50.00 100.00 61.11 100.00 27.78 38.89 
4 50.00 77.78 77.78 100.00 25.22 66.67 
5 27.78 55.56* 50.00 100.00 50.00 61.11 
6 44.44 100.00 66.67 100.00 33.33 88.89 
7 22.22 94.44 38.89 100.00 50.00 83.33 
8 61.11 100.00 50.00 100.00 44.44 83.33 
9 50.00 94.44 66.67 88.89 27.78 88.89 
10 22.22 94.44 66.67 100.00 38.89 83.33 
11 38.89 77.78 88.89 100.00 61.11 72.22 
12 55.56 100.00 38.89 100.00 27.78 88.89 
13 50.00 100.00 44.44 88.89 33.33 72.22 
14 44.44 100.00 27.78 94.44 38.89 61.11 
15 38.89 100.00 55.56 100.00 27.78 55.56 
16 38.89 94.44 50.00 94.44 33.33 77.78 
17 55.56 88.89 83.33 100.00 44.44 88.89 
18 38.89 100.00 72.22 100.00 27.78 22.22 
19 27.78 100.00 61.11 100.00 61.11 66.67 
20 66.67* 88.89 22.22 72.22 38.89 77.78 
21 44.44 94.44 33.33 66.67 55.56 72.22 
22 38.89 100.00 44.44 83.33 16.67 50.00 
23 50.00 100.00 55.56 100.00 38.89 88.89 
24 61.11 88.89 72.22 100.00 38.89 88.89 
25 55.56* 100.00 77.78 100.00 27.78 72.22 
26 50.00 94.44 38.89 100.00 22.22 33.33 
27 27.78 100.00 33.33 50.00 22.22 66.67 
28 50.00 83.33 38.89 77.78 50.00 77.78 
29 33.33 50.00 61.11 100.00 38.89 55.56 
30 55.56 94.44 38.89 100.00 33.33 77.78 
 
Note: Mean hit rates [%] are reported for all possible target images from the selected categories under two 
visibility conditions (sample of n = 9 participants). Target durations were 16.7 ms (low visibility) and 66.7 ms 
(high visibility). Post-mask duration was calculated 500 ms minus target duration, pre-mask duration was always 
167 ms. The selection criteria are given in the text. Some objects were dismissed because of too characteristic 
picture properties (*). Those images whose visibility characteristics did not satisfy the criteria (red) are high-





Figure B-3: Images of pianos used for fMRI masking experiment. The figure displays the final selection of 
24 different images (400 x 400 pixels) of pianos (for selection procedure see above).  
 
 
Figure B-4: Images of chairs used for fMRI masking experiment. The figure displays the final selection of 





Figure B-5: Phase-randomised noise images used for fMRI masking experiment. The figure displays the 
final selection of 24 different noise images (400 x 400 pixels; for selection procedure see above). The images 
were created from all piano and chair images using a phase-randomisation procedure following a 2-D Fourier 
transformation (for details see Methods).  
Noise images
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Confusion matrix in perceptual decision making 
 
 
Figure B-6: Confusion matrix in perceptual decision making. For each category (here illustrated for pianos 
as the target category), four cases are possible when objects have to be classified. “Hit” refers to correct 
classification of an object from the target category; “false alarm” refers to the incorrect classification of the 
object as belonging to the target category while a different category was presented; “correct rejection” refers 
to the classification as a non-target category object while a non-target category object was presented; “miss” 
refers to the classification as a non-target category object while the target category was presented. Note that in 
the present study, there were always two non-target categories such that object categories have to be sorted 
individually. The decoding analyses averaged across each combination of the two cells (choices, independent 
from real stimuli; stimuli, independent from choices; errors vs. correct responses). Cell-wise analyses could 
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Mean hit rates for fMRI masking experiment 
 
 
Figure B-7: Mean hit rates for object categories.  a) Behavioural data was analysed by calculating hit rates as 
a visibility index for each condition (high visibility = dark bars; low visibility = bright bars). Displayed are mean 
hit rates and standard errors for the final sample (N=14). The statistical results were highly comparable to the 
analyses by means of d' values. Following an ANOVA for repeated measures [F(5,65) = 57.71; Eta2 = 0.75; p < 
.001], post-hoc Sheffé-tests correcting for multiple comparisons revealed significant differences between high 
and low visibility for all object categories (p < .001 for all comparisons; pianos: high visibility 89%, SD = 2.99; 
low visibility 34%, SD = 2.79; chairs: high visibility 93%; SD = 1.80; low visibility: 45%, SD = 2.93; noise: 
high visibility 79%, SD = 3.24; low visibility 46%, SD = 5.74). Highly visible objects achieved significant hit 
rates above chance level (p < .001 for all). In the low-visibility condition, only the hit rate for chairs slightly 
exceeded chance level (pianos: p > .05; chairs: p < .01; noise: p > .05). b) Individual visibility indices. The graph 
displays individual hit rates for each participant for both visibility conditions and all three categories. Dark lines: 
categories in “high visibility” condition (mean 87.0%; SE 2.68); bright lines: categories in “low visibility” 
condition (mean 41.7%; SE 3.82). Nearly all participants showed a clear separation between visibility conditions 
(exception participant 4 in one case). The same category was never perceived better under “low visibility” 




















* p < .05
** p < .01



























Univariate fMRI data analysis 
 
Conventional univariate analyses were used to identify brain regions where the overall level 
of activity was significantly increased during the presentation of objects shown in different 
visibility conditions; it was also used to contrast processing of real object images (pianos 
and chairs) with noise images in both visibility conditions. For these analyses the data of the 
main experiment underwent motion correction, spatial normalisation to a standard stereo-
taxic space (Montreal Neurological Institute EPI template) and re-sampling to an isotropic 
spatial resolution of 3 x 3 x 3 mm3 with SPM2. Additionally, data were smoothed with a 
Gaussian kernel of 8 mm FWHM to account for anatomical variability and to satisfy the 
assumption of Gaussian random field theory. A general linear model (GLM) as imple-
mented in SPM2 was used. It consisted of six boxcar regressors, each convolved with a 
canonical haemodynamic response function (HRF). These modelled the presentation of 
pianos, chairs and noise images (individually for “high visibility” and “low visibility”). 
For the “high visibility” condition, stronger activations for real objects compared to 
noise images were found exclusively in left LOC and in a region in right anterior temporal 
cortex, which has been linked to semantic memory and conceptual knowledge about so-
cially used stimuli (Simmons & Martin, 2009). No region showed stronger activations for 
real objects compared to noise images under low visibility. Also, no region could be found 
that showed the inverse effect of stronger activations for noise images than for real object 
images, neither in the “high visibility” nor in the “low visibility” condition. Next, the 
contrast of “high visibility” versus “low visibility” was calculated across all categories. 
Only the same region in right anterior temporal cortex showed stronger activation for “high 
visibility” than for “low visibility”. Conversely, a region in dorso-medial frontal cortex in 
the rostral cingulate zone (RCZ) was stronger activated in the “low visibility” condition 
compared to the “high visibility” condition for all categories (all results are reported in 
Table B-2, Figure B-8). The RCZ and adjacent regions have been linked to different aspects 
of decision uncertainty (Nachev et al., 2008) and guessing (Elliott, Rees & Dolan, 1999). 
Next, it was investigated if any region was more activated for error trials compared 
to correct trials and vice versa. Again, a GLM was used as described above. It consisted of 
three boxcar regressors, each convolved with a canonical HRF. These modelled (i) the 
correct trials for the low visibility condition, (ii) the error trials for the low visibility 
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condition as well as (iii) all trials for the high visibility condition (there were not sufficient 
errors under high visibility to allow an independent estimation of correct / error). Only the 
first two regressors were of interest. A group level analysis was conducted as described 
above. No region showed a difference between correct trials and error trials for the low 
visibility condition, even when a very low threshold of p < .01 (uncorrected; 10 voxels 
threshold) was applied. Additionally, the analyses were restricted to three regions of interest 
(ROIs), namely the left LOC [-21 -51 6], the right LOC [27 -39 -12] and the precuneus [-9 -
63 30] defined by the results of the independent pattern classification analysis for partici-
pants’ choices (applying a threshold of p < .0001 for ROI definition). Again, no brain region 
showed such a difference (Figure B-9), supporting the interpretation that the images have 
not been processed at the object-level when strong masking was used. 
 
Table B-2: Table of activation contrasts for univariate analysis. 
Contrast Anatomical area L/R T p < x y z 
        
Objects > Noise (all) ---       
Noise > Objects (all) ---       
        
Objects > Noise (HighVis) LOC L 3.45 .001 -18 -39 -12 
Noise > Objects (HighVis) ---       
        
Objects > Noise (LowVis) ---       
Noise > Objects (LowVis) ---       
        
Low > HighVis (all) medial frontal / RCZ L/R 5.52 .05 * -6 21 45 
High > LowVis (all) anterior temporal R 5.34 .05 * 21 6 -18 
        
Low > HighVis (Objects) medial frontal / RCZ L/R 5.59 .05 * -6 21 42 
High > LowVis (Objects) anterior temporal R 4.10 .001 21 6 -18 
 LOC L 4.07 .001 -24 -48 -9 
        
Low > HighVis (noise) ---       
High > LowVis (noise) ---       
  
Note: * FWE corrected; LowVis = “low visibility” condition; HighVis = “high visibility” condition; LOC = 
lateral-occipital complex; RCZ = rostral cingulate zone; Objects = images of pianos and chairs; Noise = phase-






Figure B-8: Activation contrasts for visual stimulation. a) Contrast of activations related to stimuli presented 
under high visibility versus low visibility. When all categories were included, a region in right anterior temporal 
cortex showed stronger activation for high visibility compared to low visibility (red; MNI [21 6 -18]; p < .05 
FWE-corrected). When only the real object categories (pianos and chairs) were used for the same contrast, this 
region again demonstrated stronger activation but at a lower statistical threshold, along with a cluster in left LOC 
(green; MNI [-24 -48 -9]; p < .001 uncorrected) b) Areas more strongly activated under low visibility than under 
high visibility. Regardless of whether all categories or only real object categories were included in the analysis, 
only one area located in medial frontal cortex / rostral cingulate zone (RCZ) was more strongly activated 
(yellow; MNI [-6 -21 42]; p < .05 FWE-corrected). Coordinates are MNI coordinates. 
 
 
Figure B-9: Results of univariate 
error analyses for low visibility 
condition. a) Contrast estimates for 
correct trials (dark) and incorrect trials 
(bright) for peak voxels of searchlight-
clusters from which decoding of 
participants’ choices was possible. 
None of these regions displayed any 
differences between correct and 
incorrect trials (p > .01 uncorrected). 
No other region could be found 
displaying such a difference. 
a) high visibility > low visibility 
[21 6 -18] [-24 -48 -9]
all categories
only pianos & chairs
b) low visibility > high visibility 
[-6 -21 42]
all categories &
































Two-class pattern classification for presented objects 
 
Decoding participants’ categorical choices in the “high visibility” condition was possible 
from regions in bilateral LOC while decoding the presented object categories was possible 
from a wider range of visual areas (compare Figures 4-4 and 4-5). Additional multivariate 
decoding analyses were therefore performed to test the hypothesis that the wide spread of 
regions in the second case was caused by greater differences in low-level features between 
the real objects (pianos and chairs) compared to the noise images. In these analyses, only 
two categories of objects were used for classification at a time, thus, analyses for all three 
combinations of paired categories were conducted separately. The process of classification 
followed the same searchlight approach as described above (see Methods). The only differ-
ence was that by using two instead of three classes at a time, the chance level for decoding 
accuracy was 50%. The resulting brain maps of decoding accuracies of the two analyses 
using one real object category and the noise category were averaged (both based on the 
same number of images per category), preventing the use of uneven distributions in pattern 
vectors for single decoding analyses. Hence, the analyses resulted in two decoding accuracy 
maps: “decoding objects” and “decoding objects from noise”. 
Using only real object categories (pianos and chairs), decoding was possible for the 
“high visibility” condition from left LOC (see Figure 4-5b). Decoding object from noise 
images under high visibility was possible from a wider range of bilateral visual regions and 
LOC (Table B-3), highly overlapping with the regions found for three-class searchlight 
decoding. Again, under “low visibility” conditions no region allowed decoding. Taken 
together, these results confirmed that patterns in several visual areas could distinguish 
between visible objects and non-objects, pointing to the importance of differences in low-
level features of real objects and noise images (Kay et al., 2008; Walther et al., 2009). The 
LOC, on the other hand, was the only region revealing information encoding about distinct 
object categories, underlining its exclusive role in processing object category information in 
the ventral visual pathway. 
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T p < x y z 
   M SE      
          
Obj only (LowVis) ---         
Obj only (HighVis) LOC L 58 1.6 5.26 .00001 -27 -60 -6 
          
Obj – Noise (LowVis) ---         
Obj – Noise (HighVis) VisCortex L 66 1.8 8.93 .05* -36 -87 12 
  R 60 1.3 7.78 .05* 45 -84 -6 
 dorsal VisC L 62 1.6 7.75 .05* -36 -54 42 
  R 63 1.6 7.77 .05* 3 -81 30 
 LOC L 67 2.0 8.42 .05* -36 -45 -6 
  R 71 2.5 8.39 .05* 33 -45 -24 
 
Note: * FWE corrected; LowVis = “low visibility” condition; HighVis = “high visibility” condition; LOC = 
lateral-occipital complex; VisCortex = visual cortex; Obj = images of pianos and chairs; Noise = phase-
randomised noise images; Voxel threshold = 5 voxels in all analysis; in the second part of the table, averaged 
decoding accuracies from two analyses (piano and noise images / chair and noise images) are reported. Coordi-
nates refer to the MNI coordinate system. 
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Correlation analysis of confusion matrices 
 
Using an additional approach, the detailed confusion matrix of classification results pro-
duced by the support vector machine classifier was correlated with the overall confusion 
matrices of the participants’ categorical choices. In other words, the analysis searched for 
regions in which the overall classifier performance (the errors of the classifier) and overall 
behavioural performance (the errors of the participants) showed a similar pattern, again 
separately for each visibility condition (for a similar approach see Walther et al., 2009). 
First, a confusion matrix was created for each condition, containing the percentage of how 
often the classifier predicted the chosen category to be piano, chair or noise with respect to 
the presentation of each category. Such a matrix was compiled for the classifier’s results of 
each searchlight cluster at each voxel position in the brain. The same was done for the 
participants’ behavioural choices with respect to the presented objects for the whole 
experiment, separately for both visibility conditions. For each searchlight cluster, the 
classifier’s and the participants’ confusion matrices were transformed into two-dimensional 
vectors and correlated. A Fisher’s Z-transformation was performed on the correlation 
coefficients. The Z-values were reconstructed into 3-dimensional brain maps for each 
participant. These were again normalised to the MNI EPI template and smoothed with a 
Gaussian kernel of 6 mm FWHM, allowing for group-level voxel-wise statistical analyses.  
This approach, however, only allowed a general correlation analysis between the 
classifier’s and participants’ performance across the entire experiment. Nevertheless, it was 
able to mirror the similarity of performance including the classification errors, which could 
systematically vary between presented object categories and is not reflected in the global 
decoding accuracy value. Regions displaying a high similarity between the pattern classi-
fier’s performance and the participants’ performance across all participants were located in 
bilateral visual cortex, the LOC and left orbito-frontal cortex when objects were highly 
visible (see Figure B-10b, green regions). Orbito-frontal cortex has been linked to object 
recognition before (Bar, 2004). For poorly visible objects, a high correlation could be found 
in the precuneus, located slightly dorsal to the precuneus cluster found for searchlight 
decoding. A second region was located on medial frontal gyrus (Figure B-10b, red regions). 




Figure B-10: Correlation analysis of confusion matrices. a) Illustration of the confusion matrix approach by 
means of one participant’s data (classifier data taken from arbitrary searchlight clusters in the LOC and the 
precuneus). The pattern classifier’s performance for each searchlight cluster was transformed into a confusion 
matrix, displaying the classification errors for the entire experiment. The same transformation was done with 
participants’ categorical choices relative to the presented object. For each participant, one confusion matrix was 
conducted for the high visibility condition (left side in green) and one for the low visibility condition (right side 
in red). Since participants’ choices closely matched the presented categories for highly visible objects, both 
matrices had to depict high values in their diagonal cells in order to be highly correlated (left side). Additionally, 
similarities in tendency to systematic classification errors also added to a high correlation between the matrices. 
For poorly visible objects high correlations depended on similarities in overall performance of classifier and 
participant, hence similar errors (right side). b) Results: High correlations could be found for highly visible 
objects in bilateral visual cortex (peak:  MNI [42 -81 3]; Z = .55; p < .000001, uncorrected), bilateral LOC (peak: 
MNI [33 -48 -18]; Z = .52; p < .000001, uncorrected) and left orbito-frontal cortex (peak: MNI [-15 24 -18]; Z = 
.25; p < .0001, uncorrected). For the low visibility condition, high correlations could be found in the precuneus 
(peak: MNI [-12 -42 57]; Z = .71; p < .05, FEW corrected) and right medial frontal gyrus (peak: MNI [33 36 42]; 







































































cortex [-15 24 -18]
Z = .25 *
bilateral LOC 
[33 -48 -18]
Z = .52 **
a) Confusion matrix correlation analyses
b) Results correlation analyses
* p < .0001 uncorrected
** p < .000001 uncorrected
*** p < .05 FWE corrected
bilateral visual cortex
[42 -81 3] 
Z = .55 **









Figure B-11: Individual 
searchlight patterns in 
LOC. The individual 
searchlight patterns are 
rendered onto the coronal 
slice containing the 
cluster from which 
decoding of participants’ 
category choices for 
highly visible objects 
was most robust. The 
displayed cluster belongs 
to the medial temporal 
cortex, extending to the 
LOC. Grey-matter voxels 
are colour-coded accor-
ding to the category 
choice that elicited the 
strongest BOLD response 
(blue = pianos; red = 
chairs; green = noise). 
Activation values are re-
scaled and transformed 
into colour values; strong 
saturation represents a 
stronger activation for a 
single decision. The 
patterns were stable 
within participants but 
unique for each partici-
pant. One participant was 
excluded from the 
analysis because the 
noise category was never 
















[-21 -51 6] 
for N = 13 subjects
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Figure B-12: Individual 
searchlight patterns in 
the precuneus. The 
individual searchlight 
patterns are rendered 
onto the coronal slice 
containing the cluster 
from which decoding of 
participants’ choices for 
poorly visible objects 
was most robust. The 
displayed cluster belongs 
to the precuneus. Grey-
matter voxels are colour-
coded according to the 
category choice that 
elicited the strongest 
BOLD response (blue = 
pianos; red = chairs; 
green = noise). Activa-
tion values are re-scaled 
and transformed into 
colour values; strong 
saturation represents a 
stronger activation for a 
single decision. The 
patterns were stable 
within participants but 
unique for each partici-
pant. One participant was 
excluded from the 
analysis because the 
noise category was never 
selected in one run. 
left precuneus searchlight
[-9 -63 30] 













  xxx 
Behavioural control experiment: Decision confidence and hit rates 
 
A behavioral control experiment was conducted outside the scanner with a different sample 
of 11 participants (6 female, mean age 27.0; range 18-31). All of them were right-handed, 
had normal or corrected to normal visual acuity, did not take part in any of the other ex-
periments and were paid 7 € for their participation. Participants performed three runs of the 
main experiment (see Methods) under similar viewing conditions (see pre-test I for setup 
and material). Participants additionally indicated their decision confidence on a five-point 
scale (1 = “no confidence” to 5 = “very confident”) after each trial. Responses were given 
via keyboard (buttons 1-3 for categories; buttons 1-5 for confidence rating). Visibility was 
strongly associated with decision confidence (for details see Figure B-13). 
 
  
Figure B-13: Decision confidence and visibility. Eleven different participants were presented with 3 runs of the 
main experiment outside the scanner. They additionally indicated their decision confidence (1 = “no confidence” 
to 5 = “very confident”) after each trial. The graph displays mean confidence ratings and hit rates with standard 
errors (SE). Confidence ratings mirrored hit rates with significantly higher decision confidence for highly visible 
objects compared to poorly visible objects for each category (two-tailed t-tests: pianos: t(10) = 9.51, p < .001; 
chairs: t(10) = 18.05, p < .001; noise: t (10) = 11.06, p < .001). The correlation (Pearson’s r) between hit rates 
and decision confidence was highly significant for each category (pianos: r = .89, p < .001; chairs: r = .90, p < 





























































Decoding results from conventional LOC ROIs  
 
 
Figure B-14: Decoding category choices from LOC based on localizer-defined ROIs. a) Decoding accuracies 
are averaged for the three pair-wise classification processes of the three categories (chance level always 50%) for 
n = 8 participants. Bars are standard errors (SE). Left LOC showed significant decoding accuracy [65%; t(7) = 
5.94; p < .001] and right LOC just missed the threshold, still displaying a high accuracy of 61% [t(7) = 2.10; p = 
.07] for the “high visibility” condition. For the “low visibility” condition, left LOC [52%; t(7) = 0.61; p = .56] as 
well as right LOC [56%; t(7) = 1.68; p = .13] did not encode the categorical choices. b) Detailed analyses of the 
single pair-wise classification processes: The analyses revealed that for the “high visibility” condition, above 
chance classification was possible from left LOC for chairs and noise at 65% [t(7) = 3.56; p < .01] and pianos 
and noise at 73% [t(7) = 4.92; p <.01] but barely for pianos and chairs [57%; t(7) = 1.37; p = .21]. The right LOC 
consistently showed lower values: 65% accuracy for pianos and noise [t(7) = 3.56; p < .01] and non-significant 
accuracies for chairs and noise [63%; t(7) = 1.77; p = .12] as well as pianos and chairs [56%; t(7) = 0.91; p = 
.39]. For the “low visibility” condition, neither the left LOC nor the right LOC was predictive above threshold 
for any category. In sum, the left LOC was especially predictive for participants’ choices of categories in the 
“high visibility” condition while LOC was not predictive for choices in the “low visibility” condition. The 
statistical power was reduced compared to the main analyses due to the smaller sample size. These findings, 



































a) Mean decoding all chosen categories 






























b) Decoding pairs of chosen categories in detail
*** ** **
** * p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001
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Figure B-15: Decoding presented categories from LOC based on localizer-defined ROIs. a) Decoding 
accuracies are averaged for the three pair-wise classification processes of the three categories (chance level 50%) 
for n = 9 participants. Bars are standard errors (SE). The statistical power was reduced compared to the main 
analyses due to the smaller sample size. Significant decoding accuracies above chance, however, were found for 
both the left LOC [69%; t(8) = 7.67; p < .001] and the right LOC [60%; t(8) = 3.42; p < .01] for the “high 
visibility” condition. For the “low visibility” condition, decoding accuracies for left LOC [50%; t(8) = .01; p = 
.99] and right LOC [54%; t(8) = 1.55; p = .16]) did not exceed chance level. Post hoc tests revealed that the 
difference in decoding accuracy between the “high visibility” and the “low visibility” condition was significant 
(p < .001) for the left LOC. b) For the “high visibility” condition, the single pair-wise analyses revealed that left 
LOC was always more informative than the right LOC, confirming the results from the searchlight decoding 
analysis. Separate t-tests revealed that above chance classification was possible from left LOC for chairs and 
noise at 74% [t(8) = 5.12; p < .001], pianos and noise at 74% accuracy [t(8) = 4.41; p < .01] as well as pianos 
and chairs at 60% [t(8) = 4.40; p < .01] for the “high visibility” condition. The right LOC consistently showed 
lower accuracies: 66% for chairs and noise [t(8)= 2.64; p < .05], 66% accuracy for pianos and noise [t(8)= 4.15; 
p < .01] and 50% for pianos and chairs, which did not reach statistical significance [t(8)= 0.01; p = .99]. For the 








































a) Mean decoding of all presented





































* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001
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Comparison of precuneus regions with Soon et al. (2008) 
 
 
Figure B-16: Comparison of precuneus regions. In red: Medial view of precuneus region that encoded 
perceptual choices made with insufficient visual input in the present study. Black line: Medial view of precuneus 
region that encoded free decisions in Soon et al. (2008). Data from the present study and from Soon et al. (2008) 
are both displayed using a threshold of p < .0001 (uncorrected) for better visualisation. The regions display 
substantial overlap but the cluster from Soon et al. (2008) extents more anterior to posterior cingulate cortex 







Behavioural pre-tests were conducted in order to assess the suitability of the experimental 
stimuli. First, they must create the illusion that hard-to-detect object stimuli were presented 
in all trials. Also, if participants experienced the two-fold scaling of visibility they would 
have given up on hard categorisation trials and only performed on easy categorisation trials. 
Second, the stimuli must not induce a systematic bias in participants’ choices towards any 
particular category. A sample of nine independent participants (5 female; mean age 24.8; 
range 20-30; right handed, normal or corrected to normal visual acuity; 7 Euros for partici-
pation) took part in the experiment outside the scanner. The setup was the same as for the 
pre-tests of the previous study (17'' TFT monitor, refresh rate of 60 Hz, resolution 1024 x 
768 pixel screen; presentation using the Cogent toolbox for MATLAB 7.0; estimated angle 
of vision  ~ 7.2° comparable to the fMRI experiment). The paradigm was the same as for 
the fMRI experiment (see Methods), using noise images for invisible categorisation (IV) 
and free decisions (FD). Participants consecutively performed two experimental blocks, 
which tested two variants of the paradigm (short: 66.7 ms target durations vs. long: 83.3 ms 
target duration for HV, while IV and FD were unchanged in both variations). The order of 
variants was randomised between participants. Participants were not informed about these 
differences. After performing each block, a self-conducted questionnaire was used to assess 
details about their impressions (Figure C-3). Finally, they were informed about the experi-
mental manipulation and asked if they noticed any missing object stimuli.  
Hit rates for the HV condition under both variants were comparably high. Partici-
pants were nearly equally well balanced in for the IV and the FD condition, close to 50% (p 
> .05 for all t-tests) (see Figure C-1). The shorter variant was perceived as harder by trend 
and was associated with slightly earlier decisions for the FD task (see Figure C-2). The 
illusion achieved by the noise stimuli was successful: participants made decisions for object 
categories in free decision trials and did not notice the missing objects. Given the slightly 
more challenging nature of the short duration variant and better comparability with the 
former study, the short duration variant was used for the fMRI study. 
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Figure C-1: Results of behavioural pre-test. a) Hit rates in the categorisation task for highly visible objects 
(HV). Displayed are the mean hit rates and standard errors for all participants (n = 9) using both variants of the 
paradigm (left side: “short”, 66.7 ms target duration and 433.3 ms post-mask duration; right side: “long”, 83.3 
ms target duration and 417.7 ms post-mask duration). Hit rates were 93.5% for pianos and 96.3% for chairs 
(short) and 95.4% for pianos and 98.6% for chairs (long), indicating that the “short” variant was slightly more 
challenging, however not significant. b) Choice ratios for invisible detection task (IV) and the free decision (FD) 
task for both variants of the paradigm. The variants did not differ in stimulation for these conditions. Participants 
were close to perfectly balanced on average (dotted line) in all conditions for both variants (short: 49% pianos 
and 51% chairs for IV task, 50% pianos and 50% chairs for FD task; long: 53% pianos and 47% chairs for IV 
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Figure C-2: Comparison of questionnaire results between paradigm variants. Given are the mean values for 
participants’ approval to the question on a five-point scale (from “1 = never” ranging to “5 = always”) after the 
pre-test. Questions 1-12 are sorted from left to right. The mean values for the questions are: question 1 (short: M 
= 3.7, SD = 0.5; long: M = 3.4, SD = 0.7), question 2 (short: M = 3.0, SD = 0.7; long: M = 3.4, SD = 0.7), 
question 3 (short: M = 3.6, SD = 1.7; long: M = 3.2, SD = 1.4), question 4 (short: M = 2.1, SD = 1.3; long: M = 
2.6, SD = 1.3), question 5 (short: M = 1.9, SD = 1.3; long: M = 2.1, SD = 1.3), question 6 (short: M = 4.1, SD = 
1.1; long: M = 4.1, SD = 0.8), question 7 (short: M = 1.3, SD = 0.7; long: M = 1.3, SD = 0.7), question 8 (short: 
M = 3.4, SD = 0.9; long: M = 3.1, SD = 1.5), question 9 (short: M = 1.4, SD = 0.5; long: M = 1.6, SD = 0.9), 
question 10 (short: M = 2.0, SD = 0.9; long: M = 1.8, SD = 1.1), question 11 (short: M = 2.2, SD = 0.8; long: M 





Figure C-3: Post-experimental questionnaire. The questionnaire was filled in after the pre-test and after the 
fMRI experiment.  
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Results questionnaire fMRI experiment 
 
 
Figure C-4: Results from post-experimental questionnaire for fMRI experiment. The questionnaire was the 
same as for the pre-test. It asked for participants’ rating on a five-point scale (“1 = never” to “5 = always”). 
Questions are sorted from left to right. The graphs show the distribution of participants’ responses in percent (n = 
15 = 100%). The categorisation/detection task was perceived as rather difficult (question 1: 3 = 33.3%; 4 = 
46.7%; 5 = 20%). Most participants thought that at least three levels of difficulty were used, confirming the 
successful illusion (question 2: 2 = 13.3%; 3 = 60%; 4 = 26.7%). Free decisions were made rather early in the 
trial (question 3: free decisions during cue presentation: 3 = 26.7%; 4 = 26.7%; 5 = 13.3%; question 4: free 
decisions during target presentation: 1 = 13.3%; 2 = 53.3%; 3 = 33.3%; question 5: free decisions during 
response mapping presentation: 1 = 60%; 2 = 33.3%; 3 = 6.7%). Free decisions were nearly always made for 
object categories instead of response buttons, as instructed (question 6: free decisions for object categories: 2 = 
6.7%; 4 = 26.7%; 5 = 66.7%; question 7: free decisions for buttons instead of categories: 1 = 73.3%; 2 = 26.7%). 
Participants did not pay much attention to the presented objects during free decision trials (question 8; 1 = 
13.3%; 2 = 46.7%; 3 = 26.7%; 4 = 13.3%) and did not believe they identified any presented objects (question 9: 
1 = 53.3%; 2 = 46.7%). The majority seldom believed that they identified a chair during free decisions (question 
10: 1 = 40%; 2 = 26.7%; 3 = 13.3%; 4 = 20%) or a piano (question 11: 1 = 40%; 2 = 46.7%; 3 = 13.3%). Instead, 
the majority indicated that they had not seen anything (question 12: 2 = 6.7%; 4 = 53.3%; 5 = 40%). 
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Choice ratios fMRI experiment 
 
 
Figure C-5: Individual choice ratios from fMRI experiment. Choice ratios for pianos (bright) and chairs 
(dark) for invisible categorisation (IV; no frame) and free decisions (FD; white frame). a) Ratios for all partici-
pants including all runs. One participant was extremely imbalanced (s5: > 80:20 for pianos-chairs in IV, dotted 
line) and was excluded completely. b) Ratios after excluding s5 (circle) and individual unacceptably imbalanced 
runs from six participants (boxes; 2 runs excluded for s4, s7; 1 run excluded for s3, s8, s12, s15). Runs were 
considered unacceptably imbalanced if the decision ratio was more extreme than 20:80 or 80:20 for one 











































b) Choice ratios after correction for extremely unbalanced runs
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Choice ratios and decoding accuracy 
 
After excluding imbalanced individual participants and single runs, there were still differ-
ences in decision ratios between participants (see Figure C-5). These differences are a 
logical consequence of the guessing and free decision task and speak for randomness in 
decisions rather than against it. There was no trend towards one choice option across 
participants. Nevertheless, stronger imbalance might have influenced the decoding accu-
racy. To control for this possibility, additional analyses were conducted. The 14 participants 
were divided into two groups with respect to their decision balance. The absolute difference 
in percentage of decisions (averaged across IV and FD) was taken as a balance indicator 
(BI): 
BI = ( | pianos(%) – chairs(%) | ) 
Groups (BIhigh mean = 26.19%; SD = 8.45; BIlow mean = 9.23; SD = 4.41) were divided by 
median split (BI = 10%). Two-tailed t-tests for independent samples were conducted to test 
whether these groups differed in decoding accuracies for i) average searchlight decoding 
results for the whole brain volume (pointing to general methodological problems caused by 
decision imbalance) or ii) decoding results for the best searchlight clusters in precuneus and 
MPFC (pointing to specific regional biases caused by decision imbalance).  
There were no significant differences in the overall decoding accuracies between the 
two groups, neither for the IV condition (BIhigh 51.7%, SD 2.45; BIlow 49.6%, SD = 2.71; 
t(6) = 1.41; p = 0.21) nor for the FD condition (BIhigh 51.2%, SD 2.24; BIlow 50.6%, SD = 
2.40; t(6) = 0.44; p = 0.68).  
There were also no significant differences in decoding accuracies for the specific 
searchlight clusters for guessing decisions in a) precuneus / PCC (MNI 24 -45 18; BIhigh 
60.5%, SD = 12.60; BIlow 57.6%, SD = 4.29; t(6) = 0.60; p = 0.57) and b) precuneus / PPC 
(MNI 30 -63 51; BIhigh 63.2%, SD = 10.37; BIlow 58.1%, SD = 10.15; t(6) = 1.29; p = 0.25). 
Again, no differences could be found for decoding accuracies for free decisions in MPFC 
(MNI 3 48 21; BIhigh 61.3%, SD = 9.21; BIlow 65.9%, SD = 8.15; t(6) = -1.06; p = 0.33). The 
same picture emerged when BIs were calculated for each condition (IV, FD) separately to 
compare BIhigh and BIlow groups (p > .05 for all comparisons). It can therefore be concluded 
that differences in decision ratios cannot explain the present findings.  
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Univariate fMRI data analysis 
 
Conventional univariate analyses were conducted on the fMRI data to investigate whether 
any areas showed differences in general activation when participants were presented with 
(or chose) pianos compared to chairs. Additionally, areas should be identified that differed 
in activation for the HV task, the IV task and the FD task. First, all data was motion cor-
rected to the first volume of the first run using SPM2. All volumes were then normalised to 
MNI space, re-sampled to a voxel size of 3 x 3 x 3 mm3 and smoothed with a Gaussian 
kernel of 8 mm FWHM. A GLM was used for statistical analyses on subject level. Model-
ling was the same as described for the multivariate analyses, resulting in separate regressors 
for piano and chair trials, individually for each experimental condition and each run. T-tests 
were used for random effects group statistics and again a statistical threshold of p < .0001 
(uncorrected) was applied. Contrasts between pianos and chairs were calculated for each 
condition. The three experimental conditions were contrasted across object categories. 
 For all experimental conditions, strong activation could be found in large parts of the 
brain when contrasted against baseline. The overall peak was consistently located in bilat-
eral visual cortex and LOC (see Table C-1). No region was found to show stronger activa-
tion related to the presentation (or choice) of pianos compared to chairs or vice versa in any 
condition. Contrasting FD trials with perceptual decision trials in general (HV as well as 
IV), a network of brain regions could be revealed that showed stronger activation for FD. 
This network included bilateral inferior parietal lobe, bilateral precuneus, bilateral ventro-
lateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC), bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and the 
left inferior temporal sulcus. These findings are in line with an earlier study using Positron 
Emission Tomography (PET) that revealed a similar network for self-initiated actions 
(Jenkins, et al., 2000). Contrasting HV with FD demonstrated stronger activation for HV in 
bilateral visual cortex and LOC as well as in the right orbito-frontal cortex (see Bar, 2004). 
No other contrast revealed any significant differences for any of the conditions (for all 
results see Table C-1). Interestingly, the information-encoding parietal regions were again 
not strongly activated during guessing but during free decisions. Given that object categori-
sation was reported to be challenging, it is unlikely that low task difficulty can explain these 
findings. It rather demonstrates again that guessing and free decisions differed in important 
aspects and cannot be regarded as being completely identical. 
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Table C-1: Table of activation contrasts for univariate analysis. 
Contrast Anatomical area cluster 
size § 
T p < x y z 
        
HV > IV -       
        
IV > HV -       
        
HV > FD R LOC 4 5.03 .00001 36 -39  -12 
 L LOC 7 4.43 .0001 -33 -39 -15 
 R orbito-frontal 8 4.7 .0001 24 36 -12 
        
FD > HV R DLPFC 
 
402 7.65 .05* 
 
33 36 45 
 L inf parietal lobe 
 
397 7.54 .05* -60 -48 33 
 R inf parietal lobe 
 
302 7.31 .05* 57 -60 39 
 bil precuneus 167 7.3 .05* 
 
15 -54 36 
 L DLPFC 191 7.07 .05* 
 
-36 24 45 
 L inf temp sulcus 140 6.82 .05* 
 
-60 -36 -6 
 L VLPFC 92 6.5 .05* 
 
-51 27 -6 
 R VLPFC 26 4.77 .0001 57 18 -6 
        
IV > FD -       
        
FD > IV L inf parietal lobe 366 7.32 .05* 
 
-57 -57 30 
 L VLPFC 35 6.25 .05* 
 
-51 27 -6 
 R inf parietal lobe 198 6.18 .05* 
 
57 -60 39 
 L DLPFC 95 6.01 .05* 
 
-33 27 48 
 L inf temp sulcus 62 5.83 .05* 
 
-60 -36 -9 
 bil precuneus 54 5.6 .05* 
 
12 -54 36 
 R DLPFC 42 5.19 .05* 
 
30 39 42 
        
overall peak        
 
       
HV > baseline bil vis cortex/LOC  22.44 .05* 
 
30 -93 3 
IV > baseline bil vis cortex/LOC  20.73 .05* 
 
-27 -96 3 
FD > baseline bil vis cortex/LOC  19.55 .05* 
 
-27 -96 3 
Note: HV = perceptual decision task with highly visible objects; IV = perceptual decision task without visible 
objects (invisible); FD = free decision task; L = left; R = right; inf temp sulcus = inferior temporal sulcus; LOC = 
lateral-occipital complex; DLPFC = dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; VLPFC = ventrolateral prefrontal cortex; bil 
vis cortex = bilateral visual cortex; * FWE (family-wise error) correction for multiple comparisons; § cluster size 
is always given for a statistical threshold of p < .0001 uncorrected. Coordinates are MNI coordinates. 
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Decoding motor responses and visual stimulation 
 
 
Figure C-6: Decoding of motor responses and true object categories. Displayed are the clusters showing the 
highest decoding accuracies for the respective analyses using a searchlight pattern classification approach with a 
radius of r = 4 voxels. All results are displayed using a threshold of p < .001 (uncorrected) for better visualisa-
tion. a) Button presses were performed using the index- and middle finger of the right hand. Motor responses 
could be decoded from left motor cortex (peak accuracy 58%; SE = 2.0; p < .0001 uncorrected; MNI [-45 -21 
57]) for all experimental conditions. The analysis confirmed that the participants’ categorical choices were made 
on a category level rather than being motor decisions (which would have been expected for non-adherent 
response behaviour). b) The peak decoding accuracy for true presented object categories (pianos and chairs) was 
located in the right visual cortex extending to LOC (also found in the left hemisphere when a more liberal 
statistical threshold was applied). The peak accuracy was 61% (SE = 1.8; p < .0001 uncorrected; MNI [33 -90 -
3]). These regions showed a great overlap with visual/LOC regions found to encode perceptual choices for 






a) Decoding the motor responses b) Decoding the presented images
peak decoding accuracy:  61.2 % (SE 1.81)
right visual cortex / LOC [33 -90 -3]
peak decoding accuracy:  58.3 % (SE 2.0)
left motor cortex [-45 -21 57]
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ROI analyses  
 
To investigate how similar the present posterior parietal regions were in terms of the quality 
of information encoding compared to the posterior parietal regions found in the previous 
study, ROI analyses were conducted. Only those voxels were sampled for the analysis of the 
present data that constituted the significant searchlight clusters in the previous study. In order 
to define the ROIs, an uncorrected threshold of p < .0001 (precuneus; decoding choices for 
poorly visible objects) and p < .05 FWE corrected (LOC; decoding choices for highly visible 
objects) was applied for the searchlight decoding group-analyses from the previous study. The 
left and right LOC ROIs were combined to a bilateral LOC ROI (238 voxels) in order to be 
comparable in size with the precuneus ROI (360 voxels). Since the ROIs had to be applied to 
normalised data (decoding was performed on individual non-normalised data but group 
analyses were performed on normalised accuracy maps), the ROIs were used to extract 
searchlight decoding results from normalised decoding accuracy maps of the present study. 
The decoding accuracies from each ROI were averaged and tested against chance level for 
each condition using ANOVA and t-tests. These averaged accuracies strongly underestimate 
the information encoded in the ROIs, but it can be used as an approximation for the compari-
son of searchlight decoding profiles from both studies. Note that any effects were expected to 
be small due to averaging values from a relatively high number of voxels in each ROI. These 
included mainly voxels that were not significant in the searchlight decoding analyses. 
The LOC ROI was found to be informative about choices in the HV condition [t(11) = 
2.66; p = .006], but the precuneus ROI was not [t(13) = 1.11; p = .14]. For the IV condition, 
the LOC ROI was not informative [t(11) = 0.92; p = .18] but the precuneus ROI was indeed 
weakly informative about decision outcomes, marginally missing the statistical threshold 
[t(13) = 1.35; p = .09]. As expected from the searchlight results of the present study, neither 
ROI encoded decision outcomes for free decisions [LOC ROI: t(11) = 0.92; p =.18; precuneus 
ROI: t(13) = 0.77; p = .22]. Nevertheless, cross-condition classification between FD and IV, 
incorporating both directions of cross-classification in an ANOVA, was significant for the 
precuneus ROI [F(1,12) = 4.01; p = .03] but not for the LOC ROI [F(1,12) = 0.74; p = .49]. In 
summary, these results yielded a similar profile of results for ROIs derived from the previous 
study compared to the whole-brain searchlight decoding results from the present study. 
Choices for poorly visible and truly invisible objects (and to some extend for free decisions) 
were similarly encoded in a rather wide-spread region in precuneus / PPC. 
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Abstract 
In a dynamically changing environment, we are constantly required to flexibly react to 
stimuli. It is therefore necessary to adapt behaviour to environmental cues, as well as to 
successfully perceive relevant stimuli. The present work addressed the question of which 
brain areas form the basis for task preparation and decisions along the processing chain 
from stimuli to responses. It combined functional magnetic resonance imaging with 
multivariate pattern classification to search for the encoding of specific contents of mental 
processes. The first study demonstrated, using a task switching paradigm, that task-sets 
were first encoded in left intraparietal sulcus, preceding left posterior ventrolateral 
prefrontal cortex. This finding emphasises the importance of parietal cortex in establishing 
abstract rules in a cued task context. In the second study, the visibility of response-relevant 
target objects was varied. It was found that the lateral-occipital complex (LOC) only 
encoded perceptual decisions about highly visible objects. The precuneus, on the other 
hand, encoded random guessing decisions made with insufficient visual input. Contradicting 
classical signal detection models, this finding emphasises the notion of two modes for 
perceptual decision making depending on stimulus visibility. The third study demonstrated 
a shared neural substrate for random guessing and free decisions in the precuneus, 
suggesting a general role for the generation of internal decisions. Additionally, anterior 
medial prefrontal cortex was exclusively engaged when decisions were intended to be made 
without an external frame of reference. In summary, the present work highlights the 
importance of parietal cortex in controlling both rule-guided and self-determined behavior 
in humans. Parietal cortex functions might be best described as related to multi-modal 
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